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II. ABSTRACT 
 
This work is submitted to the Doctoral School on Knowledge and Management at the 
Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy of the Copenhagen Business School in 
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD. The aim of this thesis is to present a 
combination of new theoretical perspectives and management guidelines that will enable better 
insight into the dynamics of the early phase of corporate venturing. This will include new 
perspectives on corporate venturing as it contributes to academia and practical tools for decision-
making.  
The thesis provides two overall contributions to current corporate venture literature. First, it 
sheds light on the critical but overlooked dimensions of the early phases of the venture process. 
This includes prerequisites for the development of new innovative venture opportunities (i.e. 
venture base), discovery of investment opportunities, and finally preparation for the evaluation 
of investment opportunities. The venture bases are those characteristics and prerequisites of a 
firm and its environment that can serve as resources for starting new ventures. Due to the 
innovative nature of the ventures, discovering the entrepreneurial opportunities becomes a key 
challenge involving a diversified set of actors. The early phases also include specific knowledge-
creating actions to prepare for evaluation of the many different investment opportunities. 
Secondly, the thesis contributes new perspectives on how the early phase activities are 
interlinked in the value chain. Contrary to previous literature, which sees the venture process as 
linear and foreseeable, this work illustrates that a more dynamic approach is called for, one that 
pays particular attention to how knowledge and learning guides activities in the venture process 
from developing new innovative ideas to evaluation of their significance.     
The contributions draw on theoretical perspectives from present corporate venture literature (e.g. 
Block and MacMillan, 1993; Burgelman, 1984, 1996; Chesbrough, 2000; Zahra, 1991) and 
complementary literature, representing a knowledge and network perspective (e.g. Gibbons et al. 
1994; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Powell et al., 1996). These perspectives are especially 
powerful in delivering arguments about innovation process and evolutionary development. They 
also bring new insight into the type of learning process that corporate ventures are a part of when 
they develop and evaluate new venture opportunities. 
Contrary to the traditional monographic PhD thesis, this one presents its results in five (5) 
independent but connected studies, published in international, peer-reviewed journals and book 
chapters. In addition to these studies, the thesis includes a theoretical introduction, a literature 
review, and a conclusion.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In response to competitive pressures from new innovations, many major firms use corporate 
venturing as their preferred business development strategy (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). The 
strategy provides them with a window to novel technologies (Winters and Murfin, 1988; 
Hardymon, DeNino and Salter, 1983). Corporate venturing is conventionally defined as a 
business operation that involves more uncertain income streams in the development of new 
projects than the firm’s base business (e.g. Burgelman, 1983, 1984; Chesbrough, 2000, 2002; 
Zahra, 1991). These revenues derive from established firms’ active investments and equity 
stakes in small and medium sized start-ups (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). There is also usually an 
entrepreneurial element in the corporate venturing strategy, which is especially apparent in 
processes for managing and capitalising on knowledge that resides on the boundary between the 
parent company and its environment (Keil, 2002; Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). This knowledge 
can in turn lead to high strategic and financial rewards for the corporate venture. 
This thesis is concerned primarily with the innovation dynamics in the early phase of the 
corporate venture process. Beginning with a detailed understanding of the problem addressed 
and the methodology used for facilitating the answers, the thesis proceeds to elaborate a 
theoretical and empirical account of the corporate venture strategy - including how the strategy is 
usually analyzed in the literature. This provides evidence for developing a new scientific 
understanding and a foundation for the studies that it presents.  
 
1.1 Problem assessment  
The corporate venture process includes everything from developing novel business ideas, 
making investments, to harvesting the results of a venture as it develops (Bygrave and Timmons, 
1992; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). 
The managing of innovation processes like these spans several linkages in the value chain, which 
means that there are numerous stages of the corporate venturing process that could conceivably 
qualify as an object of investigation (e.g. idea development, evaluation process, venture 
development, exit strategies etc). Some authors even claim that the entire corporate venture 
process needs to be analysed in order to bring down the failure rate of investments (Block, 1982; 
Burgelmann, 1983). This thesis will focus on the early phases where corporate venture develop 
new venture ideas, discover them and prepare for their selection. Complementary literature 
indicates that the process through which innovations and new venture firms develop is linear and 
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progressive, and that the corporate venture process should be analysed accordingly (Timmons 
and Bygrave, 1986; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). The linear innovation models begin with 
scientific discoveries, passing through industrial R&D, engineering, financing and 
manufacturing activities in order to end up with a product or service that is ready to meet 
markets.  
A growing body of literature however argues that new dynamic innovation models are called for 
(e.g. Kline, 1985; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Stokes 1997). These models focus on feedback 
loops and learning rather than linear progression. Complementing previous corporate venture 
literature, I propose an alternative perspective on the corporate venture process: a perspective 
that is more dynamic and interactive. It is often argued that the analysis of dynamics and 
interactivity in the innovation process is best approached from perspectives of knowledge 
creation and learning (Zhara, Nielsen, Borgner, 1999), networking (Bygrave, 1987; Powell et al., 
2002, 1996; Seufert et al., 1999) and entrepreneurship (Hornsby, Kuratko and Zahra, 2001). 
Such analyses explore and explain the management resources that can help the organization to 
shape new promising venture opportunities and evaluate their significance. Hence, this thesis 
strives to find answers to: from a knowledge, network and entrepreneurship perspectives how 
can corporate venture firms manage the early phases of the venture process?   
The early phase of the corporate venture process, which is the focus of the studies collected here, 
includes three interconnected activities: the development of innovative ventures, the discovery of 
venture opportunities and the preparation of a basis for the evaluation of these opportunities. 
What is particular about the early phases of the corporate venture process (besides its early 
location in the valuechain of innovation) is among others the locus risk and change, the role of 
individuals, information and competences, and value creation. Development of innovative 
ventures includes characteristics and prerequisites of a corporate venture firm and its 
environment that can serve as resources for starting new ventures. This thesis argues further that 
the discovery of new entrepreneurial investment opportunities is a key challenge for corporate 
venture firms involving a diversified set of actors in a network environment. In this environment, 
actors mix and match technologies and market capabilities in a continuing development process. 
This thesis also includes perspectives on how to improve a corporate venture’s selection 
capacity. Selection capacity is needed in order to prepare an evaluation process of the investment 
opportunities. This capacity is a function of the committed participation of the corporate venture 
firm in knowledge-creating networks.  
 
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 3  
1.1.1 Thesis structure 
The chapters in this thesis are structured according to the model below. 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Assessment
1.2 Methodology
1.3 Corporate Venturing - A business development strategy
1.4 The venture process
1.5 The market for corporate venture investments
1.6 Positioning: Early phase dynamics
REVIEW OF THE EARLY PHASES: A DYNAMIC PROCESS PERSPECTIVE
2.1 Knowledge creation for innovative ventures
2.2 Discovering the investment opportunity
2.3 Preparing for investment evaluation
THE STUDIES
3.1 Study I - Munk and Vintergaard (2004)
3.2 Study II - Jørgensen and Vintergaard (2006)
3.3 Study III - Husted and Vintergaard (2004)
3.4 Study IV - Vintergaard (2005)
3.5 Study V - Vintergaard and Husted (Submitted)
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
4.1 A new dynamic model  
Figure 1. Thesis flow 
In the introduction, the methodological reflections of how to analyse the problems are defined. 
This chapter is followed by an analysis of the corporate venture strategy and a further 
understanding of the focus and positioning of this thesis. The first chapter is followed by two 
core chapters: a literature review and copies of the five (5) studies included in this thesis (please 
see the list of complementary studies in the exhibits). The literature review in chapter 2 provides 
a broader and more elaborate understanding of the academic foundation of this research than 
were published in the studies themselves. The review does not intent to analyses the subject, but 
provided a foundation for the studies. Together, the review and the studies in chapter 3 facilitate 
a general discussion in chapter 4 that summarizes the work that has been done, draws some 
further conclusions on the early stage of the venture process and provides new dynamic 
dimensions to the corporate venture model. These overall contributions are presented in a 
comprehensive and conceptual framework.  
 
1.2 Methodology 
This section provides an overall analysis of the methodology used for answering the questions 
stated in this thesis. Special attention is given to perspectives from grounded theory (e.g., Glasser 
and Strauss, 1967) and to the research process, which builds on Mode 2 knowledge production 
processes (Gibbons et al., 1994). Both of these perspectives are valuable for analyzing a new and 
developing area as the one addressed in this thesis. This thesis consists of individual studies 
which also include separate methodology sections (see chapter 3 for their detailed 
methodologies).  
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1.2.1 Grounded theory 
Innovation theory indicates that new dynamic models are called for (Kline and Rosenberg, 
1986).  There is however limited academic attention yet as to what the models would look like in 
the early phases of corporate venturing, as such an open-ended problem area. This process calls 
for an interpretative and explorative methodology which is receptive to various outcomes. A 
further complicating methodological matter is the multiple complexions of actors and sources 
which are involved in the innovative process (Powell et al., 1996). Seufert et al. (1999) argues 
that innovation processes needs competencies from many different stakeholders. These actors 
and sources need to be included in a collective and coherent methodological framework, which 
can absorb a large diversity in the substantive data. Furthermore, the academic field of corporate 
venturing spans several more established traditions such as entrepreneurship, innovation, risk-
management, and corporate finance.  
The open-endedness and diversification of actors and academic traditions in analyzing the 
dynamics in the early corporate venture phases, limited the methodological choice away from 
testing predefined hypotheses or measuring the scope of their significance. This is particularly 
due to the emergent nature of this study. A more appropriate methodology should, on the one 
hand, be open to emergent patterns from the widely dispersed sources, and on the other hand, 
systematically derive at specific sets of concepts, hypotheses and elements of theory. The final 
product should consist of new provisional theoretical perspectives and hypotheses about the 
dynamics in the early phases of the corporate venture process.  
In the late sixties Glasser and Strauss developed a general methodology framework which could 
include the above conditions - the grounded theory approach (e.g., Glasser and Strauss, 1967; 
Glasser, 1978; Martin and Turner, 1986; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). It is often argued that the 
ethnographic approach of grounded theory is ideal, when the theory of the subject remains 
weakly developed (Glasser and Strauss, 1967). The methodology has later found its broad use in 
studies of e.g. cancer care (Mason and Strauss, 2004), recovery during transition to motherhood 
(Brudenell, 1997), development of strategic ideas (Schwarz and Nandhakumar, 2002) etc. 
Common to the grounded theory approach is that it stresses theoretical discovery rather than 
theoretical testing. This guides the collection and analysis of generated audience accounts 
(DeLorme and Reid, 1999). Grounded theory studies are based on the perception that the 
processes and products of research are shaped from the data rather than from preconceived 
theoretical frameworks (Glasser, 1992). With only limited coverage in current corporate 
venturing literature on the dynamic activities in the early phases, data needed to be generated 
from the ground up (Clardy, 1997; Perlow, 1998). A methodology such as grounded theory 
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functions particularly well for including the open-endedness of the research problem and the 
diversification in the data.  
 
1.2.2 Implementation of grounded theory 
The methodology of this thesis is built on the below grounded theory model (Fernández, 2004; 
Glasser, 1998). 
Substantive Data
Archival data 
Collection
Interviews/ 
Conversation
Literature 
Review
Provisional Theory and 
Hypotheses
Set of concepts
Grounded Theory 
Logic
• Interaction
•Coding
•Recording
•Sorting
Case Studies
Deduction
Induction
Verify, 
Modify, 
Reject
Studies
-Peer review 
articles
-Book chapters
Induction
InductionInduction
 
Figure 2. Grounded theory model 
As illustrated in the above model, the grounded theory process in this thesis includes: 1) a phase 
of initial open-ended substantive data gathering, 2) a period for developing a set of concepts 
using the grounded theory logic and 3) a time for the revision of provisional theory and 
hypotheses as the data is interpreted. This process has been used for both the individual studies 
and for the overall arguments in the thesis. The grounded theory procedure is designed to 
generate conceptual frameworks directly from the emerging data (from e.g. interviews, archival 
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data and literature review). Instead of using the data to test a theoretical point it is used to build 
it.   
For this procedure, the researcher uses sources that seek out maximum differences among the 
subjects being studied. Numerous in depth interviews with venture managers are used to extract 
raw accounts of the subjects' experiences. These experiences have been supplemented with 
archival data from yearly reports, public media etc. Extending the substantive data, a literature 
review (see chapter 2) provides the common conceptualization from earlier academic 
perceptions. This thesis use grounded theory in a less pure form than how it is sometimes 
applied. Such previous interpretations believe that no prior knowledge should be included in the 
analysis. The method used here is consistent with Glasser and Strauss' (1967) approach; 
however, it deploys comparative analysis to generate theory and therefore:  
"… puts a high emphasis on theory as process; that is, theory as an ever-
developing entity, not as a perfect product" (p. 32) 
Consistent with this view, data collection, coding and analysis are overlapping operations that: 
"…should blur and intertwine continually, from the beginning of an 
investigation to its end" (p. 43)  
Through a grounded theory process that involved mainly qualitative interviews, consideration of 
newness led to the exploration of alternative conceptions and construction of corporate venturing 
and especially the early phases of the process.  
 
Data collection and analysis was carried out simultaneously throughout the process as prescribed 
by grounded theory (Glasser, 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The substantive data accounts 
were written, analyzed and coded – and later condensed into the individual studies of this thesis 
and empirical case studies. The process of analysis included taking interview notes, transcribing, 
coding while asking questions and making constant comparisons between instances in the data 
across different players in the market and between methods (Glasser 1978). When working 
inductively from substantive accounts, certain sets of concepts begins to form. Following a 
carefully controlled process of analyzing the emerging categories and comparisons between the 
case accounts, the categories are defined using logic from grounded theory. This process draws 
on returning patterns found in similar cases and tested through contrasts with cases in other 
categories (Clardy, 1997).  
The iterative comparison process between different interview statements and diverging academic 
reasoning developed into new provisional theory and hypotheses. Consistent with the conditions 
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in the grounded theory, writing this thesis developed through virtuous induction and deduction 
circles (Fernández, 2004) where:  
“…[d]eductions for theoretical sampling fosters better sources of data, 
therefore better grounded inductions” (Glasser, 1998: 43)  
More precisely, the traditional linear process for corporate venture strategies was questioned and 
new perspectives were developed, which again lead to need for new data. Working with a 
grounded method approach, often fall short in delivering finished theories for testing. Therefore, 
this thesis also focuses on deriving at provisional theories and hypotheses as they are presented 
in the studies and the concluding chapter. An additional complicating matter of the grounded 
theory approach is the time limitation to derive and deliver robust results (like within the period 
of a PhD program).     
Summing up, the illustration in the table below demonstrates a research process involving a 
broad review of the literature (both within and outside the concept of corporate venturing) and 
multiple qualitative data collections to develop a grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). A 
better understanding of the research questions is presented tested and exemplified in qualitative 
studies and is given a theoretical foundation. The table illustrates the empirical and theoretical 
foundation for developing new provisional theory and hypotheses for each of the studies of this 
thesis. 
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Studies Research question Substantive data – 
interviews and 
archival data 
Literature review Provisional theory 
and hypotheses 
Study I 
Munk and Vintergaard, 
(2004) 
What is the unique role 
of venture capitalists in 
facilitating innovation? 
25 in-depth semi-
structured interviews 
conducted in fifteen (15) 
venture capital 
organizations. The 
organizations were 
selected according to 
their industry focus with 
the intention to cover as 
many different sectors as 
possible. 
• National System of 
innovation 
• Venture capital 
management 
• Science and technology 
studies 
• Network literature 
Two-dimensional 
conceptual framework 
which locates and 
analyze the role of 
venture capitalists in the 
national innovation 
system.  
Study II 
Jørgensen and 
Vintergaard (2006) 
What are the relations 
between a company’s 
network strategy and its 
corporate strategy? 
Three (3) case studies 
from the Danish biotech 
industry exemplify and 
illustrate how a 
company’s corporate 
strategy is directly 
correlated to how it 
manages its strategic 
network identity. 
• Network literature 
• Strategic management 
A framework illustrating 
the relation between 
strategies and network 
structures. 
Study III 
Husted and Vintergaard 
(2004) 
How can corporate 
venture firms secure the 
development of 
innovative ideas by 
systematically working 
with the organization’s 
venture base? 
The article is mainly 
conceptual in nature but 
draws on twenty-two 
(22) semi-structured 
interviews conducted 
between 2000 and 2002 
with managers of 
corporate venturing 
departments at six (6) 
multinational Danish 
firms in knowledge-
intensive industries. The 
interviews are used to 
illustrate the main 
arguments of the paper. 
• Corporate venturing 
• Science and technology 
studies 
• Network literature 
 
The results are presented 
in propositions for 
venture managers. The 
propositions provide a 
framework for 
development of more 
venture ideas.  
Study IV 
Vintergaard (2005) 
How do corporate 
ventures recognize and 
discover new investment 
opportunities? 
This paper reports on the 
development path of 
several entrepreneurial 
opportunities of the 
Danish corporate venture 
capitalist, Danfoss A/S. 
The lead case has been 
followed over a five-year 
period providing the case 
with longitudinal 
characteristics. More 
then 100 hours of in-
depth interviews with 
top-level venture 
management provide the 
basis for the analysis.  
• Corporate venturing 
• Entrepreneurship 
• Network literature 
 
A conceptual (two-
dimensional) framework 
which maps the 
development paths of 
entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  
Study V 
Vintergaard and Husted 
(Submitted) 
How can corporate 
venture firms prepare for 
evaluating science based 
ventures? 
The present study was 
conducted as a focus 
group exercise with 
twenty-nine (29) senior 
venture capitalists. The 
group was meeting for a 
one-day discussion on 
evaluation issues, to 
which the participants 
had been invited or 
volunteered. 
• Corporate venturing 
• Science and technology 
studies 
• Network literature 
 
Management guidelines 
and conceptual 
frameworks for 
evaluation of science 
based ventures. 
Table 1. Theoretical and empirical overview for the thesis. 
Grounded theory continues through various modifications and re-formulations as new data and 
concepts are integrated (Charmaz, 1983; Glasser, 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The inductive 
and deductive process from the grounded theory logic has coursed one study to be lead to the 
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next. As my understanding of one part of the early corporate venture phases started to take form, 
it simultaneously stimulated new ideas and raised new unsolved academic and managerial 
problems. As an example, the results in Study III (Husted and Vintergard, 2004) about the 
venture base also lead to the arguments in Study V (Vintergaard and Husted, Submitted) about 
venture evaluation. It was acknowledged that the knowledge needed for developing new 
innovations was in many respects similar to that needed for evaluation of science based venture 
opportunities.  
While the grounded theory approach functioned particularly well for deriving at provisional 
theories and hypotheses when faced with open-ended problems in widely dispersed data samples 
it also suffers from several shortcomings. It has been argued that different from many 
quantitative methods grounded theory does not intent to prove and measure the significance of 
relations. Hence, the methodological approach does not provide information on how general the 
findings are either. On the other hand grounded theory processes led to provisional theory and 
hypotheses which indicates connections and relations between categories.   
The deductive processes results in a need for new or complementary substantive data for each of 
the studies. Such an approach is very resource demanding, and requires a receptive 
methodological approach. Working with a grounded theory approach necessitates that the 
researcher repeatedly is on a lookout for new empirical data and has the energy and resources to 
include them in the analysis. As an example, different from the other studies in this thesis, Study 
IV (Vintergaard, 2005) required an in-depth case study to discover how entrepreneurial 
opportunities develop over time. Other studies of this thesis required a broader empirical base to 
build an argument e.g. Study I (Munk and Vintergaard, 2004) interviewed more than twenty five 
(25) venture investors to illustrate their role in the innovation system.  
While grounded theory requires a very receptive approach to data collection and analysis, it also 
calls for an outreaching researcher. In a similar vain it is argued that one of the largest challenges 
for developing robust theoretical and academic arguments depends on the researcher’s capacity 
to engage in knowledge-creating networks. In order to capture the necessary breath in the data, 
such network needs to include many different environments. The use of networks is further 
necessitated to complement the grounded theory framework.  
 
1.2.3 Working as a Mode 2 researcher  
Working with a grounded theory approach cannot happen from within an academic “ivory 
tower”. The researcher needs a framework that allows for an outgoing methodology where data 
is collected from many different sources. To accommodate for such research approaches, 
Nowotny et al. (2001) pointed to the relation between knowledge production and applied context 
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in their book, Re-thinking science - Knowledge and the public in an age of uncertainty. They 
argue that applying scientific knowledge in non-scientific contexts can be solved by an 
institutional shift of knowledge production into applied contexts. Up until now, scientific 
knowledge has been expected to produce “reliable knowledge”, which was to be communicated 
to society in a de-contextualized form. The work of Nowotny et al., (2001) however, indicated 
that successful transfer of knowledge is tied to the transfer of the context of knowledge 
production as well.  
During his work, Gibbons et al. (1994) developed a new model for knowledge production in 
science, which they called Mode 2 (as opposed to Mode 1). This model sees changes in the 
practice of the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities. In Mode 2, knowledge is 
carried out in a context of application: it is characterized by transdisciplinary and heterogeneity 
and is more plentiful and temporary:  
”Mode 2 is more socially accountable and reflexive. It includes a wider, 
more temporary and heterogeneous set of practitioners, collaborating on 
a problem defined in a specific and localized context” (Gibbons et al., 
1994: 3)  
By contrast, Mode 1 is organized homogeneously and tends to preserve its messages. Mode 1 is 
most frequently identical with what is commonly meant by science. Differently, Mode 2 
knowledge production process has the following three characteristics: 
• The first is the crucial importance of context. “Context” does only not confirm that more 
consideration must be paid to the end-uses of scientific results, nor even in the sense that 
“context” helps to identify scientific problems and to select suitable methodologies. What is 
at stake here is rather the more underlying sense that, as a result of its contextualization, 
reliable knowledge is being progressively redefined – or superseded by – knowledge that is 
socially robust. (Nowotny et. al. 2001) 
• The second characteristic is the creation of research communities. Not only have information 
technologies advanced time and place for communication to take place and enabled research 
collaboration to flourish on a global scale, but these new communities have become able to 
include socially distributed “researchers”.  
• The third element is that conventional collegial accepted terms of discipline, research 
community and peer groups are being exchanged by the outline of an agora in which new 
knowledge is created as a result of the negotiation and of scientific, market, political and 
cultural perspectives.  
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In short, we are seeing a shift from Mode 1 science, which is bound to expertise, discipline and 
its own self-preferentiality, towards Mode 2 knowledge production which is to a greater extent 
based on social acceptance of many different sources (Nowotny et al., 2001; Gibbons et al. 
1994).  
This approach is consistent with the grounded theory approach and has been an important 
guideline for my research process. Emphasis is on collecting diverse data samples which can 
assist in creating a new understanding of the early stages of venture process. Like much late 
modern problem-solving, my knowledge production is characterized by inter-disciplinary 
collaboration in contexts of application resulting in a knowledge production hybrid (see Gibbons 
et al., 1994). Cooperative procedures involving other scientists, stakeholders and other users of 
knowledge were included to transform knowledge claims into trustworthy, socially-robust and 
applicable knowledge, suited to the realities of social and environmental change and in the 
transition to sustainable venture networks (Nowotny et al., 2001).  
Following the guidance of Gibbons, Nowotny and their co-authors; I designed my research 
strategy with a similar research goal in mind: to create knowledge and research results that were 
socially robust. By following an open-ended (grounded), but still planed methodological 
approach, assisted my knowledge production. I kept to the directions of a Mode 2 researcher as 
such an approach together with grounded theory would assist the development of new 
provisional theory and hypothesis which are more widely accepted. I engaged in several 
activities to contextualize my knowledge and meet the criteria of a Mode 2 researcher. It is 
necessary to be included in both scientific and nonscientific communities to make this happen. 
As illustrations of the communities (i.e. agoras) for non-academic contextualization, please 
consider the following non-scientific contexts in which I collected data and tested my tentative 
theoretical constructs: 
• I have been appointed chairman of the educational committee of the Danish Venture Capital 
and Private Equity Association. In this forum I have tested my ideas of how venture 
capitalists can engage with the scientific community to develop and test new innovative 
ideas. 
• My opinions of the early phases of the venture process and entrepreneurship issues, in 
general, have been cited in more than forty (40) newspaper articles and other public media, 
from which mutual discussions with different actors in the public have sprung.  
• I have been appointed chairman of the board and judge for the Danish Venture Cup and 
member of the board of EVU (Centre for Business Start-Up, Growth and Development). 
These partnerships has increased my knowledge of how science based ventures develop from 
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ideas to business concepts. The position has also resulted in a general extension of my 
network in the venture community.  
• I hold memberships in committees hosted by organizations such as: Connect Denmark (e.g. 
tech-trans committee) and DVCA (analytical committee). These memberships and networks 
have given various new perspectives on what venture capitalists look for in science based 
ventures. The networks have also provided insight to the daily work processes of venture 
investors. 
• I have given speeches at numerous non-academic conferences including a wide range of 
stakeholders such as e.g. daily newspapers, incubators, entrepreneurship interest groups etc. 
These connections have provided a broader basis for testing and developing my provisional 
ideas and theories.      
• Several businesses have requested speeches about my tentative results. These occasions have 
provided a possibility of getting a first hand impression on the robustness of my finding as I 
engaged through discussions of the findings.   
 
While non-scientific communities are fruitful for analyzing managerial implications and 
applicability, they often fall short in developing specific arguments into theoretical constructs. 
Working as a Mode 2 researcher also demands that I learn from interaction with my academic 
peers. I therefore also involve myself with several scientific communities that have added to my 
understanding of the field and provided a different setting for testing and developing my 
knowledge: 
• Visiting Scholar at: Babson College - Arthur M. Blank Center for Entrepreneurship (USA, 
MA). As one of the leading universities in entrepreneurship Babson´s research capacities 
were a great resource for discussion of my arguments. 
• Reviewer for the: e.g. European Academy of Management (EURAM), Eastern Academy of 
Management, The Decision Sciences Institute's 2004 Annual Meeting, Academy of 
Management Conference. By reviewing my peer’s work it also helped my own 
understanding of how to create sound scientific arguments. This skill later helped me in 
crafting my own peer review articles. 
• Feedback from conference presentations at e.g. Academy of Management Conference (2004, 
2005), RENT conference (2004, 2005), Triple Helix conference (2003, 2005), EAM-I 
Conference (2005).  
• Acceptance of peer review work: See the individual studies of this thesis in chapter 3 and the 
list of complementary studies in the exhibits.  
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• In the management team of the following international research projects: DOMINO 
(Dynamic Organizational Management for Inter-firm Network Orchestrations), The SNS 
Economic Policy Group (SNS Konjunkturråd/ SNS Ekonomiråd), CEMS faculty group: ICE 
(Innovation, Creativity and Entrepreneurship). These engagements have introduced me to a 
broad range of international researchers, with multiple perspectives on my research.  
• Co-organizer of numerous national and international conferences; including member of the 
Scientific Committee for the 5th Triple Helix Conference. These relations have provided a 
forum for intensive academic discussion and networking.  
• Development of and teaching for the MSc´s: 1) E67 Corporate Venturing and Venture 
Capital Management. 2) E31 Intrapreneurship and Innovation - A Practical Approach. 
• Guest lecturer for several BSc, MSc and MBA courses about corporate venturing. 
 
From my academic collaboration I gained awareness of how to construct theoretical arguments 
and present my work in a conceptual way. Interaction with my peers also lead to a better 
understanding of my contribution to the field and how I am positioned in relation to the work of 
other fellow academics. As a result several of my studies have already been accepted and 
published in peer-review publications.    
As a Mode 2 researcher, it has not been the aim to discover the universal “truth” but to develop a 
provisional understanding of the early phases of a corporate venture strategy. While, this thesis, 
on one hand, provides work accepted by my academic peers (e.g. international journal 
publications) it also strives to add value to the business community. In combining the inputs 
from the above communities I have a better chance of providing work which meets the quality 
criteria of the scientific community but also has managerial relevance.  
This thesis strives to develop a starting point for understanding the non-linear process in the 
early phases of corporate venturing. However further research in this area is highly called for and 
must also include perspectives beyond those presented in this thesis. 
  
1.3 Corporate Venturing - A business development strategy 
In the following section, the reader will be introduced to the concept of corporate venturing 
including some of the primary drivers behind its use as a business development strategy. 
 
Increasing demand for continuous development of new innovative products and services, has 
caused many firms to use corporate venturing as their business development strategy (e.g. Block 
and MacMillan, 1993; Burgelman, 1983, 1984, 1986; Chesbrough, 2000, 2002; Zahra, 1991). 
The concept of corporate venturing was introduced as a business development strategy in the 
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1960s (Hannan, 1976). Since then, many firms have followed. The strategy is especially 
powerful when large firms have to react quickly to rapid technological development where the 
ability to explore and exploit new knowledge is the key (Grant, 2000). To be successful in 
capturing and appreciating the value of new knowledge calls for highly receptive organisations – 
a capacity the corporate venture strategy includes. Much of the knowledge needed for new 
innovations is difficult to discover and assess as its value will first be proven when it materialises 
as new products and services. The time-lag before this happens can be lengthy and even then the 
outcome is rarely certain. Combined with the dispersed nature of the knowledge needed this 
makes it difficult to explicate (Grant, 2000).  
Managing such knowledge flows is often difficult for established firms due to cultural inertia, 
organisational resistance and risk adverseness (Ansoff, 1965; Markides, 1998). It is often so, that 
the more established an organisation gets, the more its employees and management tend to 
develop a paradigm of the way work should be done. This resistance can build on the daily 
operations of the firm, which focus on incremental innovation and optimized processes. When an 
environment shifts in a discontinuous way, the response of highly inertial systems is often 
increased conformity, commitment to the status quo, and decreased vigilance in problem-solving 
(Burgelman et al., 1996; Tushman, 1997). Due to a more established perception of what 
knowledge is of value for future R&D development, it is often argued that cumbersome firms 
have problems innovating (Block and McMillan, 1993). The same resistance can potentially also 
blind them from the knowledge which could make them appreciate and evaluate new products 
and services (Burgelman, 1996). Likewise, the path dependency of the established corporation 
means that existing capabilities and resources can become liabilities rather than capabilities, 
especially when a firm faces new markets or disruptive technologies (Chesbrough, 2002; Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990). 
Differently, while new venture firms lack a variety of resources they can in principle more easily 
adapt to environmental changes and can therefore better manage dispersed knowledge (Mønsted, 
2003). It is argued that small firms, which operate near the core of their own strategic 
development, are better at exploring and exploiting new knowledge (Block and MacMillan, 
1993). Because new ventures do not have cumbersome bureaucracies or large product-markets to 
protect, they often react faster than large incumbents (Burgelman, 1983; Henderson and Clark, 
1990; Schumpeter, 1934; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). This speed and flexibility course new 
venture firms to suffer neither from cumbersome structures, which hamper creativity, nor from 
narrow perspectives on acceptable research outcomes. These points neutralize some of the 
competitive advantage that existing companies used to have over start-ups that directly 
challenged their position – enough resources to simply overpower the small firm. 
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Flexibility and innovativeness is most often the strength of new venture firms, but they do not 
have the advantage of large resource pools. To succeed in developing new firms, new and radical 
innovations are not always enough (Bygrave and Zacharakis, 2004); capital, marketing, 
management and other resources are also needed for firm development. Corporate venturing is a 
strategy that encompasses the best of both worlds: the flexibility and innovativeness of small 
firms and the resource pools of large organisations. The way to accompany these differences is 
for corporate ventures to invest either in new venture firms from outside the corporation or in 
units formerly part of the corporation. Dougherty (1995) argues that corporate venturing is a 
good strategy for new ventures and the corporation to exchange resources and competencies. 
Thereby, access to knowledge and innovation is acquired by larger firms who can supply the 
resources of a large firm. This relationship builds on knowledge and resource exchange, but also 
specific structures which facilitate the process.  
The structure in a corporate venture is commonly established between conglomerate corporations 
and small venture start-ups. It is usually found in closely related industries, and with 
complementary technologies (Maula and Murray, 2000). The large company may be able to 
facilitate elements such as management or marketing skills and financial assets, which the small 
company would not otherwise have access to. The small company may be involved in research 
and development within a specialized field in which the large company has an interest, but in 
which it is not ready to participate in directly.  
 
1.3.1 Managing knowledge in corporate venturing 
Large firms can use many different strategies for managing new knowledge for novel 
innovations; however, corporate venturing differs from traditional business strategies by 
facilitating growth through acquisition (Albrinck et. al., 2000; McGrath and MacMillan, 2000). 
Specific to this process is that it includes most links in the value chain, from developing 
knowledge for innovations to harvesting the results of profitable start-ups.  
Some literature argues that in search for new venture opportunities, corporate venturing can be 
valuable in exploring new and unrelated areas of business, experimenting with new capabilities 
and exploring new markets (Chesbrough, 2002). Adventures into new industries can also provide 
valuable foresight about market opportunities and act as a window to new technologies and 
developments. Such foresight can be used to decide on acquisition targets and new areas for 
development (Powell et al., 1996.). The ventures are often used to scout for potential ideas and 
projects from the widest possible range of sources (Schuyt et al., 2000). Thus, the new venture 
opportunities can be used to test new products and markets, which the parent business is 
considering, thereby providing an early forecast about opportunities that arise along with their 
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possible difficulties. Another purpose is to develop back-up technologies that differ from a 
firm’s current technological trajectory (Chesbrough, 2002; Ginsberg, 2001).  
Corporate venture departments are set up within the framework of an established company, i.e., 
corporations buy up or take shares in start-ups or initiate an internal development process where 
projects can be situated. This separation from the parent company provides the autonomy needed 
to successfully develop ideas that are at the periphery and that are radically different from the 
dominant logics of the organization. In these structures new knowledge is given the 
independence and support to blossom into a new innovative venture because it is not limited by 
or dependent on a history. Internalizing (by means of acquisition) the venture into the existing 
corporation makes a dedicated part of the organization, which ensures a good balance between 
autonomy and control. These dedicated structures also provide the necessary flexibility for the 
ventures to grow (Block and MacMillan, 1993). The research of Siegel, Siegel and MacMillan 
(1988) also discovered that autonomy (link to the parent organisation) should not only be created 
between the venture and the corporate venture entity, but also between the parent company and 
its venture entity. In their study, this type of organizational structure provides a substantial 
organizational independence in the development of innovations.  
 
1.3.2 Venturing is a risky business  
The corporate venture investments are typically more risky and subject to less strict management 
of internal costs than typical research and development activities (Block and MacMillan, 1993). 
Different from other development activities, science based ventures carries more risk due to: the 
novelty of the underlying knowledge and technology is difficult to asses, the development path 
of venture opportunities are difficult to predict, and it has a longer process of development. 
The knowledge needed for evaluating new venture opportunities is often lacking. Since the new 
ventures are based on novel products and services, venture mangers only have a vague reference 
point for their evaluation. They do not know the market potential or whether the product meets 
expectations. Corporate venture capitalists typically try to spread their risk on different ventures. 
A major task of corporate venture capitalists is therefore to ensure a high intensity pipeline of 
new ventures from which they can make their investment decision. The pipeline describes the 
flow of new venture firms in different stages of maturity. This pipeline is (as it will show in the 
later section) often analysed from a process perspective. From this pipeline it is expected that 
only a very few highly rewarding investments will make up for the many loses.  
In the early stages, measures tend to focus on reaching certain milestones. Therefore, funding is 
often provided based on these well-defined achievements, sometimes through outside investors 
to provide the new venture objective with external validation. Later in this thesis a more 
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thorough review will be made of the different management mechanisms for evaluating new 
ventures.    
As a further risk adding factor, new venture opportunities can develop in many different 
directions (Roberts, 1988). The underlying knowledge often derives from scientific results and 
their uses are often multiple. Hence venture opportunities often change market focus, customer 
segments and suppliers many times in the process. Adding to the uncertain development path, 
the development process is also often longer than for traditional business development (Albrinck 
et. al., 2000).  
 
1.3.3 Strategic and financial results 
Venture capital investors can be organised in many different ways (banks, pension funds, 
business angels, fund of funds etc.), but they typically all seek high financial gains (Michalski, 
2003). Competition is played out as to whom can pick out the few promising venture 
opportunities and develop them into highly rewarding business. The aim in corporate venturing 
is different, as the returns from the venture activity are both financial and strategic. The strategic 
advantages of the relationship are more diverse but equally important (Albrinck et al., 2000; 
Block and MacMillan, 1993; Schuyt et al., 2000). According to Chesbrough (2002) strategic 
return in the context of corporate venturing is characterized by having an aim of “increasing the 
sales and profits of the corporation’s own business” - which may or may not be associated with 
a financial return from the venture itself. The broad scope of this description sheds light on how 
corporate venturing may supply a wide range of different strategic benefits for the parent 
corporation. Reviewing the literature on corporate venturing reveals some of these strategic 
returns:  
1. Rethink the corporate strategy: Corporate organizations who decide to engage in corporate 
venturing are often responding to an urgent pressure from the surrounding market. A market 
driven by new and innovative start-ups makes venture investments a valuable strategy. This 
strategy often helps to reconfigure the existing tactics of the corporate organization. Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990) argue that R&D has two “faces”, where, apart from generating 
innovations, it also helps to absorb knowledge generated by others (Gambardella, 1995). In 
many situations the established corporation, with its existing portfolio of capabilities, will be 
in a better position to enter new areas, relying on their existing knowledge as a platform for 
adopting new technology and knowledge. As part of this process, corporate management is 
forced to determine which strategies to follow. 
2. Balance exploration and exploitation: While corporate venturing is a way to search for new 
innovative activities in the market, it can also provide significant value to the current product 
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portfolio. A corporate venture program also helps to solve the problem of running the 
existing business while dedicating significant resources to the development of a new business 
area. This strategic return concerns the ventures’ ability to stimulate demand for the parent 
corporation’s products and services through developing complimentary products. Intel, for 
example, has exercised this type of venturing activity with their investments in advanced 
software companies. The initiation of this kind of venture should be seen as providing 
indirect strategic returns whereas there is not necessarily any direct flow of return from the 
venture to the corporate parent (Chesbrough, 2002; Schuyt et al., 2000). 
3. Promote innovative spirits: Over time the innovative spirit that the parent company was once 
founded on may diminish as organizational structures infiltrate the otherwise innovative 
entrepreneurial employees. The ambience of a venture department can help reignite this 
passion that could potentially be lost in the bureaucracy and organizational structure of the 
parent firm, thus creating an exciting atmosphere of new developments and encouraging 
diversity of thinking. Entrepreneurial talent is rewarded under a corporate venture structure, 
and it allows for new knowledge to be developed and appreciated. This also makes it easier 
to retain and attract highly talented people. This could, for example, be entrepreneurs with 
valuable knowledge and technologies who wish to commercialise their own idea, but need a 
solid business partner to make this happen. As an example, Lucent´s acquisition of SDX 
Business Systems into Lucent’s venture portfolio provided access to superior 
telecommunication technology (Schyut, 2001). 
4. Secure flexibility: A key advantage of corporate venturing is its natural ability to provide 
flexibility in terms of sensing and responding to new knowledge and entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Corporate venture programs are in a constant stage of alertness as to what 
potential area, university, and industry should be investigated for investment potentials. 
Conversely, traditionally established companies often fail to be flexible, as they typically 
have many other existing focuses, where providing resources into new fields tends to be a 
managerial hassle (Maletz and Nohria, 2001).  
 
While a corporate venture strategy has many positive outcomes and can function particularly 
well for exploring and exploiting new knowledge, the literature has also pointed to its different 
demands, multiple objectives and often conflicting goals (Block, 1982). Finding one strategy that 
reconciles all of them is difficult. Early on it was argued by Hannan (1976) that only few 
corporate ventures knew how to make it work. Later (but still early in the history of corporate 
venturing) Block (1982) made a similar finding. Both Hannan and Block concluded that the 
problems could be solved if corporate venturing was thought of as a strategic sequence of events. 
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Later many other authors came to similar conclusions (e.g. Burgelman, 1983, 1984; Block and 
McMillan, 1993). This approach included analysing what kind of procedures firms need to 
follow when they pursue a corporate venture strategy. This literature tries to uncover how new 
ventures are assessed and developed into rent generating new ventures under a corporate venture 
strategy (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). Such an analysis takes the value-chain of corporate 
venturing and breaks it down into its parts; it shows how they develop over time and how they 
are interrelated within a larger whole – a process comprising many activities. In the subsequent 
review of what the process looks like, I also want to raise the question of whether this approach 
should be modified.  
 
1.4 The venture process 
In the corporate venture literature, empirical complexity has been accommodated by describing 
the strategy as a sequential planned process with different critical phases and activities (e.g. 
Block and McMillan, 1993; Burgelman, 1983, 1984; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Gorman and 
Sahlman, 1989; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; Tyebjee and Bruno, 
1984). This venture capital process (value-chain) includes everything from raising money for an 
investment fund, over managing the investment process, to harvesting the results. A process 
which Bygrave and Timmons (1992) argue takes up to 10 years to complete. 
In the following, a review of the literature of the process will be conducted. This will foster 
awareness of the corporate venture strategy, while at the same time illuminating how academics 
have tried to make sense of the process. In this section, the venture capital process is described 
and analyzed in light of current research as research gaps are identified. The chapter presents 
stages and phases of the venture capital process, but also questions the strict sequential 
presentation of corporate venture strategies.  
As a reference point, Galbraith (1982) discovered that managers of new entrepreneurial firms 
think in a “stage-wise” process and venture capital managers therefore tend to do the same. In 
order to follow the rationale of new venture managers, venture capitalists need to strategize 
accordingly. One of the stage models for new entrepreneurial development, which tried to 
explain this process and establish consensus about the process, was described by Bhave (1994). 
He elaborated on the development process of new firms by building on previous literature and 
twenty-seven-business cases. He developed an 8 step process model for firm development with 
the following critical steps:  
1) Opportunity recognition 
2) Business concept 
3) Business concept development 
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 20  
4) Production technology 
5) Production technology development 
6) Organization creation - resource need 
7) Product 
8) Product development.  
 
Before Bhave (1994), many others have made similar descriptions of the entrepreneurial process, 
including many of the same stages and phases (e.g. Roberts, 1988). Ruhnka and Young (1987) 
connected the relationship between the development paths of new entrepreneurial firms to the 
type of action that could be expected of venture capitalists according to these and modelled them 
as a planned process. A starting point for a progressive venture capital model was thereby 
created with a reference point to the perceived development path of new firm formation. Since 
then a major task of venture capitalists and corporate venture capitalists has been to develop the 
technology based start-ups into prosperous firms, following their sequential development seemed 
logical. 
The planning approach to the formulation of corporate venture capital strategy is constructed as a 
sequential planned process with various critical phases, all with the aim of ensuring progression 
of the new venture firm (Burgelman, 1983, 1984; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). Each of these 
phases is consequently broken down into sub-phases permitting a more elaborative description of 
the process and a more detailed analysis of its parts (Steiner, 1979) – very much as it was done 
for the development of new entrepreneurial ventures. Approaching strategy in this way has often 
been referred to as the planning school (e.g., Mintzberg et al., 1998). The planning school 
derives and formulates strategies based on a series of planned events or processes. In order to 
meet corporate objectives, this school of thought builds on the motto of “predict to prepare” 
(Ackoff, 1983). Consequently the overall process often gets broken down into sub strategies to 
ensure that the objectives are most successfully reached even if the complex relations persist 
(Steiner, 1979).  
 
In trying to discern the advantages of a corporate venture strategy, the literature has often 
approached the phenomena from a process perspective. Block (1982) defines corporate venturing 
as:  
“…a process, which finds, examines, initiates and tracks new businesses, 
(and perhaps new products)” (p. 22)  
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This definition captures the flow from idea generation to business/ product launch. Block (1982) 
presented one of the earliest processes to understand the high failure rates of corporate venture 
investors. This is done by dividing the process up into four major phases: 
1) Making the decision to engage in venturing  
2) Generating and collecting venture ideas, establishing criteria for their selection, and then 
screening and selecting the ideas to be developed into ventures. 
3) Organizing and starting individual ventures 
4) Monitoring the newly established business and applying learning to design modification 
 
This process has since served as a starting point for many other process descriptions. Following 
authors such as Block (1982), Burgelman (1983, 1984) developed one of the most well known 
and often cited process models. Burgelman didn’t significantly alter the overall structure and 
phases of the process taken from Block’s model, but he added to the understanding of the 
process by assigning different corporate functions to the individual phases. This interpretation 
allowed for a better understanding of the combined strategic, organizational and managerial 
implications in corporate venturing while at the same time keeping to the process perspective. 
While Burgelman´s process model did provide the field with a stronger management orientation, 
it didn’t include as many phases of the process as, e.g., Block’s model already had (1982). 
Needless to say, however, process models are not necessarily assessed according to the number 
of sub-strategies they provide but, rather, according to their analytical component. In the 
corporate venture literature, Burgelman´s model has been a reference point for much research on 
the process. As a reference point, however, he also postulated that while chronological models 
are useful for narrative purposes they do not capture the fact that critical, strategic activities can 
take place in the organisation simultaneously as well as sequentially (Burgelman, 1983). In this 
connection, he and others also referred to strategies as being emergent. Particularly the later 
innovation model of Burgelman et al. (1996: 5) reflects the dynamic interpretation of how 
technological innovations develop.   
Both Block (1982) and Burgelman (1984) interpreted corporate venturing primarily from an 
internal perspective, where strategic returns and corporate entrepreneurship issues were of the 
essence. This perspective paid special attention to management of entrepreneurial ideas from 
within the organisation. The later work on corporate venturing also added an external dimension 
which called for a more financial perspective (Keil, 2000; Maula, 2001). The financial 
perspective is traditionally used for analysing the last part of the phases where venture capitalists 
harvest the results of their investment. This part of the process includes how to exit the venture 
when it has matured. 
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In contrast to the process literature on corporate venturing, traditional venture capital literature 
tends to focus more on the later phases of the venturing process. As traditional venture capitalists 
have a stronger financial orientation, the focus of the literature is on when and how venture 
capitalists can harvest from their investments. As an example of such processes, Tyebjee and 
Bruno (1984) identified five principal activities carried out by venture capitalists:  
1)  Deal origination 
2)  Deal screening 
3)  Deal evaluation 
4)  Deal structuring  
5)  Post-investment activities.  
 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) argue that a central part of post-investment activities involves how 
investor’s should cash in on their investments. However Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) focus to an 
even greater extent on the process including recruiting key executives, strategic planning, 
locating expansion, financing etc. A similar discovery was made in the work of Gorman and 
Sahlman (1989) who tries to answer the question: What do venture capitalists do? In their 
analysis, the daily management processes of nurturing the venture constitute the primary focus. 
In contrast to Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), Gorman and Sahlman (1989) pay only limited attention 
to the exit phase and pre-investment process. Gorman and Sahlman (1989) analyse the types of 
management tasks venture capitalists perform for new venture firms (help to raise additional 
funding, strategic analysis, management recruiting etc.).  
While most of the process literature on venture capital management have concluded by 
describing and analysing different types of exit strategies (IPO, BMO etc.), Wright and Robbie 
(1998) have provided very elaborate descriptions of the venture process that include also post-
exit activities and have thereby contributed to our understanding of the cyclical nature of the 
venture process. These activities include re-contracting issues with previous entrepreneurs who 
have already been part of an earlier investment. These are activities where investments are 
relocated to previously successful entrepreneurs that were formerly part of the venture portfolio. 
Such investment can be very rewarding as the entrepreneur has gained very important insight 
into what it entails to be an entrepreneur and how to work with venture capitalists. Such 
experience can be very expensive to gain, and many only gain this by failing with their venture. 
The learning experience, however, is very valuable for running a new venture. 
    
The above description provides an examination of the different venture capital processes. With 
this in mind the reader should be aware, that while corporate investors need to conduct very 
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different tasks for developing a venture, their process does not necessarily follow 
chronologically one after another. This thesis later argues that this is especially true for the early 
phases of the venturing process.     
Before this critique, the reader will be provided with an empirical glimpse into the corporate 
venture market. This will allow for an even better understanding of the corporate venture 
strategy and offers the reader a foundation for the later analysis and critical approach. The 
empirical section primarily builds on secondary data and quantitative studies of Pedersen and 
Vintergaard (2001), Jensen and Vintergaard (2002), EVCA (European Private Equity & Venture 
Capital Association), DVCA (Danish Venture Capital and Private Equity Association) and 
Vækstfonden (Danish government granted fund). 
  
1.5 The market for corporate venture investments 
In the following section, a short empirical overview will be provided of the market that corporate 
venture firms work in. The quantitative analysis will foster a better understanding of the market 
and the investment strategies of corporate venture investors.  
Corporate investors operate on the same market as many other categories of venture capital 
investors. This is the investment market for unquoted early stage innovative ventures, with a 
high risk and reward profile. These ventures are often based on scientific results which may 
steam from university based research, corporate R&D etc. Besides corporate venture investors, 
additional players in the market are: bankers, pension fund holders, business angels, government 
granted fund holders and other investors. However, the risk profile, time horizon and strategic 
expectations of investors differ. As mentioned earlier, due to the novelty of the ventures the 
expected returns are very difficult to predict prospectively1.  
 
Structure 
Some corporate ventures have earmarked funds at their disposal; others get permission from the 
members of the board from case to case. This differentiation tells something about the level of 
autonomy of the corporate venture department. Yet the organizational structure may also differ: 
In 2001 a survey undertaken by the European Private Equity & Venture Capital Association 
(EVCA) on the European corporate venture market, reported that 74% of corporate venture 
departments were operated from a subsidiary of the parent corporation and 24% from a 
department within the parent organization (EVCA, 2001). Two years later, 69 % came from a 
                                                 
1 The following section will not include a separate methodological discussion, the reader however have to be aware 
that different measures and definitions have been used in the different data sources (venture capital reports). We 
may therefore also have to consider that not all corporate venture firms have been included in the analysis due to 
difficulties in discovering them.     
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subsidiary and thirty-one (31) from a department with in the parent organization (EVCA, 2003). 
This is an indication that more corporate venture departments are gaining in autonomy from the 
rest of the organisation. It also indicates, however, that many corporate venture departments are 
still heavily governed by the corporate organisation. 
 
Invested capital 
In the diagram below, the funds invested by corporate investors are illustrated. Such data tell 
how much activity there is in the market. In times of general economic recession, venture capital 
investments also tend to be lower. This causes less demand for new venture firms, but also 
creates greater uncertainty about the ventures’ level of success. During periods of stagnation, the 
price paid for the ventures will fall, bringing a situation where venture investors have to pay 
special attention to their evaluation process. The graph shows that the level of funds invested 
was at its peek in 2000 and was in 2003 at its lowest since 1996. The significant increase from 
1996 to 1997 and decrease from 2000 to 2001 is both coursed by the general economical 
development. 
 
Diagram 1. Funds invested by corporations in the European private equity industry 1991-
2003 (in € millions) (EVCA, 2004a) 
 
The diagram of European investment activity tells us that the activities have significantly 
decreased. It however also shows that many corporate venture firms are still operating and 
making investments. The same kind of tendency has been apparent in the US market.  
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Market size 
Before analysing corporate venture investors, understanding their relative significance in the 
market in comparison to other categories of investors is beneficial. In a study of the Danish 
venture capital market it was concluded that corporate venture investors constituted a significant 
proportion of the Danish market (Pedersen and Vintergaard, 2001). As corporate venturing is 
viewed in relation to the overall market for venture capital, it was found that they were an 
important player in the market. In 2000 it was discovered that corporate venture funds accounted 
for 10 % of the total capital under management for theses types of investments in Denmark 
(Pedersen and Vintergaard, 2001). In 2004, the relative amount is 15%, which has decreased, 
however, from 22% in 2001 and 2002 (Vækstfonden, 2004). In comparison, this is still 
approximately 10% more then the average European market (EVCA, 2004a). The large 
proportion of corporate venture capital is an indication that corporate venture investors have 
substantial resources available for future investments. In the most recent Danish GEM report 
(GEM, 2004) it was concluded that while the overall entrepreneurial activity in Denmark was 
low, Danish corporate firms were particularly good at managing innovative processes. With 
many resources available, corporate venture firms can also make a significant impact in the 
future if these are put to efficient use.  
 
Pipeline and exit 
As mentioned earlier, corporate venture firms harvest their results when they sell/exit their 
investments. Part of what determines such results is the number of incoming investment 
proposals and the nature of the market for exits. The collective Danish corporate venturing funds 
received 3,259 investment proposals and invested in 119 - only 3.5% of the incoming proposals 
in 2000 (Pedersen and Vintergaard, 2001). In the years that followed the percentage was even 
lower.  
There are many different exit strategies, but the most frequently used are the ones illustrated in 
the table below, which represents the total European market. One could say that an exit is 
basically a change of ownership structure of the venture. While corporate venture firms only 
invest in a very limited number of the proposed cases, they also prefer to exit their investments 
using very few exit options.  
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Diagram 2. Divestment at cost 2000-2003 (EVCA, 2004b) 
 
As seen in the diagram the largest proportion of corporate ventures divestments (i.e. exits) are 
carried out through what is known as “Trade Sales”. A trade sale is when the venture is sold to 
another party (investor, corporate firm etc.). This category accounts for 42% of the total 
European divestments for corporate venture capitalists. For the overall venture market only 
14,2% of the divestments were trade sales in 2003 (EVCA, 2004b). In contrast to the other types 
of divestments, one could argue that trade sale is a favourable way to exit if the venture is at a 
less mature stage (then e.g. IPO´s). Therefore one could also claim that corporate venture firms 
need to build up competencies which are particularly good for managing less mature ventures. 
Since exiting ventures through a trade sale happens in a less formalised market (versus an IPO), 
the corporate venture firm needs to develop skills that can help them find such buyers, negotiate 
prices etc. Such considerations imply that corporate ventures should include their exit strategy 
already in the evaluation phase of venture, to ensure that there eventually will be a buyer for the 
venture. Such considerations will determine the price set during the evaluation of the venture.  
 
Funds     
In a recent study of the Danish venture capital market it was indicated that the number of 
corporate venture funds (investors) only accounts for 8% of the Danish venture capital funds in 
2003 as compared to 18% in 2001 (Vækstfonden, 2004). This confirms another characteristic of 
the corporate venture market: Corporate venture actors are the first to go into venture capital 
markets when the economy is growing and the first to get out of the market in times of recession. 
Note that all of the corporate venture companies in the Danish market today were founded after 
1999 (Vækstfonden, 2004). This gives an indication of the fragile structure of a corporate 
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venture strategy, but also highlights the importance of creating an alert organisation which can 
easily react to market changes.   
 
Investments 
Statistics further show that Danish corporate venture funds have made 17% of the total number 
of investments in 2000 which account for 21% of total invested capital (Pedersen and 
Vintergaard, 2001). In 2003, the amount of capital invested by these funds was down to 16% of 
the total number of investments (Vækstfonden, 2004). While the amount invested is down, the 
independent funds raised by corporate investors has in relative terms grown from 45.1% to 
60.1% from 2001 to 2003. This shows that corporate ventures should have funds available for 
new deals. In the overall European market we see that the market has recovered from 2002 to 
2003 both in terms of investment and fundraising (EVCA, 2004a). As a consequence of the end 
of the economic downturn through 2005, it must be expected that many corporate venture firms 
will be focusing on making new investments and ensuring a prosperous pipeline of opportunities. 
This places specific emphasis on the area of investigation in this thesis: the early phases of the 
venturing process.   
 
Investment stages 
Due to the strong commercial and technological understanding of corporate investors (in contrast 
to other venture investors) they can develop a superior competency in the early phases of a 
venture’s development. While traditional venture investors focus more on the development and 
exiting phases of the investments, corporate venture funds can find a niche in the early phases of 
the venturing process. In 1999, most of the Danish corporate investments were made in the Start-
up stage (55%), but relatively many were also made in the seed and the expansion/growth stages 
(Pedersen and Vintergaard, 2001). Further, in a European comparison the diagram below 
illustrates that most corporate investments are placed in the early stages (both number of 
investments and amount invested) (EVCA, 2004a).  
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Diagram 3. Stage and distribution by amount and number of deals for 2000-2003 (EVCA, 
2004a) 
 
In comparison to the rest of the European venture capitalists (in percentage of amount invested), 
corporate ventures place 0,6% in seed, 6,8% in start-up, 21,4% in expansion, 7,9% in 
replacement, and 63,6% in buyout (EVCA, 2004b). This makes corporate venture investors a 
proportional early investor in relation to their peers. This further accentuates the content of this 
thesis.    
An explorative analysis of the Danish venture capital market made in 2002 was to explicate the 
growth improving factors in the Danish market (Jensen and Vintergaard, 2002). Thirty-three (33) 
potentially growth-improving factors were identified to prompt the development of the Danish 
venture capital market. The analysis concluded that in order to increase the general level of 
venture capital investments, greater focus needed to be placed on the development of new and 
innovative ideas. It was concluded, further, that the most important factors to prompt growth for 
the Danish venture capital market were the development of new valuable business proposals 
(coming from entrepreneurial culture and qualifications, quality of business plans and 
government funded research). This study supported the idea that an important analytical focus is 
to be placed on the early phases of the venturing process and thereby how to access new 
potential ventures from which knowledge could be exploited. 
Corroborating evidence can be found in the fact that while the total amount of funds invested in 
new ventures has been on a down slope since 2000, corporate investors have fewer investments 
to spread their risk over. Hence the return has to be high on the few investments that are in fact 
made. This again emphasises the importance of the quality and uniqueness of new venture ideas 
and the ability to evaluate the ones which may most likely yield the highest returns. In the light 
of the very few selected business proposals which receive funding this point is further 
emphasized (Pedersen and Vintergaard, 2001).  
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Another empirical observation that highlights the importance of the early phases is the combined 
investment focus and the patience of the corporate funds. Corporate ventures build pipelines to 
invest in early stage projects. In these stages the venture is determined mostly by the underlying 
technology and not so much by the mercantile and market parameters (Block and McMillan, 
1993). In this part of the process there is a high degree of uncertainty about the future of the 
venture and the use of the technology. This calls for additional attention to be paid to the 
underlying innovativeness of the venture and the capacity to evaluate the most promising 
business opportunities even at this stage. While corporate ventures can harvest from both strong 
commercial and technological competencies, it becomes crucial to pay special attention to 
leveraging these in the early stages of the venturing process.           
Like the conceptual description of the corporate venture strategy, the empirical data also 
indicates that new and important analytical angles are called for in how to work with the early 
phases of the venturing process. Similar to the theoretical perspectives presented in the earlier 
chapter, the empirical analyses also focus on the highly needed attention to be paid to the 
beginning of the venture process.  
The following section will further address how the current theoretical and empirical foundation 
in corporate venturing accentuates a complementary perspective. This perspective relies on an 
understanding about where the venture opportunities come from and how they develop.   
 
1.6 Positioning: Early phase dynamics 
The specific financial, strategic and organizational advantages of corporate venturing all depend 
on the novel innovations that the corporate ventures access. Empirical observations find that a 
large proportion of the new venture firms are built on science-based technologies which are 
developed from academic research (Block and McMillan, 1993; Stokes, 1997; Sung, Gibson and 
Kang, 2003). Science-based ventures are selected because of their novelty and their uniqueness. 
This often shows in the technological edge of academic discovery. Research especially from 
universities, has been the target of new investments (Chrisman, Timothy and Fraser, 1995, 
Etzkowitz, 2003). Sung, Gibson and Kang (2003) argue that in trying to define new venture 
firms, much is determined by how much R&D expenditure makes out of total sales and cost of 
these firms. Research has shown that university based research accounts for a significant amount 
of new ventures. For example, Powell et al. (2002), find that venture capitalists tend to locate 
themselves geographically in close proximity to research intensive areas. This happens 
especially in Boston and the Bay Area where the research intensity is high. Research even shows 
that R&D projects which are sponsored by venture capital are three times as likely to generate 
patents as corporate sponsored R&D (Kortum and Lerner, 2000). Etzkowitz (2005) also 
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describes that the venture capital market began around the academic community of MIT and the 
technologies developed there.  
The altered structures for innovation have also changed the role of universities in society. They 
now provide the foundation for new ventures in addition to their traditional role as research and 
teaching institutions (Chrisman, Timothy and Fraser, 1995). New names for this kind of 
entrepreneurship have even been developed, such as academic entrepreneurship (Powers and 
McDougall, 2004) and faculty entrepreneurship (Chrisman, Hynes and Fraser, 1995). The 
challenge has also caused the development of new organisational structures at the universities 
including technological transfer offices to facilitate smooth interaction with investors (Powers 
and McDougall, 2004).  
The new role of universities in society has lead universities to spin their research off as new 
firms, many of which are obstacles for venture investment (Charney and Libecap, 2000; 
Etzkowitz, 1998; Nicolaou and Birley, 2003). Spinning off science in terms of ventures has also 
added a managerial component to research, and changed the traditional interpretation of output. 
There is a general tendency here, that the role of the university now includes more commercial 
goals (Ernø-Kjølhede, Husted, Mønsted and Wenneberg, 2003). Natural science departments in 
particular have had to acquire capabilities to meet these new demands, but the social sciences are 
also expected to follow this trend. In the next chapter we will see how the role of science also 
has changed in relation to development of new innovations. More specifically attention is given 
to the changed perception of how innovations are developed. Understanding this change 
becomes key when analysing the early phases of the venturing process, as venture capitalists see 
themselves as the end-users of scientific research. This will ultimately question the linear 
pipeline perspective on corporate venture strategies. 
 
1.6.1 The linear model 
Analysing the development from science to science-based innovation (ventures) was 
traditionally seen as a way of exploring the connection between “knowledge search” and 
“knowledge use”. These categories are themselves often subdivided into a number of distinct 
stages, linked in a simple linear fashion (Bush, 1945). This connection, generally known as the 
“linear model”, provides a framework for categorising the processes of knowledge creation and 
application (e.g. Stokes, 1997). The linear model advanced during the scientific revolution and 
was initially argued for by authors such as Sir Francis Bacon2, but it re-emerged in a broader and 
more recent debate when presented by Vannevar Bush in a report to President Roosevelt about 
                                                 
2 This was done in his book “Advancement of Learning” published in 1605 
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science in peacetime: “Science, the Endless Frontier” (Bush, 1945). Since then many other 
researchers have constructed innovation and entrepreneurship models based on this overall 
interpretation of how innovations develop; among them Edward B. Roberts (1978, 1988) who 
argues that innovation is the multiplicity of invention and exploitation but who also indicates to 
be an expounder of the linear interpretation. While Roberts acknowledge that feedback loops are 
needed in the process, he and others still argue that the overall management of technological 
innovation thus includes the organization and direction of human and capital resources towards 
efficiency: (1) reacting to new knowledge; (2) generating technical ideas aimed at new and 
enhanced products, manufacturing process and services; (3) developing those ideas into working 
prototypes; and (4) transferring them into manufacturing, distribution and use (Roberts, 1988: 
13). Like many others, Roberts believes if enough effort in terms of time, money and freedom is 
provided for R&D then the project will automatically blossom.   
 
1.6.2 Corporate venturing and the linear approach 
From the discussion of characteristics of the linear model it is obvious that there is a high degree 
of similarity with the process model in corporate venturing (and venture capital management). 
The process/pipe-line perspective is indirectly a reflection of the linear model; a strong 
separation from science and research to new firm formation and market needs. As already 
proposed, Block (1982) and Burgelman (1983, 1984) introduced some of the first official 
corporate venture models which include different stages in new firm formation. These models 
also introduced the pipeline perspective on strategy formation. While Burgelman described the 
emergent phenomena of innovation, the model still had a pipeline perspective. Each of the 
models presumes that entrepreneurial value is enriched in the transition from producers to users 
– from the entrepreneurial team to the corporate venture company. While it is known that 
scientific research results will always be an important input to the development of new venture 
firms, the involvement of corporate ventures in this process is less highly thought of.  
Along similar lines to those proposed by Roberts (1988), it is believed that venture managers 
need a critical mass of ventures to feed into the corporate ventures pipe-line. The pipe-line 
perspective has been the dominant in the corporate venture literature until today, focusing on 
how to attract and screen as many projects as possible. It is an attempt to find “the needle in a 
haystack”. It has remained a fixed interpretation that new ventures logically flow from basic 
research to finished ventures that will consequently be up for evaluation and development. The 
problematic points of the linear model will be clarified in what follows. This critique will help to 
develop a new and supporting interpretation of the corporate venture strategy.     
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1.6.3 A scientific critique of the linear model 
The linear innovation model has today received broad criticism in the research community. It is 
argued that effective innovation is more likely to depend upon constructive negotiations between 
people with different social and cognitive backgrounds: researchers, practitioners, lead users and 
other stakeholders in the innovation in question (e.g. Clark, 1995; Gibbons et. al, 1994). The 
dynamics of a complex system of innovations are non-linear (Christensen, 1992; Leydesdorff 
and Meyer, 2003). For example, the interaction between demand pull and technology push may 
become more important for the systemic development of innovations than supposed by the linear 
model (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979, 1989).  
Critics of the linear model (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Mehta, 2002) have argued that it has the 
following critical components: 1) it focuses on a predictable process, 2) it makes a distinction 
between basic and applied research (and users and producers of science), 3) it supposes that 
scientific research comes only from the universities, and 4) it offers little focus on the market and 
commercial demands. Some authors have argued that in general the linear model does not really 
describe science but, rather, design, and the assumption that basic research drives innovation is 
flawed (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986).  
In theory, the linear model consists of successfully interrelated activities. These begin with basic 
research and progress to more developmental research activities such as the development of new 
product and process ideas, the evaluation and testing of prototypes, commercial production and 
finally marketing and diffusion (Massey, Quintas and Wield, 1992; Sung, Gibson and Kang, 
2003). Kline and Rosenberg (1986), argue that:  
“…models that depict innovation as a smooth, well-behaved linear 
process badly mis-specify the nature and discretion of the causal factors 
at work” (p. 275)    
Likewise, the linear model presumes that the innovation processes is a one-way flow of scientific 
or technological knowledge from academic research to industrial development and 
commercialization. These processes are divided into ‘basic research’, ‘applied research’, 
‘development’ and ‘production’ and their analysis depends on an artificial distinction between 
basic and applied research (Stokes, 1997). Vannevar Bush was the first to explicate this 
distinction by arguing that basic research is performed without thought of practical ends, and that 
basic research enriches general knowledge and an understanding of nature and its laws (Stokes, 
1997). Making this distinction assumes that universities and industries are the only players in the 
development of new innovations. Several other actors, however, play important roles in the 
innovation processes, including both government (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1996), investors 
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(Coehoorn, 1995), and end users (Bobrowski, 2000; Bunders, Broerse, and Zweekhorst, 1999; 
von Hippel, 1988).  
In addition, the problems of the linear model have been identified as lacking client focus, making 
it difficult or impossible to judge the value of the work that is undertaken. By making this 
distinction, the role of demand in the marketplace is often only given scant attention (Myers and 
Marquis, 1969). The demand of the market is presumed to be high, making it a supply driven 
strategy. Because of the novelty of scientific research, the end product does not yet have a 
market or a defined costumer base, which makes it problematic to make this assumption. This 
market may eventually develop depending on input from many different actors, trends, public 
debate and organizations. This argument does not remove the two forces of innovation: market 
forces (income, relative prices etc.) and forces that progress at the technological and scientific 
frontiers, but bring them closer (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). To further complicate matters, the 
development horizon is also substantially longer for science based ventures than for other 
product developments, which makes the potential outcome even more open ended. As the 
outcome of this broad critique, a series of new and non-linear models has been developed, of 
which some are reviewed in the following section. These new models will provide valuable input 
for a new perspective on the early phases dynamics of the venturing process and they have all to 
some degree been included in the studies and conclusions of this thesis. 
 
1.6.4 New innovation models 
Based on the above critique of the linear model, the scientific research community has developed 
new and more interactive interpretations of how innovation is developed in society and within 
firms (Gibbons. et al., 1994; Kline, 1985; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Leydesdorff and 
Etzkowitz, 1996; Stokes 1997). These models and ways of thinking (e.g. Mode 2 knowledge 
production, Triple Helix, Chain-linked model, National Innovation System) re-thinks the 
processes and the actors involved into a more interactive interpretation. The models range from 
micro to macro-economic perspectives. Many of them also gave new meaning to how 
innovations are created and the knowledge production process which leads to it. 
Other innovation models, such as Pasteur’s Quadrant (Stokes, 1997), The stage Gate Model 
(Cooper, 1990, 1993) also makes valuable contributions to the innovation literature. 
Complementary arguments have also been made in evolutionary economics about 
Schumpeterian competition in an industry (Nelson and Winter, 1982). However, these models do 
not add significantly to this thesis as it develops its arguments from new venture firms with 
limited routines and decision rules.  
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In the following, a review is made of a sample of such non-linear models - models which have 
been a key source of inspiration. The content of these models will later be useful for deriving at 
new perspectives for the early phases of corporate venturing. Common to these models is that 
they all in different ways provide a counter reaction to the linear approach, by implying 
dynamics to the knowledge creating process of innovation.   
 
Mode 2 knowledge production 
One of these new interactive approaches was introduced by authors such as Gibbons. et. al 
(1994) and et al. Nowotny (2001). The approach was called Mode 2 science (as opposed to the 
linear Mode 1). This model has already been introduced in the methodology chapter of this 
thesis, as it dealt with the role of science in society. In the context of this thesis, the 
understanding of Mode 2 grasps a broader set of actors and their role in creating knowledge for 
innovations. This approach argues that no individual or single firm holds all relevant knowledge 
and expertise needed to facilitate input to significant innovations. Cooperation between a greater 
number of participants therefore increases the chances of new and innovative developments. The 
sample of participants has to be trans-organizational, relying on activities in networks between 
firms, universities, consultants, customers, suppliers, national laboratories, media etc. From a 
Mode 2 perspective it will have to become common knowledge that complex research results are 
no longer robust when developed in academic communities of homogeneous character. Nowotny 
et al. (2001) and Gibbons et al. (1994) argue that the growth of complexity arising from the 
abandonment of industrial age meta-narratives has developed a distinctive society in which the 
development of more open systems of knowledge production and the growth of social 
complexity has increased uncertainty in both knowledge production and society. As a general 
consequence of this shift, the boundaries between basic research, oriented basic research and 
applied research have become blurred.  
Within the traditional linear model (Mode 1) the process of innovation corresponded to a 
vertically and serially structured supply chain of basic research, oriented basic research and 
applied research. By contrast, within the new model (Mode 2), and more especially in the field of 
innovation, research is based on recursive interaction processes and networks of heterogeneous 
actors that are provided with heterogeneous knowledge resources. This has developed a position 
where knowledge is carried out in a context of application. It has made knowledge creation more 
socially accountable and reflexive. The core processes have involved transforming knowledge 
claims into trustworthy, socially robust and usable knowledge. This tightly links to what Carlile 
and Rebentisch refers to as knowledge “transformation” of knowledge into novel application 
(Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003). 
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Those who were in favour of Mode 1 and Mode 2 claim that this approach provides a more 
suitable framework for explaining modern societies in which the roles of knowledge, research 
and education are characterised by increasing distribution, complexity and significance. It is 
argued by Hellström et al. (2003) that commentators on Mode 2 knowledge production have 
often focused on the problem of justification. Here it is argued, that it does not seem sufficient to 
recognize the need for a formalized and internally received phase of justification in academic 
knowledge creation (Weingart, 1997). Justification of knowledge is connected to disciplinary 
institutions such as departments and journals. Hence the argument often replicates itself, and it is 
only through these institutions that knowledge has its validity. Hellström et al. (2003) further 
argues that the problem with this critique is that it is based on a naive “truth as correspondence 
with nature” understanding of the product of academically produced knowledge, and, further, on 
an idealistic conception of the political economy of science. This correspondence and 
presentious understanding is problematic from a socialized perspective because it presupposes a 
conception of nature prior to and disconnected with the knowledge that is to be tested about it.  
To take one well-known example, it takes for granted that knowledge is tested through 
replication, Collins (1985) however has shown that it is not. This standpoint has been grounded 
in the tradition of academic society for some time, but the significance has not yet attained 
meaning in the practice of corporate venturing. This becomes problematic because one of the 
premises for Mode 2 knowledge production in the formation of new venture firms is that 
knowledge has been tested and challenged in the context of application. It is presumed that 
corporate venture firms have participated in the process.  
 
Triple helix 
Another approach to the analysis of the innovative process was introduced as the Triple Helix 
model. The Triple Helix model was developed in 1996 by Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz and 
describes the process as a transition from the linear model of scientific progress to an interactive 
structure, which appears as a "triple helix" of science, policy and industry (Leydesdorff and 
Etzkowitz, 1996, 1998; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1997, 1998; Etzkowitz, 2002, 2005; Ernø-
Kjølhede, 2001). Contrary to the Mode 2 model, the triple helix model deals with specific 
institutions. The model explains the changing relationship between government, university and 
industry and thereby challenges the assumption that the public and private spheres are separate. 
According to Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1997), the three institutional helixes public, private, 
and academic, which formerly operated at arm’s length, are increasingly working together to 
create new knowledge and value from the innovation generated within each helix. Leydesdorff 
and Etzkowitz (1996) take this argument further and state that a triple helix of academia, 
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industry, and government relations is likely to be a key component of any national or 
multinational innovation strategy in the late 20th century. In arguing for the changed relationship 
between these three actors, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1997) emphasize that the boundaries and 
roles of the helixes are undergoing significant changes and are being replaced by a web of ties. 
These network ties will later be analysed in more detail.  
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1997) further claim that the challenge of creating new knowledge 
flows has today become an academic challenge in cooperation with government and private 
firms, which has changed the structure and role of the university from the traditional linear 
model. Their primary focus is thereby directed towards the changing role of the university in 
relation to the other helixes (Martin and Etzkowitz, 2000:13). The university is increasingly 
becoming involved in tasks such as technology transfer, commercialization, and the creation of 
new ventures, tasks that originally have been held by private firms. This moves university 
research closer to application and the authors argue that commercialization is supported by, e.g., 
new hybrid organizations, ventures, incubators, etc. (Martin and Etzkowitz, 2000). This way of 
analysing knowledge production has challenged established notions of institutional roles and 
identities more so than the earlier critique of the linear innovation model.  
 
Chain-linked model 
An alternative innovation model developed by Kline (1985), and Kline and Rosenberg (1986) 
propose an interactive process approach to the development of innovations. Their model was 
also developed as a counter reaction to the linear model. Contrary to the linear model of 
research, Kline (1985), and Kline and Rosenberg (1986) launched the so-called “chain-linked 
model” of innovation processes. The model was first introduced by Kline (1985) and a year later 
further elaborated with Rosenberg. This model explains the relation in most countries between 
basic research and the innovative firm. It also explains the activities that an innovative firm 
undertakes. The model of Kline and Rosenberg (1986) carries the logical implication that, in 
commercially successful radical innovations, the research solutions in one arena are influenced 
by the ideas and opportunities in other areas. In this connection Kline and Rosenberg (1986) 
argue that:  
“...it is a serious mistake to treat an innovation as if it were a well-
defined, homogeneous thing that could be identified as entering the 
economy at a precise date – or becoming available at a precise point in 
time…” (p. 283)  
In contrast to the linear sequential model, that is, the “scientific push” argument, according to 
which scientific discoveries naturally drift towards the market and are instinctively adopted. 
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Kline (1985), and Kline and Rosenberg (1986) emphasize the effects of “loops” and feedback on 
the flows and transfers of information within the firm. The chain-linked model takes into account 
the loops and feedback between the roles of different functions within the firm. These includes 
design, manufacturing, marketing, sales etc. Hage and Hollingsworth (2000), argue that: 
“Obviously, a product that does not have desired attributes and a certain 
level of customer-preferred quality is unlikely to do well, although, 
products are frequently developed without much research concerning the 
needs of customers.” (p. 977) 
While on this model, as on the linear model, innovation still emerges from a process, it is 
assumed that scientific research is not only a source of inventive ideas but is used to solve 
problems along the chain of innovation:  
“In this model [the Chain-linked model], the “central chain of 
innovation” begins with design and moves toward development and 
production to sales. Each step is linked together via feedback loops and 
all are side-linked to research” (Mehta, 2002: 270)  
Science profits directly and indirectly from the products of innovative activities such as the tools 
and instruments made available by technology (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). Moreover, special 
emphasis is put on the important role of the actors who learn with the context of the innovation 
process and who cooperate and participate in the process.    
 
National innovation system 
There has also been a counteraction to the linear model from a macroeconomic perspective: “The 
innovation system” approach (Cooke, 1998; Lundvall, 1992; Niosi, 2000). A dominant part of 
the literature from the systems approach focuses on the national level and the central theoretical 
and empirical contributions within this approach have been published in recent decades by the 
work of Freeman (1988), Nelson (1988) and Lundvall (1988), setting forth a framework allowing 
for a systems approach in understanding the possibilities and opportunities in innovation 
(Lundvall, 1992, 2000). The analysis of the innovative capacity of nations has become widely 
diffused and is now an integral part of the analytical frameworks of such organizations as OECD 
and the European Commission. The national system of innovation has been defined by Lundvall 
(1992) as: 
“…the elements and relationships which interact in the production, 
diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge… either 
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 38  
located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state” (Lundvall, 
1992: 2)  
This concept has emerged in recent decades, especially in work that seeks to define the 
composition of innovation actors. Other strands within the systems approach are represented by, 
e.g., sectoral systems of innovation (Malerba, 2002), regional systems of innovation (Cooke, 
1996, 2002) and technological systems of innovation (Carlsson et al., 2002).  
The system rests on the ability of all actors to collaborate and interact. Interaction is assisted 
through nearness and collaborative initiatives; joint research activities and licensing agreements 
between public and private sector actors. In the system approach, private sector actors can access 
and exploit the pure science competencies generated in public organizations and institutions and 
the public sector can realize the transfer and application of its technology into new commercial 
products. The national system of innovation framework argues that such a system creates, stores, 
and transfers information, knowledge and skills to technologies and new innovative projects. 
Although academics and policy makers employ different definitions and perspectives to the 
system approach, the basic premise is interaction. This includes understanding the linkages 
between the actors involved in innovation.  
 
After reviewing the innovation models, which counteracts and complements the linear approach 
in different ways, an obvious next step is to analyse the early phases of corporate venture firms 
in a different, non-linear light. This draws on these critical frameworks to different degrees, and 
creates new analytical approaches to the early phases of the corporate venture process by these 
means.   
 
1.6.5 A critique of the linear approach in corporate venturing 
As has been indicated by the various models of innovation, part of the scientific community has 
opened up for a more dynamic and interactive approach to analyse the creation of innovations. 
Corporate venture firms, however, are still cited (in academic work) for operating according to 
obsolete models. When analysing the process and pipeline approach in relation to the previous 
critique of the linear research model, one may easily question whether such methodology should 
also be changed in a corporate venture context. The corporate venture process perspective is very 
much a reflection of the user and producer distinction where specific actors have been assigned 
predefined tasks in the process (Block, 1982). While the process-models provide a good 
overview of the corporate venture checklist it may not function very well for analysing how to 
use, access and develop innovations.  
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A large proportion of the founding literature on corporate venturing uses the planning and 
development perspective from strategic management (e.g. Block, 1982, Block and MacMillan, 
1993). The venture capital process descriptions also have their basis in this tradition, also known 
as the planning school, which focuses on how decisions are supposed to be made and carried out 
in a sequential order (Block and McMillan, 1993; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Gorman and 
Sahlman, 1989; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; Tyebjee and Bruno, 
1984). This school of thought describes how decisions are carried out, but not as often as how 
and by whom they are made.  
The process literature was developed for analysing large corporations which operated in 
relatively certain environments characterised by incremental change in production processes and 
products. The corporate venture literature applies the same approach to analyse the emergence of 
new firm formation under conditions of high uncertainty with challenging demands from both 
entrepreneurs and investors. In this context the planning approach carries several disadvantages. 
It lacks flexibility, neglects the complication of implementation, presumes that the firm is 
managed from the top down and distinguishes between planners and managers, and is not well 
suited for taking into account discontinuities (Mintzberg, 1998). While theses, processes can 
work well for building firm strategies in stable environments, they are problematic when used for 
managing dynamic entrepreneurial developments.     
Yet another important complication of the process approach in a corporate venture context is that 
it presumes that new venture firms develop according to predictable stages along the value chain 
(Ruhnka and Young, 1987). The “process” literature describes the development of new venture 
formation where the venture goes through a predictable lifecycle (Bhave, 1994; Birley, 1984). 
These lifecycles are described chronologically as a natural progression that constitutes the 
maturation of new venture firms. A contradicting academic view, however, argues that ventures 
do not always develop in a linear and relatively sequential process (Hansen and Bird, 1997; 
Reynolds and Miller, 1992; Ruhnka and Young, 1987). This argument goes hand in hand with 
the previous critique of the linear model. Authors with this view argue that task accomplishments 
in new ventures may happen chronologically, but are just as likely to occur in any random order 
(Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). Also, Wright and Robbie (1998) argue that a clear gap exists in the 
process literature, which neglects the dynamics of the venture development process. This 
tradition argues that while some steps in the process may be included in the venture’s 
development, others will not. One thing is clear, and that is the process seldom develops 
chronologically. These changes happen as discontinuities in the venture’s development.  
There is a multitude of examples to illustrate the significant changes entrepreneurial ventures 
experience from the initial discovery of opportunities to the final business. Similar evidence of 
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changes exists when the entrepreneurial team finally captures the attention of future investors. 
When investors engage in investments it is common knowledge that deadline, milestones and 
new strategic directions all influences the new venture in new and unpredictable directions; these 
factors will direct the young ventures in new directions which are different from the natural 
predictable progression. This perception also opens for a new interpretation of the strategy for 
corporate venture firms, which is highly dependent on the development of new venture firms. 
When the development of the venture is more unpredictable, corporate ventures need to be 
involved in the early part of this process to provide direction and predict the outcomes. 
Corporate ventures can not predict a natural progression but must reach back in the value chain 
to acquire knowledge for future decision-making about the research intensive new ventures. This 
further accentuates both the early phase focus and a new dynamic approach to understand 
corporate venturing.   
 
This thesis argues that literature on corporate venture firms, like the scientific research 
community on innovation, have to break with the linear model and open up to a more interactive 
involvement particularly in the early phases of the venture process. Corporate venture firms are 
part of the ”innovation ecosystem” and must therefore also be analyzed as part of the innovation 
process. As emphasised in the previous chapters, there is conceptual, empirical and theoretical 
evidence that indicates that a complementary academic focus on the early phases of the venture 
development process could also be valuable for corporate ventures. The early phases focus less 
on the maturity and development of the ventures and to a greater extent on the type of 
involvement that is needed from corporate ventures when including the innovative process at the 
beginning of a venture’s life.  
The analysis builds on new models of innovation, and therefore introduces a new way of seeing 
and developing corporate venture strategies. While this view acknowledges that specific tasks 
are included in corporate venturing it interlinks them and connects them in ways that does not 
necessarily follow sequentially (Burgelman, 1996; Wright and Robbie, 1998). By contrast to 
many other previous corporate venture models this thesis develops its analyses in a non-linear 
light. Study V (Vintergaard and Husted, Submitted) however makes the claim linear dimensions 
also in some cases proves valuable to provide direction for decision-making, safe resources etc. 
 
As a challenge to the linear pipe-line perspective on corporate venturing, this thesis studies the 
ability to create, discover and evaluate original investment opportunities using an interactive 
approach. The knowledge creation process needed to accomplish activities is of particular 
interest to this thesis and its studies. In the following chapter a literature review will be 
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conducted of the early phase. This review will address to early phases of the venture process 
from a knowledge and network perspective. The review will create a broader foundation for the 
studies in the subsequent section. Drawing on this review the studies develop their arguments in 
more detailed and narrow way.   
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2. REVIEW OF THE EARLY PHASES: A DYNAMIC 
PROCESS PERSPECTIVE. 
 
Based on the previous chapter it is indicated that a complementary corporate venture perspective 
can benefit the current literature in the field. This thesis rests on established literature on 
corporate venturing, but also challenges the pipeline and linear process perspective presented in 
this tradition. This includes new ways actors are involved in the innovation and learning process. 
To ground this new perspective in the literature, the following chapter provides an overview and 
review of the topics and perspectives used in this thesis. The review departs from the earlier 
academic work on corporate venturing, but also covers research areas which are of particular 
relevance for establishing a new dimension. Such a perspective includes literature from 
knowledge creation in networks and entrepreneurship. The review does not intent to break new 
academic ground, but to provide the reader with an academic foundation which support the 
arguments presented in the Studies in the next section. The combination and use of the literature 
in relation to the early phases of corporate venturing is however new.  
Different from previous research on corporate venture strategies this thesis brings together users 
and producers of knowledge and technology – an approach which is well covered in the 
knowledge and network litterateur. It develops a multi-actor framework where corporate venture 
firms co-operate in network formations. In this analysis, the traditional theoretical strategic 
management perspective on corporate venturing (e.g. Block, 1982; Block and MacMillan, 1993; 
McMillan, Block and Narasimha (1986); Siegel, Siegel and MacMillan, 1988; Sweetig, 1981; 
Winters and Murfin, 1988) is supplemented with perspectives from entrepreneurship (e.g. 
Brazeal, 1993; Day, 1994; Hornsby, Kuratko and Zahra, 2001; O´Conner & Rice, 2001; Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000; Zahra, 1991) and social studies of science and knowledge production 
in networks (Etzkowitz, 1998; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1997; Gibbons et. al., 1994; Powel et. 
al, 1996, 2002; Seufert, Von Krogh, Bach, 1999).  
Previous strategic management perspectives on corporate venturing, analyse the choices, 
tradeoffs and activities of the venture managers striving for a strong competitive position. This 
strand of research builds on theories and methods of behavioural science, economics and other 
disciplines to understand the effects on firms. Here, allocation of resources, firm structure and 
new product development was the object for the investigation. This thesis complements these 
issues. It focuses on the corporate venture firm’s knowledge creation in interactive networks to 
develop the knowledge needed for developing and evaluating new innovative ventures. This puts 
emphasis on the structure and context in which knowledge is created and shaped, and more 
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specifically how this facilitates the dynamic management of the early phases of the venture 
process.  
The knowledge for managing in particular the early phase is created in negotiation among a 
waist-high amount of actors; issues well argued for the interfaces of the network, managerial and 
organizational behaviour and entrepreneurship literature. Managerial and organizational 
behaviour focuses on how people use information and how they interact with one another to 
make decisions. Other aspects include negotiation processes, teamwork, and evaluation. The 
entrepreneurship literature supplements this tradition well, as it covers areas of idea generation, 
opportunity discovering, shaping and maturing a new venture.  
 
The following three sub-sections will include a literature review which mirrors the development 
of venture ideas, discovery of business opportunities, and preparation for making an investment 
evaluation. This review will facilitate and position the studies included in this thesis and create 
the broader base for their arguments. The studies don’t cover the field in a totalitarian matter, but 
contributes to current and future discussions on early phase dynamics in corporate venturing.   
 
2.1 Knowledge creation for innovative ventures 
The primary interest of corporate venture firms is to generate a combined strategic and financial 
return on their investments (McNally, 1997). Needless to say, but however very important, this 
demands that they have something to invest in! One could claim that the new innovative ventures 
are the “primary fuel” for the corporate venture capitalists “engines” (McNally, 1997). If the 
corporate venture firm doesn’t have access to novel new ventures it is not able to create a 
sufficient level of profitability and will eventually terminate (Block and MacMillan, 1993). The 
development of new venture opportunities and particularly the knowledge production needed to 
facilitate these, will be examined in this section. This theme is of particular interest in relation to 
Study I (Munk and Vintergaard, 2004), Study II (Jørgensen and Vintergaard, 2006) and Study III 
(Husted and Vintergaard, 2004). 
As indicated in the previous chapter, many venture ideas are developed from scientific research. 
One of the characteristics is the innovativeness or novelty of the investment opportunities 
(venture ideas) (Block and McMillan, 1993; McNally, 1997). The investment opportunities for 
corporate venturing have to be genuinely original in order to fit the risk and return profile that 
venture capitalists expect. The importance of having access to novel ideas was emphasised by 
Timmons (1999: 96) by saying:  
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“At the heart of the entrepreneurial process is the opportunity. The 
entrepreneurial process starts with the opportunity, not money, not 
networks, not the team, not the business plan”.  
Timmons further emphasized that identifying a potential business opportunity is mostly a matter 
of being the right person, in the right place, at the right time. From the earlier discussions about 
the development of scientific results, the perspective has however changed from “the right 
person” to a network of persons. Since we know, that no single person holds all relevant 
knowledge or competence for developing novel ideas, the later analyses will focus on networks 
of people and their collective knowledge creation. Freemann (1976) broadens the network 
perspective by defining technological innovations as:  
“…a process which includes the technical, design, manufacturing, 
management, and commercial activities involved in the marketing of a 
new or improved product…” (Chiesa, 2001: 3)  
 
Roberts (1988) further argued that a prerequisite for creating technological innovations is 
inventions and market connection. Roberts (1988: 12) claimed that a technological innovation is 
defined as the product of an invention and exploitation. The invention is often seen as something 
that did not exist before, and exploitation is the conversion of the idea into new ventures or other 
useful projects (Ettlie, 2000; Roberts, 1988). Kline and Rosenberg (1986) linked this argument to 
uncertainty:  
“…generally, the greater change introduced, the greater the uncertainty 
not only about technical performance but also about the market response 
and the ability of the organisation to absorb and utilize the requisite 
changes effectively” (p. 276)  
 
When talking about innovations the dimensions are however very dispersed (e.g. Christensen, 
1992). This includes such parameters as: 
• Extent of change (radical—incremental) 
• Modality of change (product—process) 
• Complexity of change (component—architecture) 
• Materiality of change (physical—intangible) 
• Capabilities, change and consequences (enhance or destroys market/ technological 
capabilities) 
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 45  
• Relatedness of change (replaces a firm’s existing product or extends it) 
• Cycle of innovation (time between discontinuities) 
 
Innovations are most often indented to create a substantial improvement or functionality of a 
particular product/ service and/or reduce the cost structure of a particular industry. Ettlie (2000) 
argues that technological innovations in particular can cause change in unanticipated and 
unintended ways. However, innovations can take on many other forms than new product 
offerings, some of these are: offering it in a new way, offer something which others find difficult 
to master, contribute a platform on which other variations can build etc. The novelty of an 
innovation is however often related to how radical it is. This refers to innovations which 
represents:  
“…discontinuous events unattainable through incremental adjustments of 
the pre-existing state of affairs” (Lundgren, 1995: 17)  
Therefore, a novel idea is an invention, which has the potential to create a radical innovation 
(Leifer et al., 2000). Burgelman et al. (1996) argues that this type of innovation establishes a new 
dominant design with a new set of core design concepts for the set of components that constitute 
the product. Such components are often a result of knowledge intensive research, which later 
leads to new investment opportunities. This will require new sets of knowledge.  
It has been argued that only six to ten percent of new products are truly new to the world (Ettlie, 
2000: 40). In general, unique venture ideas are rare, involve a long development time, and 
include a high level of uncertainty. Because venture ideas are rare and novel an uncertainty, their 
outcome is correspondently difficult to predict. Discovering new ideas and developing them into 
novel technological innovations involves a high level of uncertainty as a very high percentage of 
new technological innovations will fail (Garud et al,. 1997; Pedersen and Vintergaard, 2001). 
This is particularly true in high tech industries (Mønsted, 2003).  
Timmons (1991) finds that over twenty (20) percent of new ventures fail within one year and 
sixty-six (66) percent fail with in six. In an explorative study of the courses of venture failure 
Zacharakis, Meyer and Decastro (1999) find that venture capitalists most often believe that 
environmental factors are coursing ventures to fail. Since these factors can not be controlled by 
the venture capitalist or the entrepreneur, it follows that the venture investors need a high 
velocity of investment proposals to choose from. In a continuum, here of Block and Macmillan 
(1993) stress the importance for corporate venture firms to develop more ideas than they can 
possibly exploit to have a large sample of available novel ideas to choose from due to the high 
failure rate. Focus is on the ability to make something out of the few successes, and less on 
making more ventures succeed. This argument fits well with the pipeline perspective presented 
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in earlier corporate venture literature, but also disconnects the producers of innovations from the 
rest of society. More specifically it removes the corporate venture firms away from facilitating 
the development of new innovative firms. These arguments are also presented in Study III 
(Husted and Vintergaard, 2004). 
2.1.1 Contributions from the corporate venture literature 
In the corporate venture literature, limited research is conducted on the development of new 
venture firms (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999). While the corporate venturing literature has 
focused substantially on the reasons for establishing venture units and predicting their potential 
rents, only limited attention is paid to the development of a steady flow of high rewarding and 
innovative venture ideas.  
As a key author in the field of corporate venturing, Burgelman (1983) analyses the idea stage 
from a strategic management perspective when discussing the conceptualization and pre-venture 
stages of the development process:  
“…As the definition process takes shape, an idea for a new 
business opportunity evolves into a concrete new product, process 
or system around which a pre-venture team of people is formed. As a 
result of the successful technical and market development efforts of this 
pre-venture team, it grows into an embryonic business organization. 
These stages take place in the context of the corporate R&D department” 
(p. 231)  
This elaboration focuses on the team who enacts, but pays less attention to how this is carried 
out. Burgelman´s (1984) well cited development model depicts both sequential and simultaneous 
strategic activities. These activities happen on three different organizational levels. At the lowest 
level, the activities are performed by the group leader or the venture manager, the middle level is 
the new venture division management and the highest level is corporate management. 
Dimensions of this model are later brought to a different use in connection to strategic business 
exits (Burgelman, 1996).   
Block and MacMillan (1993) (like Burgelman) argue mostly from an internal corporate 
venturing perspective, for the importance of building a venture base on the basis of current 
competencies. Here, the employees are responsible for developing new venture ideas. External 
corporate venturing on the other hand focuses on the ideas generated in the environment outside 
the borders of the parent firm (Keil, 2004; Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). In Study III the venture 
base is the origin of the future ventures. The notion of a venture base is derived from Hannan´s 
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(1976) early work on the venturing process. Block and Macmillan’s (1993) analysis of how to 
influence the idea population explains under which conditions the internal and external 
environments are good sources for new ideas. Their starting point is that corporate venture firms 
should be receptive to ideas generated both inside and outside the organization. Like the work of 
Burgelman (1983), Block and Macmillan include an organisational perspective of which actors 
to include in the process. They argue that the venture bases are imbedded in what they call a 
venturesome climate – a climate developed by venture managers (Block and MacMillan, 1993: 
37). From their analyses they argue that the senior management should: 
• Insist that the entire division pursue new-business development. 
• Don’t assume that the firm must offer specific, extrinsic rewards for new-business activities. 
• Demonstrate significant and visible personal commitment. 
• Sustain the commitment over a longer period of time. 
• Assign very good people to the new business. 
• Develop an in-depth knowledge of customers and markets. 
• Build organizational confidence. 
• Empower the creators of the new business. 
• Build momentum.  
Based on organizational studies from authors such as Byron (1994), we also know that different 
types of so called “venture modes” i.e. organisational and legal structure also provides different 
ways of managing new firm formation. This research focus is on the type of personal and 
organizational structure and less on the innovative process as such. In the corporate venture 
literature, such organisational distinction often analyses where the ideas come i.e. internal and 
external corporate venturing.  
Taking an internal corporate venture perspective; the venture bases is primarily built on current 
organisational knowledge production processes, areas of knowledge, skills, technology, market 
position, distribution channels, product gabs, or product improvements (Block, 1982). In internal 
corporate venturing, one should begin with the analysis of the firm, rather than its environment. 
As mentioned earlier, development should be based on the resources of the firm and not around 
external possibilities. It is argued that following this strategy can lead to competitive advantages 
and thereby superior profits as the firm is better than its competitors in utilizing its unique 
resources (Barney, 1991). Venture ideas, which are developed from internal sources, have some 
kind of relation to the base business of the corporation. The intrapreneurs from an internal 
venture have developed cognitive schemes, which make them more capable of developing highly 
related ventures for the corporation (Block and Macmillan, 1993). Thus, profits are often created 
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through entrepreneurial rents, stemming from firm-level efficiencies (Grant, 1991). Nevertheless, 
internal ventures are closely related to the core business areas of the corporation. In many cases, 
it could even be supporting activities to the current line of business (Block and MacMillan, 
1993). These business ideas are developed on the basis of past development, and these types of 
venture ideas might therefore be less prone to lead to a diversification of major consequences 
(i.e. new products to new markets) (Block, 1982). Simultaneously, internal ideas may be 
limiting, but also a more safe choice as knowledge of the core business already exist (Block and 
MacMillan, 1993). Being bound by past dependencies further implies that firms can only see the 
possibilities that have been useful in the past and not so much, what can be useful in the future 
(Burgelman and Grove, 1996).  
In bridging strategic management and entrepreneurship Hornsby, Kuratko and Zahra (2001) also 
identified the internal conditions that influence middle managers participation in corporate 
entrepreneurship. They found that rewards, top management support, available resources, 
supportive organizational structures, risk taking and tolerance for failure do in fact have a 
positive influence on corporate entrepreneurship. Slightly divergent from this view Day (1994) 
argues that the intrapreneur does not necessarily have to hold a particular position in the firm. 
Day (1994) argues that champions for the highly innovative ventures have their origins in all 
levels of the organization.        
In other corporate venture programs, it is realized that the market (external corporate venturing) 
is somewhat better at identifying new developments, whereas traditional innovation programs 
often are given directions (Keil, 2004; Block and MacMillan, 1993). This thesis argues that 
developing the basis for new ventures happens best in a network environment, an environment 
that strives to combine internal and external knowledge. A network construct would eventually 
make the distinction between internal and external corporate venturing less profound as the two 
melt into one. This perspective strives to combine the innovative capacity of current employees 
and the network that surrounds the corporate venture firm. In the following a review will be 
made of the literature combining network and innovation. This will make valuable contributions 
to most of the studies included in this thesis.  
 
2.1.2 The origin of networks 
Several authors have argued that the creation of new innovations happens in a network structure 
(e.g. Powell et al., 2002, 1996; Seufert et al., 1999). One particularly important source of new 
venture ideas and entrepreneurial opportunities may be the entrepreneurs' and venture capitalists 
social networks (Hills, Lumpkin, and Singh, 1997). Some argue that social networks encompass 
all of the people an individual knows: family members, friends, business associates etc. 
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Johannisson (1990: 41) describes entrepreneurs’ personal networks as the “most significant 
resource of the firm”. It may therefore be of significant insight to analyse new innovations from 
a network perspective. Such perspective is also highly supportive of the dynamic approach in 
this thesis. Before analysing how new and innovative ideas develop under these network 
structures, an initial understanding of the network phenomena is created. This develops from 
understanding the nature of the firm to understand the connection between firms.    
 
Coase’s considerations of the existence of the firm was the beginning of a discussion of different 
governance structures and also a starting point for analysing the origins of the organisation 
(Coase, 1937). This interpretation shaped as he tried to bridge arguments of pricing mechanisms 
with personal based coordination’s – an interpretation which later gave birth to new 
interpretations of networks. Coase argues that some transactions are not carried out through 
market coordination and that firms emerge because of significant lower transaction cost through 
coordination by hierarchy (Coase, 1937). He argues that the:  
“…task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges at all in a 
specialised economy” (p. 390) 
Based upon this dichotomy of the firm and the market, Williamson categorized the so called 
hybrid modes (e.g. inter-organizational networks) as an intermediate form of coordination 
between market and hierarchy. This interpretation was the first genuine conceptualisation of the 
nature of a network. Therefore network formation or structures are in most cases described as 
organisational orchestration located between market and hierarchy (Seufert, von Krogh and 
Bach, 1999).  
A main characteristic of markets is free exchange of goods. Organizations demand goods and 
services that they do not produce themselves, hence exchange of these makes an economy 
develop. Hierarchical coordination is based on influence and control of coordinating the firm. 
The firm integrates goods and services, but it also processes orders in the market regulated by 
contractual agreements. Therefore a hierarchy is regulated by internal control systems and by 
authority. On the contrary, network formations or interfirm coordination is, by Jones, Hesterly 
and Borgatti (1997), characterized as organic or informal social systems, in contrast to 
bureaucratic structures within firms and formal contractual relationships between them (Gerlach, 
1992; Nohria, 1992). A further nuance of such relationship and networks is according to 
Williamson’s (1975) argumentation described:  
“…as a spectrum of arrangements, from loose to tight, from arms-length 
bargaining to total integration, from spot transactions via standing 
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relations to the internalization of their tasks. (...) At one end of the 
spectrum is what we may call the open market. At the other we find the 
firm which is relatively self-sufficient in terms of vertical or functional 
integration.” (Thorelli, 1986: 37)  
This interpretation later gave birth to Burts (1992) categorisations of network structures (more 
details will follow this section). 
Within organizational theory; transaction cost economics is one of the most frequently 
mentioned approaches for analysing networks (e.g. Williamson, 1994). Williamson (1994) even 
argues that organisational theory is often at times, based on the arguments previously presented 
in transaction cost economics. Based on Coase's (1937) insights into the existence of firms, 
Williamson (1975) argues that transaction costs like opportunism, early-mover advantages and 
other strategic considerations lead companies to integrate activities that could normally be 
performed by others more efficiently. Put differently, firms would not integrate activities if they 
had no transaction costs when trading on the open market. Under this assumption, Jarillo (1988) 
points out that firms are able to lower transaction costs by co-operation and therefore will 
become less integrated and more efficient. The latter consists of focusing solely on distinctive 
competencies, reaping all benefits of economies-of-scale and by increasing flexibility to switch 
partners in case of dynamic changing conditions in the business environment. According to 
Williamson (1991), governance structures are typically characterized by at least five 
distinguishing attributes: incentive intensity, administrative control, autonomous adaptation, 
cooperative adaptation, and contract law. Incentive intensity describes the extent to which 
economic incentives vary according to performance. Administrative controls refer to the firm’s 
ability to monitor and either reward or penalize behaviour that supports its objectives. 
Autonomous adaptation deals with the capacity of the individual actors in an operation to make 
changes to unforeseen contingencies or instabilities. Cooperative adaptation refers to the ability 
of network actors to respond to disturbances in a coordinated way. This happens either through 
administrative action or bargaining. Finally, contract law deals with different requirements on 
contracts of particular governance structures. 
 
2.1.3 Network governance 
Networks, however, do not always provide the best mechanism for coordination and governance. 
Therefore, Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) developed a framework for analysing network 
governance in the likely event that a mechanism would accrue and be of a competitive 
advantage. This kind of analyses links very well to the choice of market and hierarchy. Present 
literature on network governance takes point of departure in two distinct clusters: first, the 
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patterns of interaction in exchange and relationships and second, the line of research concerns 
the flows of resources between independent units (Jones, Hasterly and Borgatti, 1997). In order 
to combine the two into a coherent structure, an integrated framework of transaction costs, and 
social network theory was established. In combination, Jones, Hasterly and Borgatti found that 
the condition mechanisms for efficient exchange factors are dependent on: 1) demand 
uncertainty, 2) asset specificity, 3) frequency and 4) task complexity. Depending on a 
combination of these factors we can find indications of the advantage of a network structure. 
These categories also provide a useful set of parameters for showing the use of network 
formations when analysing the early phases of the venturing process and in this context the 
knowledge creation for new venture development.    
Environmental uncertainty refers to an inability to predict future events (Milliken, 1987). 
Sources of uncertainty can come from suppliers, customers, competitors, regulatory agencies, 
unions, or financial markets etc. (Miles and Snow, 1978). High-level uncertainty often prompts 
firms to vertically integrate (Helfat and Teece, 1987). This can be due to obsolescence, 
(Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986; Mariotti and Cainarca, 1986), and specialisation etc. As it 
has already been pointed out, corporate venturing strategies are by definition influenced by a 
high level of uncertainty. The corporate venture firms are searching for new business ideas, 
which are more risky than the base business of the corporate setting. Demand uncertainty is also 
generated by rapid changes in knowledge, or technology which results in short product lifecycles 
and makes the rapid dissemination of information critical (Barley, Freeman and Hybels, 1992; 
Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993; Powell and Brantley, 1992; Robertson and Langlois, 1995). By 
adapting a network structure in the process of developing new venture ideas, it increases the 
flexibility and ability to respond faster and broader to a wide range of opportunities. Due to that 
fact, resources are exchanged rather than owned and information and knowledge can also be 
reallocated and exchanged upon demand at a much lower cost.  
The second factor is asset specific exchange. According to Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) 
this involves unique equipment, processes, or knowledge developed by participants to complete 
exchanges. The more specific the task is the more emphasis is needed on coordination between 
parties. Customization combined with uncertainty also pressures safeguarding on exchanges 
through reducing behavioural uncertainty (Hesterly and Zenger, 1993).  
Knowledge for new venture ideas has to be novel to facilitate genuine and unique innovative 
process. As it will also be pointed out later in this thesis other authors have stressed that the 
possibilities of renewal happens best in the overlaps between the different disciplines and not in 
units of one (Powell et al., 1996; Wilks, 2000). Such overlaps are often seen from the 
perspectives of cooperation between academic research and research done in cooperation as well 
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as across different industries (Gibbons et. al, 1994). Universities are, to a greater extent, starting 
to take responsibility in relation to the overall need of society e.g. production of research based 
knowledge for practical implementation. Likewise, we see that commercial scientists are equally 
on the research forefront. This makes academic and commercial scientists part of the same 
community (Powell and Owen-Smith, 2002, 1998). 
Frequency is important for several reasons: First, frequency facilitates sharing tacit knowledge, 
especially for specialized processes or knowledge. Second, frequent interactions between actors 
facilitate conditions for relational and structural embeddedness which provides the foundation 
for social mechanisms to adapt, coordinate, and safeguard exchanges effectively. As this thesis 
will show later, different kinds of relational and structural embeddedness will also be powerful 
when collecting knowledge for investment evaluation. Additionally, frequent interactions 
decrease the costs of using specialized governance structures (Williamson, 1985: 60). Frequent 
exchanges not only justify but also enable interfirm networks as an alternative governance form. 
Some degree of frequency is important with human asset specific exchanges because human 
asset specificity results from learning-by-doing, deepens through continued interaction, and 
creates exchanges where the identity of the other network actors matters (Williamson, 1991: 
281-282). Human asset specificity requires frequent exchanges to transfer tacit knowledge 
among parties. 
The composition of knowledge in today’s products and services are reaching increasing levels of 
complication – accentuating the final element of task complexity. This demands an increasing 
level of competencies and diversification of knowledge (Bach, Seufert and Krogh, 1999; 
Gibbons et. al 1994). A major consequence is that even though firms are allocating more and 
more resources to their in-house R&D functions, they can rarely carry the burden of a full blown 
program alone. Task complexity in conjunction with time pressures has led to team coordination 
where diversely skilled members work simultaneously to produce a good or service (Faulkner 
and Anderson, 1987; Goodman and Goodman, 1976; Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig, 1976). 
As teams coordinate activities and mutually adjusted information flows, it leads to increased 
speed in information sharing among parties and reduces the time to complete complex tasks 
(Clark and Fujimoto, 1989; Imai, Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1985). This implies that firms are 
seeking resources from a wide spectrum of firms in order to facilitate the innovative process. 
Small firms are often forced (due to the complexity in specific tasks and lack of human 
resources) to use outside networks (e.g. Mønsted, 2003; Nygaard, 2000). Large firms have, as it 
has been exemplified, often difficulties in innovating why networks also are a prerequisite for 
them (Block and MacMillan, 1993).  
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2.1.4 Network and innovation 
As highlighted above, networks seem to function particularly good for managing the early 
phases of the venturing process - especially for governing the knowledge creation and utilisation 
necessary for developing new innovative ventures. Therefore it is often argued that 
interorganizational collaboration is the locus of innovation (e.g. Newell and Swan, 2000).  
Authors describing the creation of innovation in networks stresses that firms are changing from 
well-defined entities consisting of fixed structures of managing systems into an entanglement of 
network systems with indistinct boundaries (Seufert et al., 1999). One could argue that this 
illustrates Williamson’s (1983, 1975) description of balances between markets and hierarchies 
very well. The focus has shifted from products and firms as units of analysis to people and the 
social process that connects them in ongoing relationships. Most firms are realizing that a key 
factor in obtaining a lasting competitive advantage is not the ability to administer existing 
knowledge, but the capacity to continually generate new knowledge (Powell et al., 1996). The 
locus is interorganisational relationships where participation and invitation of knowledge 
exchange is core (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Powell et al., 1996). A network serves as the 
locus of innovation in many high-tech fields:  
"…because it provides timely access to knowledge and resources that are 
otherwise unavailable, while also testing internal expertise and learning 
capabilities" (Powell, 1996: 231)  
This trend will presumably continue, thus making the process of opportunity creation and 
transfer of new knowledge into network structures. As an extreme illustration it has also been 
recognized that also competitive organizations have started to make collaborations units 
(Gibbons et. al, 1994; Nowotny et al., 2001; Wilks, 2000). It indicates a tendency of reorganizing 
the knowledge production process in new physiological and organisational structures. In these 
setups, knowledge is exchanged and developed in structures that previously did not exist 
(Gibbons et al, 1994). These setups are often executing so-called “systematic innovation”, as 
they engage in the determined and organized search for changes and the systematic analysis of 
the opportunities (e.g. Drucker, 1986). Such changes might offer product as well as social 
innovations.  
To further understand the development of new ventures and innovation, Powell et al. argues that 
networking should be seen in a learning perspective (Powell et al., 1996). Here learning unfolds 
in the trade zone between e.g. established firms, start-ups, universities, research units, suppliers 
and customers; situations well argued for in the previous chapter on new dynamic innovation 
models. Contrary to the strategic network arguments of risk speeding (which sees network 
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activities as calculative and strategic) the learning perspective focuses on building and 
maintaining skills and routines - a central activity in organizations (Powel et al., 1996). 
Collaborative research and development can function as an eye opener for accessing ideas and 
knowledge from a variety of sources, in order to exploit already achieved research results in a 
commercial context. Experience in collaboration is however needed to develop the capacity to 
benefit from interdependencies across collaborative behaviour (Mønsted, 2002).   
Bridging organizational studies and innovation literature, Powell et al. (1996) and others argue 
that the locus of innovation should be thought of as a network of inter-organizational relations. 
For these authors the composition of the network actors is key. Powell et al. finds that innovation 
requires diverse types of institutions and organizational practices. Innovation is created by 
interfaces and overlaps between the different industries and disciplines (e.g. Etzkowitz, 1998). In 
the earlier mentioned work of Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1997) we know that such 
organizations in some incidents even have been categorized into separate but collaborative 
arrangements.  
Other authors have focused on the specific context in which such network agreements takes 
place. For example, knowledge production that focuses on problem solving in the context of 
application is as mentioned earlier characterized by both Gibbons et al. (1994) and Nowotny et 
al. (2001) as Mode 2 knowledge. Mode 2 knowledge production was initially developed for 
testing and shaping university research, but in this thesis, it is put to a broader use. This 
argument follows the previous dynamic models for developing innovations, and making them 
socially robust. An important element in the process of making the research results socially 
robust is the process of the contextualization. Here, results are tested in broad context and 
feedback for further development as provided. Mode 2 refers to knowledge produced in the 
context of application, which implies that research can be used by industry or society to solve 
specific problems (Nowotny et al, 2001). Apart from being produced in the context of 
application, Mode 2 knowledge production has two other characteristics: Transdisciplinary and 
heterogeneity, which influence the knowledge production. 
Transdisciplinary and heterogeneity refers to the variety of skills and experiences people 
contribute to produce Mode 2 knowledge. By focusing on the new forms of knowledge 
production in such a heterogeneous character, a greater understanding will be created of the 
knowledge production process to be utilized in innovative projects. There seams to be two prime 
reasons for engaging in heterogeneous networks: first, production/development of viable 
knowledge which can result in significant novel ideas and second, to ground and test the 
developments. In these networks, resources are not only collected, but also generated in a 
dynamic interplay (Gibbons et al. 1994; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). Effective knowledge 
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creation, both in terms of renewal and in terms of the frequency, can happen if resources are 
committed to the process. One of the main drivers for these networks is the significant output, 
which is found in organizing knowledge production, but also because it is socially robust. This 
has potential in establishing innovations, as it automatically ensures heterogeneity (Gibbons et 
al, 1994).  
One of the largest challenges is the ability to appreciate the value of novel ideas (Weick, 2001). 
Gibbons et al. (1994) argues that while the novelty of the ideas will increase in these types of 
networks, so will their trustworthiness (robustness). Later in this chapter a more elaborative 
analysis of this type of collaboration will be described. This shows particularly powerful when 
analysing some of the mechanisms that corporate venture firms could use, when they evaluate 
new investment opportunities (please also see Study V about evaluation).   
Consensibility and consensuality also relates to innovation processes in Mode 2 knowledge 
production (Nowotny et al., 2001). That is, the content of knowledge should not be ambiguous or 
obscure in the sense that the essence of it becomes difficult for others to assent or contest. Hence, 
knowledge should provide a sense of consensibility. Furthermore, science should be based on 
facts as well as principles that have been accepted and hereby a broad range of actors. In other 
words, science should possess a high degree of consensuality. Thus,:  
“…it is through the operation of the twin processes of consensibility and 
consensuality that science is able to produce reliable knowledge…” 
(Nowotny et al., 2001: 170)  
 
As earlier argued, the process of knowledge creation is not linear. On the contrary, the 
production of knowledge should be seen as a circular and intertwined process (Kline and 
Rosenberg, 1986). It is thus, not a question of right and wrong but on the contrary, a question of 
creating knowledge based on sound arguments. In this way the process of creating not just new 
knowledge but knowledge that is consensible to more than the researcher himself becomes a 
question of an ongoing process where the researcher incrementally expands his or her pool of 
knowledge. Hence, in a sense, scientific knowledge is contextualized in a process of research and 
discovery where “feedback loops” constantly are created to reach incremental increases in 
quality.  
The quality of the conclusions put forward for determining the robustness of innovations for new 
venture firms depends on the quality of the knowledge produced and its iterative testing 
procedures. Ensuring that the knowledge produced is reliable is crucial as it affects the quality of 
the conclusions put forward for future decision making in the different research initiatives. 
Nowotny et al. (2001:167-178) recognize the importance of producing reliable knowledge and, 
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thus, introduce the concept of socially robust knowledge. The concept of socially robust 
knowledge builds on the findings of Ziman (1991), who argued that reliable scientific knowledge 
is produced when researchers make individual contributions, which then are filtered and 
elaborated by mutual evaluation and intellectual challenges from other researchers. To Ziman 
(1991), scientific knowledge becomes reliable by going through continuous evaluation and 
criticisms posed by other researchers and practitioners:  
“…”science” is not a well-bounded, coherent thing, capable of being 
more or less “understood”…what counts as science is something defined 
very differently by different people – or even by the same people under 
different circumstances.” (p.100)  
Through the process of continuous testing, the knowledge is improved and reaches a state of 
stability. It is the process of testing and improving the knowledge that makes the knowledge 
receive a larger degree of reliability and simultaneously turns it more applicable, also for the 
corporate venture firms. While the Mode 2 framework was initially developed for scientific 
research at universities, it also finds particular good use in venture context, which carries many 
of the same attributes and belong to many of the same communities. Most noticeable is that 
corporate ventures in most cases invest in science based ventures. 
According to Nowotny et al. (2001), the process of creating socially robust knowledge is 
repeated continuously, as the reliability of the knowledge will always be challenged. This means 
that knowledge will always, to some extent, be incomplete as the questioning and criticisms 
posed by other researchers will continue. Based on the discussion, the concept of socially robust 
knowledge could be interpreted as knowledge, which has been subject to frequent testing, 
feedback, and improvements enhancing the reliability of the knowledge produced. A point that 
further illustrates the dynamic nature of innovation processes. 
As illustrated above, creating socially robust knowledge is an iterative process of continuous 
testing and improving the knowledge created through interaction with others. In line with this 
argumentation, it is not possible to create knowledge that is purely socially robust, as the quality 
of the knowledge produced will always be questioned by other researchers, costumers, 
academics, other venture capitalists, etc.  
The previous section paid special attention to the literature written about network formations and 
knowledge productions process for the development of new ventures ideas and opportunities. 
The following section will move further up the value chain and provide a literature review of 
corporate venture firm’s discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
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2.2 Discovering the investment opportunity 
This chapter will review a new and developing theme from the entrepreneurship tradition: 
discovery of venture opportunities. Particularly, how different investment opportunities gets on 
“the radar” of corporate venture firms. These arguments are also presented in Study IV 
(Vintergaard, 2005) and Study V (Vintergaard and Husted, Submitted). While overlaps may 
occur, this chapter does not directly pay attention to venture evaluation which is addressed in the 
next section.  
Most articles on entrepreneurial opportunities have been analysed in the framework of individual 
entrepreneurs discovering new business opportunities. This process is often analysed in some 
relation to Robert’s (1988) idea of linking markets and technologies. In this terminology it is the 
job of the entrepreneur to link technologies and solutions to market needs. This thesis uses some 
of these same findings to construct arguments in a corporate venture structure. While the 
corporate strategies differ in many concerns to the entrepreneurial venture many of the 
arguments still have relevance. For corporate venture investors, discovering new venture 
opportunities is one of their primary tasks. If no venture ideas are discovered, no investments nor 
results can be harvested. As a contribution to the entrepreneurship tradition, opportunity 
recognition is moved to the investor’s point of view. This shift requires that not only should the 
entrepreneur discover new entrepreneurial opportunities, but the corporate venture should have a 
similar positive attitude for the venture to develop. The following sections provide a review of 
the literature for analysing the discovery of venture opportunities. To accompany the analysis, 
literature from the corporate venture tradition will initially be reviewed.  
 
2.2.1 Contributions from the corporate venture literature    
In Wright and Robbie´s review and synthesises of the wide body of venture capital literature, 
they argue that only limited attention is paid to the discovery stage of the venture process (deal 
generation) even though it remains an important area to the corporate world (Wright and Robbie, 
1998). Their own review and analysis of what venture capitalists do, however, also neglects this 
phase. Wright and Robbie do pay attention to deal generation but moves on directly to the 
problems associated with venture evaluation. This leaves out the search process and therefore 
also the process associated with opportunity discovery. While this stage of the process remains 
relatively untouched, below will follow some of the main findings made in the venture capital 
and corporate venture literature.  
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 58  
There are two different approaches to discover new venture opportunities: a proactive and a 
reactive approach (Sweeting, 1991). In the proactive approach, venture investors are actively 
looking for potential ventures to invest in, for instance by attending industry fairs, business plan 
competitions, springboards, and other networks, or by direct involvement in influencing the 
entrepreneurial communities. The reactive approach is characterized by venture investors 
passively awaiting business plan proposals. In an analysis of venture capital firms in the mid-
1980’s Tyebjerg and Bruno (1984) found that the behaviour by venture capitalists in seeking out 
investments was to wait passively for new deal proposals to be given to them. Sweeting (1991) 
also found that most deals were referred by third parties and that venture capitalists rarely act 
proactively in discovering new investment opportunities. The two major sources investors gain 
access to investment opportunities from are: entrepreneurs themselves and the informal 
networks. Other sources were (in descending order): Formal network/ partners, financial 
intermediaries and proactive search. In their analysis, both Sweeting (1991) and Tyebjerg and 
Bruno (1984) concluded that venture capitalists almost without exception where applying a 
reactive and passive approach to deal generation.  
The investment opportunities are most often exchanged between investors who have a high 
degree of trust between each other and therefore believe that they are not served a lemon. The 
reason for including other investors is primarily to spread risk, access more opportunities, and to 
create a broader knowledge base for investment decisions. Syndicated investments are especially 
for established investors that wish to work with new and untried markets (Albrinck et al. 2000). 
McNally (1997: 111) argues: 
“Co-investments with venture capitalists (parallel investments) are a 
potentially beneficial way of identifying investment opportunities and 
also accessing the investment expertise of the venture capitalist”.  
This relationship often constitutes a syndicate investment situation between two or more venture 
capitalists investors (Bygrave, 1987, 1988; Dotzler, 2001; McNally, 1997). In order for venture 
managers to gain access to an opportunity from other venture managers, there is a reversible 
commitment to provide these managers with other venture opportunities. A common 
characteristic of this type of opportunity is that they are presented as venture proposals/ business 
plans and sometimes even established ventures. Selling an investment to another venture 
capitalist is also a variant of this kind of relationship. In the next section some of the problems 
associated with investment evaluation are reviewed.      
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Other authors have found that venture capitalists also discover new investment opportunities 
from other actors then entrepreneurs and other venture capitalists (Burgelman, 1983; Sharma and 
Chrisman, 1999; Sweetig, 1981; von Hippel, 1977). Venture capitalists often have a broad 
network and therefore manage to access and make themselves visible in many different contexts. 
As earlier indicated, venture capitalists are also often searching for knowledge and research 
intensive venture opportunities at universities (Etzkowitzz and Leydesdorff, 1997). Other authors 
have found that venture ideas also derive from corporate firms which are spun off. These are 
often ideas that do not fit with the core business of the firm (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003).  
 
2.2.2 Defining entrepreneurial opportunities 
When reviewing the entrepreneurship and general innovation literature, the definition of an 
entrepreneurial opportunity reveals large deviations (Bygrave and Hofer, 1991; Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2001; Singh, 2001). For example, corporate entrepreneurship, use entrepreneurial 
opportunities to describe the business idea that the venture initially possesses (Bhave, 1994; Hills 
et al., 1997; Long and McMullan, 1984). However from the traditional entrepreneurship tradition 
focus is more on the entrepreneurial act i.e. finding the good idea. Some of the most recognised 
definitions even define and distinguish the field of entrepreneurship as the study of sources and 
exploitation of opportunities (Venkataraman, 1997; Zahra and Dess, 2001). In Bygrave and 
Hofer (1991: 14) they define the entrepreneurial event as the creation of a new organisation to 
pursue an opportunity. In this work, the organisation as a distinctive institution, takes a central 
role for describing entrepreneurship. Shane and Venkataraman (2000) further, use opportunities 
as a means to delineate the field of entrepreneurship. They argue that:  
“…entrepreneurship is the scholarly examination of how, by whom and 
with what effects opportunities to create future goods and services are 
discovered, evaluated and exploited” (p. 218)  
This definition draws on Venkataraman’s article from (1997), which aim at a broader context. In 
the more specific article from 2000 Shane and Venkataraman additionally argues that the 
following three sets of research questions are especially central for the entrepreneurship field 
(and also point out that this makes the field distinct from e.g. statistic management): a) why, 
when and how opportunities for the creation of goods and services come into existence; b) why, 
when and how some people and not others discover and exploit these opportunities; and c) why, 
when and how different modes of action are used to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities.  
In a later dialogue with Zahra and Dess (2001) it is argued that several points have not been yet 
accounted for by Shane and Venkataraman, but that it creates a good starting point for making 
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entrepreneurship an academic field on its own. Very insightful, Zahra and Dess make the claim 
that a fourth dimension is to be found in the outcome of the exploitation process: they rightfully 
argue that most entrepreneurial activities never become successes. In the work of Shane and 
Venkataraman (2000) they successfully manage to delineate the scholarly domain of 
entrepreneurship rather than suggesting yet another definition of the academic phenomenon. As 
part of this elaboration, Zahra and Dess nevertheless managed to point out the existence of 
alternative modes of exploitation for given opportunities as an important research question. 
However, entrepreneurial opportunities differ from the larger set of other profit-seeking 
opportunities because the former requires the discovery of new means and ends relationships, 
whereas the latter also involves optimization within existing means/ends relationships (Kirzner, 
1997).  
In a later article of Eckhardt  and Shane (2003) they attempted to solve some of the critical 
points that derived from describing the entrepreneurship field, as the study of entrepreneurial 
opportunities (e.g. Singh, 2001; Zahra and Dess, 2001). Here, a more thorough discussion of the 
role of opportunities is made. In the discussion they: 1) break with the previous equilibrium 
orientation of entrepreneurship, 2) explain why entrepreneurship requires theories based on the 
existence of opportunities and the actions of agents, and 3) explain what opportunities are (and 
their type) and how they are discovered and exhausted.      
 
2.2.3 Opportunities and profitability 
As a further comment to the field of entrepreneurship, Shane and Venkataraman (2000) argue 
that opportunity can imply several different modes of exploitation and state:  
“…opportunities can be sold to other individuals or to existing 
organisations” (p. 220) 
This makes opportunities more transit then the usual perception of products and organisations. 
Differently, Christensen, Madsen and Peterson (1994) offer a definition of opportunities in the 
business context, where they define an opportunity as a new profit potential through: 1) the 
founding and formation of a new venture, or 2) the significant improvement of an existing 
venture. Like for Shane and Venkataraman (2000) this turns profitability and commercial issues 
into key parameters of an entrepreneurial opportunity, but also makes the interpretation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities narrower. Others have argued that while an opportunity to create 
value is a necessary part of the entrepreneurial process, it is not sufficient to generate wealth for 
the entrepreneur (Casson, 1982). This line of argument somewhat supports Zahra and Dess 
(2001) in earlier arguments of venture failures.  
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As part of the same dialog by Zahra and Dess (2001) in Academy of Management Review 
regarding the article of Shane and Venkataraman (2000); Singh (2001), makes the claim that 
many opportunities would be jeopardized when analyzed from the perspective of profitability. 
One could say that this perspective is very much in line with Zahra and Dess (2001) and Casson 
(1992). Singh argues that technological advances and a high degree of uncertainty conceivably 
could cause ventures to lose their “status” as opportunities if they later turn unprofitable. In this 
vein, Singh (2001) proposes:  
“…that an entrepreneurial opportunity should be defined as a feasible, 
profit-seeking, potential venture that provides an innovative new product 
or service to the market, improves on an existing product/service, or 
imitates a profitable product/service in a less-than-saturated market” (p. 
11) 
He further argues that by focusing on feasibility and profit seeking, an opportunity can be 
defined prior to venture founding and profitability (Singh, 2001). Recalling Roberts (1988) 
previous definition of an innovation (invention and marketability), there are tight links to the 
definition of an opportunity. The new dimensions from the entrepreneurship tradition come from 
a more dynamic and process oriented analysis. This kind of analysis often has the entrepreneurs 
as the focal point of investigation.  
In an earlier definition; Casson (1982) elaborated on new profit potentials by defining 
opportunities as situations in which new goods, services, raw materials and organizing methods 
can be introduced and sold with a yield. Shane and Venkataraman (2000) subscribe to Casson's 
(1982) definition of entrepreneurial opportunities, but later extend it to a conceptual element of 
entrepreneurship. In a later and more comprehensive explanation of entrepreneurial opportunities 
Eckhardt and Shane (2003: 336) argues that opportunities:  
“…do not need to change the terms of economic exchange to be 
entrepreneurial opportunities, but need to have the potential to alter the 
terms of economic exchange”  
The important word here is the potential, which softens the previous dimension of profitability. 
One may however question, when the economic potential is present (or can be determined) in a 
situation when the balance between economic success and failure is so tightly connected as it is 
for venture capital investments. This is however somewhat included as Eckhardt and Shane 
argues that prices are incomplete indicators of opportunities.  
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2.2.4 Entrepreneurial opportunities: discovered or created  
In the entrepreneurship literature, a further diversifying element is whether entrepreneurs 
discover opportunities or whether they actively create them. For some authors, their perspective 
on entrepreneurial opportunities are perceived as a natural happening in the world where alert 
and sometimes fortunate entrepreneurs make a discovery and take actions to exploit it (e.g. 
Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2003). Based on this kind perspective Shane and 
Venkataraman (2000) argue that:  
“because the range of options and the consequences of exploiting new 
things are unknown, entrepreneurial decisions cannot be made through an 
optimal process in which mechanical calculations are made in response 
to a given set of alternatives…” (p. 220)  
In this context an optimal process is interpreted as the active peruse of a given mean to an end. 
From a resent book of Shane (2003) he extends the analysis of entrepreneurship by offering an 
overarching conceptual framework that explains the different parts of the entrepreneurial 
process. This process includes: the opportunities, the people who pursue them, the skills and 
strategies used to organize and exploit opportunities, and the environmental conditions 
favourable to them. As a further elaboration of the entrepreneurs and how they discover new 
opportunities Eckhardt and Shane argue that:  
“…entrepreneurs… allocate resources better than they are currently 
allocated or would be allocated in the future on the basis of information 
not incorporated in prices” (p. 338)  
This perception is based on the assumption that entrepreneurs buy, make new, use or sell 
recourses and does not assume that new resources can be defined.   
Different arguments suggest that opportunities should be analysed in the light of entrepreneurs 
who actively try to create their own opportunities. In this interpretation the entrepreneurial 
opportunity fundamentally depends on the entrepreneurial action. Different from e.g. Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000; and Shane, 2003, this view believes that opportunities are not discovered 
before exploitation but rather seen as the final result of a creative and social process (e.g. Gartner 
et al., 2003; Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy, 2004). These kinds of results are primarily driven by 
an underlying technology-push strategy where the entrepreneurs in their extreme form know and 
create future demands of the market. Such interpretation could in an absolute case be seen as the 
linear model, which was discussed and critiqued earlier in this thesis.  
Others have emphasised that the creation process is strongly coupled with organisational 
development and environmental change. In this context the creation process is a central proof of 
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being an entrepreneur. In Bygrave and Hofer (1991) it is claimed that the act of becoming an 
entrepreneur involves changing the external environment from one state (without the venture) to 
another (with the venture). For such an argument the organisational process is a key variable.       
In a current academic contribution, the two previous strands (creation versus discovery) is 
incorporated into a larger comprehensive framework, a framework also including recognition of 
opportunities. Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and Venkatarman (2003) developed a conceptual 
understanding of the distinction between opportunities recognition, discovery and creation. In 
this framework they try to:  
… model an entrepreneurial opportunity as a function, or a process of 
decisions, respectively” (p. 142)  
Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and Venkatarman (2003) refer to opportunity recognition as an 
entrepreneur who manages to combine existing technologies and markets. In this context:  
“…both sources of supply and demand exist rather obviously, the 
opportunity for bringing them together has to be recognized and then the 
match-up between supply and demand has to be implemented either 
through an existing firm or a new firm” (p. 145)  
This view has its origination in neoclassical economies where resource allocation can lead to 
efficiency perfectly competitive markets.  
On the contrary, the process of opportunity discovery describes the process where only one of 
the variables exists and the other needs to be created (technology or market). This is a situation 
where a technology has been developed, but not marketed yet. The last possible (and less 
frequent) situation, opportunity creation, is where neither market nor technology exists. Such 
situation is however difficult to imagine. For corporate ventures demand or supply will most 
likely be given. Therefore opportunity discovery will be the typology used from now on.  
 
2.2.5 Discovery of opportunities: a process 
In current entrepreneurship literature on entrepreneurial opportunities, it becomes more and more 
accepted that opportunity discovery is a process and not an act out of sudden intuition (e.g. 
Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and Venkatarman, 2003). We will see that incremental information 
exposure will result in a process driven discovery. Some authors have also argued that 
entrepreneurial opportunity discovery is a behavioural phenomenon and an approach to 
management involving a progressive course of action (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). This 
progressive course is further illustrated in Study IV (Vintergaard, 2005). 
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Working with processes, as one of the explaining variables to discover new opportunities, leads 
many authors to focus on the individual entrepreneur or the individuals assisting him. Therefore 
the process of opportunity discovery is often explained as the process through which individuals 
acting alone perceive a previous unseen or unknown opportunity (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). 
Some have even argued that entrepreneurship researchers must recognize the importance of 
human volition (Bygrave and Hofer, 1991: 17).  
Earlier literature perceived entrepreneurs as someone with a specific cognitive mindset. 
Entrepreneurs were born with a specific gene-structure which leads them to start up new 
ventures. Current literature on the personal attributes of entrepreneur tends to distant itself from 
this interpretation, by focusing more in the cognition of humans in general. This kind of 
literature strives to explain how individuals interpret information and make decisions. A central 
area of analysis in the entrepreneurship literature is how entrepreneurs think, what they do, etc. 
Such analysis is a core theme in the Austrian economic literature (Foss, 1994; Foss and Kline, 
2002; Hayek, 1945; Kirzner, 1979). Hence it is central in Austrian economics to focus on how 
knowledge and information is produced and distributed between individuals and consequently 
how the individuals act. The discovery of new entrepreneurial opportunities becomes a key 
challenge for individual entrepreneurs in this regard. The source of opportunities here separates 
defenders of Austrian economics into those who believe that new opportunities are based on 
different accesses to existing information (Kirzner, 1973, 1997) and those who believe they are 
based on new information used to recombine information (Schumpeter, 1934). More resent 
research suggests that both types of opportunities can be presented in the same market (Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000). Schumpeterian opportunities are however more radical and less 
frequent and will most often be of interest for venture investors. 
The process of opportunity discovery has also been studied within existing firms (Stevenson and 
Jarillo, 1990; Venkataraman, 1997). Such analysis often stresses how information and new 
venture ideas travel in organisations. This analytical focus is also core to the early corporate 
venture literature of e.g. Burgelman (1983). In Burgelman’s, (1983) specific attention is given to 
the development process of the ideas and the people involved. Other authors developed 
analytical frameworks of the kinds of paths that ideas travel on. In Hellström and Hellström 
(2002) they developed a structural understanding of how ideas travel in large organisations. The 
article develops an understanding that successful idea development depends on the capacity of 
actors and ideas to move on “organisational highways”, alleys and by lanes. Hellström and 
Hellström (2002) highlight that opportunities can travel in many different ways through an 
organisation, and it can meet many different obstacles on its ways. This also opened for a 
different analysis of management position to facilitate the process. In the work of O´Conner and 
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Rice (2001) they analyse how large firms recognize new radial innovative ideas. Hence they 
develop an understanding of how different management positions in organizations enable 
recognition of opportunities.  
This section has highlighted some of the resent discussions about entrepreneurial opportunities 
and the process of their discovery. The next section will review and elaborate on the 
preconditions for the corporate venture investor’s evaluation process of these opportunities. 
More specifically the review will include the challenges associated with evaluation and the 
means to overcome them.     
 
2.3 Preparing for investment evaluation   
As venture opportunities have been discovered, they need to undergo an evaluation process 
before the corporate venture firm makes its investment (Block, 1982; Block and MacMillan, 
1993). Following the dynamic logic of this thesis, the evaluation process often proceeds over a 
period of time – in many cases from the very early phases of the venture process. Study V further 
analyse the complications in venture evaluation whereas Study IV illustrate how the process 
proceeds over time. 
This section reviews the literature on corporate venture firm’s evaluation process. The evaluation 
processes includes activities which prepare the investors for value assessment and selection of 
the venture investments. The evaluation phase of the venture process includes some of the most 
important activities in the process for both corporate venture investors and entrepreneurs, as it is 
during this phase investors create and collect the knowledge needed for the investment decision. 
The review will focus on the knowledge production for evaluation which takes place in 
networks. Such knowledge production makes venture managers better prepared for evaluation. 
The later processes of: selection and commitment of capital will not be included in the review 
e.g. contracting, financial structuring, due diligence etc. More specifically, this chapter will 
review the evaluation literature in perspective to how knowledge can be created and acquired to 
establish a better platform for decision-making. Here knowledge production in networks will be 
of particular interest.  
The evaluation phase will (like the previous phases) not always follow strict chronological 
procedures but sometimes advance in parallel or decupled from the rest of the innovation 
process. Often the entrepreneur presents his business idea to venture capitalists many times 
before he ends up having his business plan evaluated. During this period, investors try to disclose 
as much information of the venture opportunity as possible. Yet, other times the idea is presented 
by other investors etc. Therefore the process is highly dynamic and includes a wide range of 
people and organizations. 
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Initially a review of the relevant corporate venture and venture capital literature will be 
presented. This includes some of the most often mentioned struggles associated with evaluating 
new innovative ventures and the most frequent methods of overcoming these. Secondly a review 
of alternative strands of literature will be conducted, including how to manage knowledge 
creation for evaluation in a network. This review has in particular contributed to Study V 
(Vintergaard and Husted, Submitted). 
 
2.3.1 Contributions from the corporate venture literature 
Research has shown that for each project accepted for investment, venture capitalists reject most 
of the proposals in the screening process (Harrison and Mason, 1996; Pedersen and Vintergaard, 
2001). Given the low rate of success for new ventures there has to be something particular 
compelling before venture investors are convinced of the viability of the venture (Foo, Wong and 
Ong, 2005). The investment evaluation phase is an important and very time-consuming activity. 
Tybjee and Bruno (1981) found that venture capitalists spend almost fifty per cent (50%) of their 
time screening and evaluating business proposals. Ironically, other authors have found that 
venture capitalists seldom utilize the potential beneficial decision aids (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 
2002).  
Since only a few emerging ventures have the right risk and reward profile, competition for good 
venture projects is fierce and the capability to make the right decision on the right foundation is 
critical. A series of arguments exists as to why the decision-making process is critical: There is 
first and foremost a risk of wrongly promoting a malign venture or wrongly rejecting a beneficial 
one. If less rewarding projects are selected it prevents the venture capitalist from using its limited 
resources on other projects and hence looses profits from other business. Additionally, there is a 
chance that unprofitable projects can hurt the image of the investor. 
When evaluating private firms (e.g. new ventures), a number of estimation issues arise that do 
not exist when valuing public firms (Damodaran, 2002). These differences affect both the 
valuation process and the final value of the private firm. Firstly, public firms display items in the 
financial statements according to accepted accounting standards and private firms operate in a 
less regulated environment. Secondly, while public firms are under a legal obligation to make 
certain kinds of information available to the public, there is less information available about 
private firms. Thirdly, current and historical prices for equity can be obtained for public firms 
but not for private ones. Fourthly, the costs associated with liquidating an equity position in a 
private firm are higher and the task more difficult due to the absence of a marketplace. In the 
markets such as the Danish, legislators have just recently started to build a market place for 
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unquoted stocks attempting to make a better market for both buyer and seller. Finally, owners of 
a private firm also tends to be a part of the management structure of the firm and, as such, often 
fail to differentiate between personal and business expenses, management salary and dividends. 
All of these differences will affect the discount rates used, cash flows and expected growth rates 
and hence the value of the private firm.  
 
2.3.2 Evaluation condition 
In the corporate venture literature on venture opportunity evaluation, the following arguments 
are often proposed as to why the evaluation process is a particularly troublesome task for such 
private firms and new venture firms. 
New innovative ventures build on transdisciplinary and heterogenic knowledge 
The first reason for substantial difficulties in evaluating new venture firms is found in the risk 
(and return) that is associated with early stage projects (Bygrave, 1987; Liles, 1974). Many 
venture projects only entail limited information about the products or services (Mønsted, 2003). 
The business may only consist of sketched out business plans and preferable intellectual property 
rights of the product or service. The limited information is coursed by limited knowledge about 
future market conditions and costumer segments etc. Consequently there is a high level of 
uncertainty about the level of success as things easily can change and markets can disappear.  
As an additional complicating matter, new venture ideas are often representing the work of many 
different disciplines and competencies (e.g. Christensen, Gregersen and Rogaczewska, 1999). In 
an analysis of how team diversity affects external decision-making Foo, Wong and Ong (2005) 
found that by having a task-related diversity of team members, their characteristics enhances 
team effectiveness. We also know from the earlier sections that innovations are no longer 
developed through inputs of homogeneous character (Foo, Wong and Ong, 2005) nor according 
to linear progression (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). This is particularly relevant for ventures 
which build on scientific results. As mentioned earlier, formalized and systematic knowledge 
production in research is increasingly carried out in a context of application and is characterized 
by transdisciplinarity and heterogeneity (Harvey, Pettigrew, Ferlie, 2002; Nowotny et al., 2001). 
This dominant mode of knowledge production in the present knowledge society is expected to 
be:  
“…more socially accountable and reflexive. It includes a wider, more 
temporary and heterogeneous set of practitioners, collaborating on a 
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problem defined in a specific and localized context” (Gibbons et al., 
1994: 3)  
In addition to the new and innovative nature of venture projects, these new conditions further 
challenge venture capitalists in their own knowledge production to make them capable of 
evaluating and later be able to make the final selection assessment. Venture capitalists need to 
decode the collection of knowledge in the new venture in order to make a proper evaluation. 
Therefore, the capacity to access and develop such knowledge becomes key. Central to the pre-
evaluation process is the ability to mirror or be part of the knowledge production which has lead 
to the new venture. As argued later in this section and in Study V, such capacity can only be 
developed if venture capitalists know how to engage themselves in the early phases of the 
venturing process where such knowledge is created.  
Information asymmetry: Another often stated problem with new venture evaluation is the high 
level of information asymmetry (Arrow, 1973) between the entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist (Amit, Glosten and Muller, 1990; Christensen, 1992). As many projects have a high 
technological novelty, investors often have problems in recognizing the potential of the 
innovation. This is particularly true for highly innovative ideas, which involves many sets of 
skills. The entrepreneur (or team) carries most of the knowledge about the product and the 
investor has to make evaluations/decisions with incomplete knowledge about the innovation. The 
principal/agent theory has often been included to explain the possible opportunistic behaviour of 
the entrepreneur and the control mechanisms employed by the investor (Gompers, 1995; 
Sahlman, 1990). A central theoretical argument is that the agent (entrepreneur) will only disclose 
information that is personally benefiting. The entrepreneur possesses much more information 
and knowledge about their business opportunity and their own capabilities than potential 
investors do. Therefore, the entrepreneur may exploit the asymmetric distribution of knowledge 
to his own benefit (Amit et al., 1990) leading to principal/agent conflicts (Barnea, Haugen and 
Senbet, 1981; Eisenhard, 1989; Gompers, 1996).  
Additionally, entrepreneurs are not inclined to share all their knowledge with the potential 
investor before a favourable investment decision is settled. This is due to fear for potential 
investor’s opportunistic behaviour. Such investors turn down investment proposals, while 
exploiting the business opportunity at their own benefit. However the asymmetric distribution of 
knowledge poses a serious challenge to potential investors especially in making the investment 
evaluation and decision.  
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 69  
Difficulties in explaining the knowledge behind the venture idea makes the relationship between 
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalists even more challenging as it can lead the entrepreneur 
to unintentionally hoard knowledge. Here communication of knowledge becomes key as:  
“…projects cannot be documented at this stage…” (Mønsted, 2003: 194)  
The principal (venture capitalist) will force different management initiatives in order to make the 
entrepreneur disclose information about the value of the venture. It is often argued that the 
inability of outsiders to asses the entrepreneurs core attributes, namely their entrepreneurial skills 
and abilities, may affect both the decisions of entrepreneurs to involve outsiders and the prices 
venture capitalists may be willing to pay for new ventures (Amit, Glosten and Muller, 1990: 
1233). Research has also found that the agency costs associated with evaluation are increasing 
when assets become less tangible, growth options increase, and asset specificity raises (Gompers, 
1995: 1461).    
Idiosyncratic evaluation: The argument has been made in the previous section that information 
about a given entrepreneurial opportunity makes prices change for a given venture (Ziman, 
1991). The capacity to evaluate entrepreneurial opportunities depends on prior knowledge, which 
is idiosyncratic in nature, and therefore will lead people to perceive opportunities differently 
(Shane, 2000). Educational and professional experiences lead people to assess ventures in very 
different ways. At the same time, information asymmetry is crucial for the investor’s ability to 
earn an above average return on the successful investments (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). If 
markets were perfect (in a Neoclassical definition) and people’s interpretations were alike, then 
venture capitalists couldn’t earn the expected high returns. It is almost a prerequisite that the 
venture opportunity shouldn’t be subjected to perfect competition as the opportunity would then 
become too obvious and therefore loose its high commercial upside. Shared beliefs and 
interpretation of business opportunities among entrepreneurs would reduce competition and 
thereby the potential of earning entrepreneurial profits (Schumpeter, 1943). The idiosyncratic 
nature of entrepreneurial opportunities, however also obstructs the evaluation process by 
increasing the difficulties of the potential investor in recognizing the potential of the proposed 
idea. This is particularly true in the very early phases of the ventures development as it is only 
discovered by a limited proportion of the market.   
Broad spectrum of expectations: Another challenge for evaluation is that corporate venture 
investors additionally face the challenge of satisfying a broad spectrum of expectations besides 
the financial (Block and MacMillan 1993; Burgelman, 1983). As already indicated in the earlier 
chapter, corporate venturing is predominantly seen as a mean for large, well-established 
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companies to increase their level of innovation (Burgelman, 1984). However, there are several 
additional related motives for setting up a corporate venture unit. Among those motives are 
securing growth and responding to competitive pressures (Block and MacMillan, 1993), 
improving corporate profitability (Zahra, 1996), stimulating strategic renewal (Guth and 
Ginsberg, 1990; Wielemaker, Elfring, and Volberda, 2000, 2001) and knowledge creation that 
may be parlayed into future revenue streams (Venkataraman, MacMillan and McGrath, 1992). 
Due to the diversity of these additional and sometimes contra dictionary objectives, corporate 
venture firms are further complicated in their evaluation. Finally, as mentioned earlier in this 
thesis, different from traditional venture capital funds, corporate venture capitalists often receive 
funds from their corporate parent for investments on an ad hoc basis (Siegel, Siegel and 
MacMillan, 1988). Formal investment approval is needed from top management, which can 
hamper the flexibility of the venture division (Block and MacMillan, 1993). 
 
2.3.3 Evaluation strategies 
In order to accommodate for the previously mentioned evaluation conditions, investors make use 
of several methods and strategies. In the following the most frequently mentioned are reviewed:  
Self-selection: An often suggested mean to overcome the problem of information asymmetry is 
by allocating contractual rights, staging capital, and shifting risks. Such mechanisms often lead 
entrepreneurs to self-select and disclose more information about their business opportunity and 
themselves to the potential investor (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). In such a case, the relation 
between the entrepreneur and investor would shift together with the risk. By specifying a number 
of sanctions the entrepreneur would lose shares if the venture under performs. The premise is 
that it would be foolish of the entrepreneur to accept these conditions if he is in doubt about the 
promises of the venture or his own abilities (Sahlman, 1990). At the same time these sanctions 
keeps the entrepreneur at a high performing level. 
Self-selection can further be reinforced if corporate ventures communicate specific selection 
criteria to the entrepreneurs. Transparency in selection criteria stimulate self-screening among 
the potential entrepreneurs which therefore, contribute to reducing the disadvantages of 
information asymmetry and at the same time lesser the investor’s resources spending on 
identifying and selecting business ideas. The criteria are, as mentioned in the earlier chapter, 
based on industry focus, investment stage, expected return on investment etc. The criteria should 
be disseminated throughout the organization in order to achieve a greater organizational sense of 
purpose and direction (Block and MacMillan, 1993). Similar information can be reviled to 
entrepreneurs outside of the organisation.  
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The attempt to deal with information asymmetry by moving the risk from the investor to the 
entrepreneur is not completely achievable. The main reason is the entrepreneur’s extreme 
optimism about their business opportunity and confidence in their own abilities which in return 
can promote inefficient self-selection (Shane and Cable, 2002). If that venture eventually fails, 
the investor still risks loosing all the invested capital (Shane and Cable, 2002). 
 
Environmental-selection: Other authors have argued that new venture firms listen to what kinds 
of investments that are currently being made in the venture marked. This makes entrepreneurs fit 
their idea to market demand (Aldrich, 1979, 1999; Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1984). Selection-
adoption theory provides principles of self-renewal under such conditions (Volberda and Lewin, 
2003) while population ecology analyses how firms are selected out. An environmental-selection 
strategy is, by nature, less easy to influence for investors, unless they find ways to influence 
general market trends. The ways to activate such initiatives can be through public debate, 
conference participation and other forums open to a broader audience.   
 
Social networks: Organizational theorists suggest that the disadvantages of asymmetric 
distribution of knowledge can be reduced by using social ties for supporting the investment 
decision (Bygrave, 1987; Shane and Cable, 2002; Venkataraman, 1997). Furthermore, networks 
are often used as means for venture capitalists to discover, develop and exploit business ideas 
(Bygrave, 1987; Foo, Wong and Ong, 2005; Huffmann and Quigley, 2002). Others yet have 
argued that strategic networks are critical for information and resource acquisition without 
carrying the cost of vertical integration (Burt, 1992). It is eminent for investors in high-
technology businesses to use social ties for creating access to private information about the 
entrepreneur and his venture idea (Shane and Cable, 2002). Consequently, some investors clearly 
prefer to invest in ventures which are referred to them by their network (Fried and Hisrich, 1994) 
and many investors tend to perform repeat syndication arrangements over time (Bygrave, 1987, 
1988). The importance of inter-organisational collaboration arrangement can also be seen in the 
increased use of equity joint ventures (Wright and Lockett, 2003).  
 
Syndication: As follow-up on the use of social networks, research suggest that one of the ways 
to overcome lack of critical information in evaluation of venture opportunities is by syndicating 
investments i.e. co-investment (e.g. Bygrave, 1987, 1988; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Networks 
are viewed as essential for assisting syndicated approaches and therefore are essential in the 
investment infrastructure. Syndication allows a greater number of venture capitalists to screen 
potential investments, thus reducing the likelihood of investing in a poor project. Bygrave and 
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Timmons (1992) further examine the importance of other network externalities that apparently 
influence venture investing. In an analysis of the UK business angel networks, Harrison and 
Mason (1993, 1996), found that syndicated investment with other registered angels account for 
around twenty-five percent (25%) of total investments, while a further ten percent (10%) were 
with other equity investors, which does not compare favourably to the US (Harrison and Mason, 
1993). Where syndicated deals among business angels happen, levels of funds for expanding 
businesses have increased, but there is still a need for further public support for the establishment 
of such networks (Harding, 2000).  
Data on the US market indicate that relationships between venture capital companies are 
essential for cheering co-investment (Bygrave, 1987) and that syndications can be linked to 
greater success in entrepreneurial businesses and for venture capitalists themselves (Bygrave, 
1988). As previously indicated, network approaches to investment, help spread risk and engage 
more people in the investment evaluation. Syndication in networks also assist learning, 
encourage larger funds to be invested in appropriate ventures, create greater network 
opportunities and enable entrepreneurial firms to grow more quickly.  
One of the problems of relying on co-investors is dependent on the idiosyncratic nature in 
perception of the project. The consequence for making an investment will change according to 
the nature of the investor and so will the expectations. However, co-investments have shown to 
be a valuable way to overcome some of the asymmetric information embedded in the investment. 
In this process, social capital plays a crucial role in catalyzing the exchange and transfer of 
knowledge and information in networks (Granovetter 1973, 1985). Later in this chapter further 
analysis of the different kinds of network structures will be analyzed in relation to how 
knowledge can be created to prepare for evaluation.   
 
Staged investments: Another strategy to deal with the specific selection conditions in corporate 
venturing is by staging the investments. Venture capitalists often commit fractions of the entire 
investment on an ad-hoc basis (Gompers, 1995; Sahlman, 1990). Shalman (1990) noted that this 
management tool is the most potent mechanism that a venture capitalist can employ. The 
advantage of this strategy is that capital is injected at the speed of knowledge disclosure and 
venture development. The duration of the particular round is just one metric for the intensity of 
monitoring, the size of each investment, total funding provided, and number of financing rounds 
are also import measures of the staged investment structure (Gompers, 1995: 1462). Using the 
staging mechanism, capital will be infused to the new venture company according to specified 
milestones. Such milestones are based on specified progression of the ventures development e.g. 
development of prototypes, market analysis, employment of new competencies etc. Through this 
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multi-stage structure, the venture capitalist will have more control over management and the 
operation of the portfolio business (Sahlman, 1990). Additionally, staged investment also 
enables investors to limit the losses when choosing to invest in the wrong venture and at the 
same time, reduce the risk of wrongly selecting away promising ventures. 
An additional promising perspective of using a staged approach is the decreasing effect on the 
ventures “burn rate” of funds. This discussion is a natural link to the often mentioned discussion 
of balancing autonomy and control between the new venture and the corporate venture 
organization (Simon, Houghton and Gurney, 1999). Staging the investments can potentially help 
to find a balance between overly high spending and too little cash.    
 
Criteria lists: One of the most frequent mechanisms in evaluation is the use of criteria lists 
(Block, 1982; Block and MacMillan, 1993; Knight, 1988, 1994, MacMillan et al., 1985). These 
lists proscribe the investment criteria of the venture investor. According to Block and MacMillan 
(1993: 54) a company:  
“…should define enough criteria to enable managers and potential 
investors to determine that a proposed venture is consistent with the 
firm’s overall strategy, likely to produce worthwhile results and feasible 
for the firm to undertake”.  
This stream of literature recommends that in order to select the “best” ventures, corporate 
venture companies should develop and define both: 1) general criteria (i.e. those which may best 
reflect a potential ventures' fit with the overriding strategy of the corporate venturing initiative) 
and 2) specific criteria which stems from encompassing various aspects of the general criteria 
(i.e. criteria relating to the specification of products, markets or technologies). The general 
criteria should reflect both the specific goals for the venturing activity and the corporate strategic 
goals of the parent company. Specific criteria include evidence of consumer needs and the 
capability to satisfy these, competitive advantage, and various financial criteria (Block and 
Macmillan, 1993).  
In the following, specific criteria are object for the review. The selection criteria often look like 
the one provided by Block and MacMillan (1993):  
 
• Is the opportunity consistent with the firm’s strategy? 
• What factors produce this opportunity? 
• What are the character, size, and nature of the market? 
• What factors are required for the proposed ventures success? 
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• Is it worth the effort? 
• What is the time to break-even?  
• What are the stable gross margins? 
• What is the Payback time? 
• Is it feasible? (Can we do it?) 
• Can the corporation facilitate the resources required?  
 
Research has shown that inexperienced venture managers often use the same criteria as 
experienced managers (MacMillan and Day, 1987). Obviously, working with investment criteria 
does not solve the information asymmetry problem alone, but only directs what to do with the 
information when first collected and how to secure representation of different stakeholder 
interests in the decision making process. The need for knowledge is, for example, tackled by 
employing an analytical team for evaluating proposals, producing recommendations for 
selection, and reporting to senior corporate executives (Block, 1982). The team should contain 
skills of market demand, technical and financial. This should be combined with empathy and 
understanding of the venturing process (Block, 1982). 
From the venture capital tradition most studies about the criteria used for investment decisions 
have found that management-related-criteria are key factors in influencing their decision-making 
(e.g. Bachher and Guild, 1996; Hall and Hofer, 1993; MacMillan et al., 1985). MacMillan et al. 
(1985) summarize their findings:  
“There is no question that irrespective of the horse (product), horse race 
(market), or odds (financial criteria), it is the jockey (entrepreneur) who 
fundamentally determines whether the venture capitalist will place a bet 
at all” (p. 119)  
The capability of the management team to manage the venture is often seen as an investment 
criterion. Venture capitalists often prefer to select an investment opportunity that offers a good 
management team even at only reasonable financial and market characteristics (Muzyka, Birley 
and Leleux, 1996). Shifting the selection focus away from the entrepreneurial opportunity to the 
management team’s previous track records is an attempt to reduce the effect of information 
asymmetry. Since it is difficult to analyse the future prospects of a venture idea, evaluating the 
team based on their past performance can be a more reliable measure. Such analysis includes the 
entrepreneur’s former experiences with running an entrepreneurial firm, their knowledge of the 
industry, the team composition etc. Investor’s often stress evaluation of the entrepreneur mostly 
in the earlier phases. The marginal importance decreases as the company reaches a more mature 
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level. This is a natural reflection of the disclosure and exploitation of knowledge as the venture 
develops. Cash flows seem to play a modest role when evaluating firms in early phases. Lastly, 
the management team of the venture always is important during evaluation. 
In corporate venturing, it is important that the selection criteria also cover issues such as 
operational relatedness. Operational relatedness measures the degree to which venture ideas 
relate to the core capabilities of the parent organization and expected strategic importance for 
corporate development (Burgelman, 1984). 
 
While both the academic and the business community have paid significant attention to criteria 
lists, from which investment decisions can be made, others have argued that such lists only 
contribute limited use and value (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002). The first critical element of 
using criteria lists is that the value of early stage ventures is difficult to assess. Since the ventures 
value proposition is new to the market, criteria of sales prognostics provide only limited value. 
As mentioned earlier there is a high degree of uncertainty with the commercial potential of the 
ventures offering, and the focus of the entrepreneurial firm can easily change depending on 
exogenous shocks (Casson, 1997). With limited information available, the foundation for 
decision making is very incomplete.  
Secondly, the criteria lists, and the answers to the questions they pose, can be easily manipulated 
by the entrepreneur himself. This is due to the problem of asymmetric information between the 
corporate venture investor and the entrepreneur, which was mentioned earlier. The principal/ 
agent theory would argue that the entrepreneurs have an interest in providing overly “optimistic” 
figures and estimates regarding the future potential of the business opportunity, to give a better 
evaluation of the venture opportunity.  
Thirdly, many of the factors which are value-adding for a new venture are difficult to quantify 
e.g. skills, excess to network, experience etc. In essence, rating the performance of a particular 
business opportunity on a list of specified criteria can be difficult. Lastly knowing when enough 
investment criteria have been added to the list and measure and their appropriate weight is 
equally difficult to determine.  
However one of the reasons why criteria lists continue to be used in the evaluation of ventures is 
to enhance the legitimacy of the venture process. Venture managers need to justify the 
investment decision and thereby pose legitimate arguments. The list also creates a guideline of 
what to look for when presented with an investment proposal. 
 
Emotional parameters: It is unavoidable that the evaluation process is also coloured by 
emotional and personal parameters when dealing with entrepreneurial ventures in early phases. 
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 76  
Since the investment criteria only provide limited information on the ventures success, other 
means need to be included. Consequently the investor’s evaluation is often assisted by a 
backbone feeling of the ventures potential and the personal chemistry between the venture 
capitalist and the entrepreneur (Isaksson et al., 2004). Practitioners claiming this view often use 
an evaluation approach when considering new investments sometimes referred to as “common 
sense” or “pit of the stomach”. The method is based on investors’ experience, knowledge and 
intuition, thus relying upon the personal skills of the investor. Research of Shepherd et al. (2003) 
found that venture managers with over fifteen (15) years of experience makes more accurate 
perditions in rating the business ideas. It could be argued that they have a more “reliable” “pit of 
the stomach” then less experienced venture managers.  
The rather intuitional nature of the common sense approach makes it difficult to determine when 
a certain investor actually uses it, however as mentioned earlier venture managers seldom make 
use of the potential decision aids available (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002). It may well be an 
unconscious use of the approach as well as a conscious one. It is often observed that when the 
next round of financing is needed, the valuation of the firm may considerably alter the initial 
estimation even under the same market conditions. One could however claim that what 
determines the “common sense” or “pit of the stomach” is matter of experience and better 
knowledge of the evaluation methods, and their respectful impact. Therefore this kind of 
decision-making could be just as qualifying as rational decision-making.  
Venture managers often place “pit of the stomach” equal to trust issues. They argue that the 
evaluation of venture most often is determined by the trustworthiness of the entrepreneur to 
complete a given task. Isaksson et al. (2004) focused on trust between the portfolio firm and 
venture capitalist in order to explain the linkage between governance and trust. The analysis 
shows that trust has a positive effect on performance and that the simple relationship between 
venture capitalists governance of portfolio firms and portfolio firm’s performance can be 
explained by an indirect effect whereby governance increases trust in the relationship that in turn 
has a positive effect on performance. In other words, governance is only having a positive effect 
on performance if there also is trust in the relationship. 
From the above review, there still remains a gap as to how venture capitalists prepare for making 
investment evaluation. This thesis fill part of this gab by arguing that the preparation is 
determined by the knowledge creation needed for making a sound investment evaluation. In a 
1988 article, Bygrave argues that venture capitalists operate in a network environment. Bygrave 
(1988) demonstrates the importance of information sharing between venture capitalists to reduce 
the uncertainty inherited in the investments. The principal means of reducing risk is through 
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syndication of investments in a network of fellow venture investors. Other authors have argued 
that in addition to the acquired information from fellow investors several other benefits exist for 
venture capitalists to operate in networks of different structures – many of these found in the 
knowledge creation used for evaluation. Kreiner and Schultz (1993) emphasize (in a study of 
collaboration in the biotech sector) the relevance of having access to up-to-date 
information: In turbulent and fast developing fields, traditional sources such as journals etc. 
are not sufficient, as they do only provide information of where the technology frontier was in 
the past, but not where it is now. If firms are to react to "windows of opportunities", they have to 
be participants of the network since this is their access point to new opportunities (Powell et al., 
1996; Kreiner and Schultz, 1993). To further investigate these networks, the following section 
provides a review of the relevant network literature. Special attention will be given to the 
different kinds of structures and relations that venture capitalists can engage in. This review 
contributes especially to Study II (Jørgensen and Vintergaard, 2006) and Study V (Vintergaard 
and Husted, Submitted). 
 
2.3.4 Network structures for evaluation 
To understand the notion of networks and how corporate ventures can use these, an initial review 
of the litterateur provides a foundation. As one of the pioneers in the field of assessing networks 
and a counterpart to classical and neoclassic economics, Granovetter (1985), developed the 
notion of embeddedness. In his well-sited work from 1985, he critiqued the classical and 
neoclassic economics for viewing humans as under-socialized actors, and modern sociology for 
its conception of over-socialized man. He presents the idea that most behaviours are closely 
embedded in networks of interpersonal relations. Granovetter examined the problem of trust and 
malfeasance in economic life. He uses the previously presented "market and hierarchies" 
argument of Williamson (1975) to illustrate how the embeddedness approach generates different 
understandings and predictions from that implemented by economists. Later other authors have 
likewise critiqued the market and hierarchies approach and argued for a unique form of 
governance (e.g. Gulati, 1998; Powell, 1990).  
Among others, Williamson tries to answer the following question: under what conditions 
economic functions are performed within the boundaries of hierarchical firms rather than by 
market powers that cross these boundaries. Williamson (1986) argues that:  
“…the markets and hierarchies approach is interdisciplinary in that it 
draws extensively on contributions from both economics and 
organisation theory” (p. 7)  
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Granovetter (1985) criticized this by arguing that even with complex transactions, a high level of 
order can be found in the "market" - that is, across firm boundaries - and a correspondingly high 
level of disorder within the firm. The natures of human relations and networks between and 
within firms determine whether order or disorder, sincerely of malfeasance, will succeed. 
Granovetter (1985) further criticized the assumptions about hierarchical structures. He argued 
that social relations between firms are more important then power within firms, in bringing order 
to economic development. Granovetter (1985) makes the point that Williamson (1975) 
overestimates the effectiveness of hierarchical power within organizations. He further claims that 
whenever internalization within a firm does lead to a better handling of complex transactions; it 
could be due to the increase of the density of social relations within the firm of previously 
independent market entities. Complexities that arise, when formal agents negotiate with one 
another, can be resolved by implicit or explicit power relations among firms and not only by the 
assumption of all parties under a single hierarchy. For Granovetter (1985), networks of social 
relations, rather than institutional coordination or generalized structures, are responsible for the 
production and maintenance of trust and order in economic life. By analyzing concrete patterns 
of social relations, the embeddedness approach makes no all-encompassing predictions. Rather, 
it assumes that the details of social structure will determine the outcome.  
 
Relational and structural embeddedness – Strong and weak ties 
Building on Granovetter’s work on embeddedness, the notions of relational and structural 
embeddedness was developed (Gulati, 1998; Granovetter, 1992, 1973; Rowley, Behrens and 
Krackhardt, 2000). Departing in the overall social context in which both social actors and firms 
are embedded, Gulati (1998: 295) argues that such structural context could be parted into two: 
First, relational embeddedness characterises relationships and second, structural embeddedness 
describes the relationship structure:  
“Relational embeddedness or cohesion perspectives on networks stress 
the role of direct cohesive ties as a mechanism for gaining fine-grained 
information…. Structural embeddedness or positional perspectives on 
networks go beyond the immediate ties of firms and emphasize the 
informational value of the structural position these partners occupy in the 
network” (Gulati, 1998: 296).  
Relational embeddedness is often analysed based on the kinds of ties which are established 
between social actors. These ties may be strongly or weakly connected.  
One group of researchers claims that densely, embedded networks grants competitive advantage 
(Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Powell 1998; Seufert, Von Krogh, Bach, 1999). 
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Granovetter (1992) argues that strong ties facilitate the exchange of important information and 
tacit knowledge since strong ties are built on a high level of trust and insight into the partnering 
company’s organisation. Actors who share direct connections with each other are likely to 
possess more information and knowledge about each other (Gulati, 1998: 296). There is a 
common understanding that networks of social actors that are often highly involved with each 
other and therefore have strong ties, will more likely develop a shared understanding based on 
mutual interaction and discussion (Coleman, Katz and Menzel, 1966). Therefore, companies 
bound together by strong ties also often become very dependent on each other (Rowley, Behrens 
and Krackhardt, 2000).  
In tightly linked networks, information about the behaviour and performance of the individual 
participant in the network travel faster and dense network are therefore better at reducing 
opportunism (Ahuja, 2000). Closeness and the strength of ties between network participants are 
important factors in the ability to mobilizing knowledge between firms (Granovetter, 1985). 
Repeated partnerships seem to be more important than proximity of firms in the network for 
stimulating exchange of valuable knowledge (Soh, 2003). The explanation may be as Bouty 
(2000) points out that the sharing of valuable knowledge between firms depends on the level of 
trust among the exchange partners and this trust is matured through past successful exchanges. 
As economic literature has pointed out, in a venture capital context, investment syndication is a 
mechanism by which trust is created around a specific investment and knowledge is shared. The 
legitimacy of such investment is built on trust and is something which develops over time. 
Repeated interorganizational collaboration often results in increased trust, developing and 
improving collaboration routines and reduces opportunism. One could argue that since 
evaluation in corporate venturing demands a trusted network partner, then it should be expected 
that direct ties are more important. As argued, strong ties to network actors promote knowledge 
transfer; they however hold search disadvantages (Hansen, 1999). Acknowledging that working 
with a broad set of actors will enhance corporate venture diversity of information; strong ties are 
not always efficient.  
Weak ties, on the other hand, do not involve the same degree of dependency (as strong ties) and 
they do no not facilitate the type of information exchange and therefore do not require the same 
level of trust building. They do still provide novel information by functioning as gatekeepers to 
other companies hereby acting as a kind of sensor following up on new trends and ideas 
(Granovetter, 1973). Loosely connected networks carries the advantages that they are cheaper to 
obtain information from because of the lower maintenance costs (Burt, 1992) but also because 
indirect ties reduce the cost of social interaction in the form of time and investment required to 
gather information (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Even though it is known that indirect ties 
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primarily support information spill-over (Ahuja, 2000) they carry the advances of a broader base 
of connections.  
Seen in connection to the structure of the strategic networks, Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt 
(2000) discuss whether or not strong or weak ties enhance performance is contingent on the 
environment. In settings with little uncertainty and a high demand for exploitation of existing 
product or processes, strong ties are more efficient as they facilitate information of tacit 
knowledge, high quality information and hereby learning. However, where uncertainty is high 
and exploration is crucial, relationships bound together through weak ties is the best solution to 
improve performance as they provide quick access to new trends and opportunities (Rowley, 
Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000). Direct and strong ties promote the exchange of knowledge and 
resources, however, weak ties favour knowledge search (Burt, 1992). This does not imply that an 
actor in a certain environment should only favour one type of tie binding mechanism. According 
to Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt (2000) a mix of the two types would be beneficial but 
depending on the environment one type should be dominating. A company hereby avoids getting 
locked in to a certain structure.  
 
Contrary to relational embeddedness, structural embeddedness concerns the informational role of 
the position that an actor or firms occupy in a network (Gulati, 1998). This type of 
embeddedness analyses the firm as a position in a larger system. From the perspective of 
structural embeddedness, a picture will also emerge of the firms who are directly connected. 
While most network theory highlights the information advantages between social actors or firms 
Burt (1992) and Gulati (1998) also emphasises the control benefits of being in a network. Actors 
who manage to locate themselves in-between two or more actors gain the advantage of being the 
tertius gaudens (i.e. a broker). Once a firm begins collaborating, it gains experience 
in cooperation and a status as a partner (Powell et al. 1996). In the context of venture evaluation, 
such a position is valuable as the investor can obtain a key position between investors and new 
ventures. Experience will over time help the corporate venturing firm to be more effective in 
exploiting collaborations. Reputation, on the other hand, is a fertile ground for both formal 
partnerships and an expanding array of informal "relationships”. This is very important; as a 
broad range of collaborative endeavours provides central connectedness in the network and help 
generate visibility and over time access to resources. Such a central position can be of extreme 
value to uphold but also requires firms to overlook the entire network. For further insight to the 
use of structural embeddedness of firms please see Study II (Jørgensen and Vintergaard, 2006) 
and Study III (Husted and Vintergaard, 2004).   
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Burt (1992) refers to the issue of maximising a company’s possibilities within its strategic 
network by incorporating what he refers to as “structural holes”. His arguments are based on a 
combination of sociology and traditional economic ideas of monopoly and oligopoly powers. 
The main point in his arguments on structural holes was developed based on network theorists 
such as Freeman´s (1977) concept on betweenness centrality, Cook and Emerson´s (1978) and 
Cook et al. (1983) exclusive exchange powers, and Burt´s (1980) own analysis of structural 
autonomy created by network complexity.    
As an important element for understanding the concept of structural holes, we start with 
Freeman´s (1977) review of different kinds of measurements on centrality in social networks. In 
this review he finds their methods misguiding as measures. As a counteraction and an extension 
of the arguments, he developed the notion of betweenness centrality from Bavela´s (1948) 
perception of centrality. In this analysis Freeman argue that individuals can find themselves in a 
negotiation and communicating position between two or more social actors. In the work from 
Cook and Emerson (1978) and Cook, Emerson and Gillmore (1983), the relation between actors 
was further analysed. In Cook and Emerson (1978), the analysis of social agents is analysed 
using a laboratory method to analyse social structural determinants of power and normative 
constrains on the use of power. They propose that social exchange networks are frameworks for 
bargaining structures. What Cook and Emerson (1978: 721) find is that:  
“…(a) power is an attribute of position in a network structure observable 
in the occupant’s behaviour, even though the occupant does not know 
what position or what amount of power s/he possesses; (b) equity or 
justice concerns constrain the use of that power; (c) emergent 
interpersonal commitment impede the use of power; and (d) when power 
is unequally distributed among actors in a network, females form 
stronger commitments to their exchange partners than do males”.  
A further theoretical component for understanding the structural holes argument came from 
Burt´s own work from 1980 about “structural autonomy”. This concept embeds aspects from 
both oligopoly theories (economics) and group-affiliation (sociology). From a network 
perspective, this proposes an analytical framework for seeing a pattern of relations. This analysis 
defines an actor’s position in a system that determines his autonomy, that is, his ability to pursue 
and realize interests without constrains from other actors in the system (Burt, 1980: 893)  
In combining these authors, they contributed to the structural holes argument. Burt (1992) argues 
that a company has a number of redundant relationships i.e. relationships that relate to the same 
persons and hereby provide access to the same kind of information. Henceforth Burt (1992) 
argues that it is important for a company to incorporate some non-redundant relationships i.e. 
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relationships that are strictly dyadic with no further relation to any other of the company’s 
relationships. These relationships are connected by what Burt (1992) calls structural holes. 
Structural holes are thus defined as:  
“a relationship of nonredundancy between two contacts" (Burt, 1992: 65)  
Due to the existence of structural holes and non-redundant relationships, access to information 
and persons are obtained, that does not relate to the knowledge already obtained, from other 
relationships. New information is thus added that does not overlap with already existing 
knowledge (Burt, 1992). Non-redundant relations are often represented by Granovetter’s (1973) 
weak tie binding as they function as a kind of safeguard by keeping possibilities open to the 
company in case of unforeseen problems with its redundant relations or due to environmental 
change. Hereby, avenues are kept open to take action that is not facilitated by the dominant 
structure. In other words, by adding some loosely coupled relations representing the opposite 
form of tie binding than the general structure of relationships within the business network a 
company can avoid getting stuck in an unwanted position (Ibarra, 1992).  
As argued, several different positions in a network can facilitate the knowledge needed for 
venture evaluation. The different structures and tie-binding facilitates knowledge creation in 
different ways. Understanding the different values and drawback from the structures are of 
essence. However, much of the information needed to make a proper evaluation requires that the 
investor is part of the innovative process or has significant insight to the process. Investors can 
also benefit from considering the network arguments for venture creation and opportunity 
discovery. 
The content of the above review of literature has provided a foundation for the studies in this 
thesis. The review has provided insight to what has currently been written in the field of 
corporate venturing and how this can be complemented with new perspectives from knowledge 
creation, network and entrepreneurship litterateur. This has lead to a new understanding of how 
the dynamics of idea development, discovery and evaluation better can be explained. Such 
explanation includes the actors and the structures which drives and supports the innovative 
development.   
The individual studies in the next section draw on the review independently and base many of 
their arguments on this foundation. In this section, the studies and their connections are 
presented. This will be followed by a general conclusion and discussion.    
 
    
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 83  
3. THE STUDIES 
 
The above positioning and literature review has materialized into 5 studies representing a 
combination of: International peer review articles and book chapters. A summery of each of the 
studies, and the connection between these is followed by the full versions. The studies included 
in this thesis are:  
I. Munk, B. K and Vintergaard, C. (2004). Accentuating the role of venture capitalists in 
systems of innovation. (VEST) Journal for Science and Technology Studies. 1-2(17): 65. 
II. Jørgensen, H. and Vintergaard, C. (2006). Connecting Company Strategy and Network 
Identity. In: Managing Dynamic Networks Organisational Perspectives of Technology 
Enabled Inter-Firm Collaboration. Poulymenakou A. and Klein S. (eds.) Heidelberg: 
Springer. 
III. Husted, K and Vintergaard, C. (2004). Stimulating innovation through corporate venture 
bases. Journal of World Business. 39(3): 296-306.  
IV. Vintergaard, C. (2005). Opportunities in Corporate Venturing – Actors Creating 
Passageways. International Journal of Innovation Management (IJIM). 9(1): 215-239. 
V. Vintergaard, C. and Husted, K. (Submitted). Corporate Venture Companies Linear and 
Dynamic Evaluation Strategies for Science Based Venture Opportunities. In: Handbook of 
Corporate Entrepreneurship by Shaker Zahra. Elger. 
 
Summery and connection between the studies: 
 
Study I  
Research question: What is the unique role of venture capitalists in facilitating innovation?  
(Munk and Vintergaard, 2004) creates through a network perspective an understanding of the 
role of venture capitalists in the framework of the national innovation system. While recognizing 
the importance of corporate and traditional venture capitalists in supporting innovation the 
literature so fare provides only limited information the role of venture capitalists in society in 
relation to other actors in the innovation system.  
 
Study II 
Research question: What are the relations between a company’s network strategy and its 
corporate strategy?  
After having mapped the role and importance of venture capitalists in Study I the reader become 
aware that managing social networks is of essence. The second study analyses how companies 
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use their network as part of their overall strategic intent (Study II). In this study Jørgensen and 
Vintergaard (2006) creates a link between different business typologies and their network 
strategies. While acknowledging that different companies peruse different strategies we know 
little about how this relates to how they manage their network. 
 
Study III 
Research question: How can corporate venture firms secure the development of innovative ideas 
by systematically working with the organization’s venture base? 
As the scene for corporate venturing has been set both from a micro and macro perspective, it 
becomes clear that the focus on early stages is very important; both from a theoretical and 
empirical standpoint. Understanding the early phase’s dynamics is presented in Study III by 
Husted and Vintergaard´s (2004) work, published in Journal of World Business. This study 
develop and understanding of the prerequisites for developing genuine original ideas – the 
venture base. The venture base includes those characteristics and prerequisites of a firm and its 
environment, which can serve as resources for starting new ventures.  
 
Study IV 
Research question: How do corporate ventures discover new investment opportunities?  
Due to the innovative nature of the new ventures which come from the venture base; discovering 
the entrepreneurial opportunities becomes a key challenge involving a diversified set of actors 
(Study IV). Vintergaard (2005) argues in an article in International Journal of Innovation 
Management that the process of opportunity discovery needs special attention. Acknowledging 
the limitation of the framework; this study provides the first insights in to the dynamic 
passageways from which venture capitalists gain access to future ventures. The passageway 
represents a continuous development process of investment opportunities as they are shaped 
between a variety of actors. 
 
Study V 
Research question: What are the implications on evaluation strategies when relying on dynamic 
innovation models instead of the linear? 
While Study III provides arguments for idea creation, and Study IV for opportunity discovery a 
gap still reminds as to how corporate investors prepare for the investment evaluation. In Study V 
Vintergaard and Husted (Submitted) it is proposed how corporate venture companies can design 
appropriate evaluation strategies to deal with the ambiguity of science based venture 
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opportunities. Especially the paper discusses the implications on evaluation strategies when 
relying on dynamic innovation models instead of the linear. 
 
This section has provided insights to the connection between the 5 studies. The following will 
present the studies their full length. After the studies have been presented a general conclusion 
will try to embrace the work carried out in this thesis – presented in the final chapter.  
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3.1 Study I – Munk and Vintergaard (2004) 
 
 
 
Accentuating the role of  
venture capitalists in systems 
of innovation 
 
Kasper Birkeholm Munk 
& 
Christian Vintergaard 
 
ABSTRACT 
In contemporary literature, venture capital financial infrastructures are identified as major contributors to 
a large proportion of today’s innovations. Yet quite contradictory, the literature on systems of innovation, 
hardly ever treats venture capitalists as a coherent actor in neither national nor regional innovation 
systems. In attempt to locate and determine the potentials and importance of the venture capitalists in the 
innovation system, a two-dimensional taxonomy is constructed and used to illuminate their role and 
position. The taxonomy gains insight through theoretical reasoning and the possible location is 
exemplified by a case of the Danish venture capital market.It is argued in this article that venture 
capitalists stand a better chance of realizing their potential when they take and are given direct and formal 
responsibility in the innovation system. In relation hereto, the authors thus present initiatives to be taken 
to raise venture capitalists to a more direct and formal role in the context of systems of innovation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
What is the unique role of venture capitalists in facilitating innovation? Theoretical studies on venture 
capital closely link the existence of risk-seeking capital to the continuous development and formation of 
new products and processes (e.g. Kortum & Lerner 2000; Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Block & McMillan, 
1993). Studies within the tradition of systems of innovation stress the relevance of network relations 
where innovation can happen through continuous interaction and collaboration between diverse actors 
(Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997; Chung, 2002; Niosi, 2002). Systems of innovation have 
emerged during the last two decades, especially working with defining the composition of innovation 
actors and their relations. The systems of innovation literature works implicitly with the existence of 
capital to facilitate innovative and collaborative processes, yet fails to explain how and where capital or 
venture capitalists can leverage resource problems and provide financial competencies. As a result, 
venture capitalists are seldom mentioned as more than an important factor for innovation-based growth.  
At the same time, most of the studies in the area of venture capital and venture capital management 
takes place outside the system framework, whereby the potential role and influence of venture capitalists 
in the innovation system is rather neglected.  
This paper therefore aims at providing a conceptual and theoretical understanding of the potential 
role and influence of the venture capitalist in the innovation system. By using the system of innovation 
approach, explicit strategies for venture capitalists to engage in collaboration with other innovation actors 
are formulated. Consequently the extracted contribution of the paper is presented in a coherence 
framework. It is argued in this article that constructing a macro approach describing and positioning 
venture capitalists in relation to other innovation actors, enhances both the self-understanding and the 
awareness in and between actor subsets. It is additionally argued that creating such understanding will 
support the possible synergies between actors in the innovation system and leverage possible resource 
constraints related to capital access and access to ideas.  
Based on a theoretical discussion and an exemplifying case about actors in the Danish market, the 
paper analyzes venture capitalists in the system of innovation, in relation to mapping innovation actors 
and the relationships between the two. Primary effort is put on discussing how to realize the potential of 
venture capitalists as collaborative innovation partners in the system.  
It is argued that incorporating financial structures, especially risk-seeking venture capitalists in 
collaborative arrangements (with different actors in the system of innovation), will cause macro economic 
benefits (i.e. support the development of new technology based firms). By committing to a closer 
relationship to investees, the venture capitalist will simultaneously gain strategic intelligence on markets, 
technologies, etc., hereby enhancing their capacity to select new investment opportunities (Vintergaard 
and Husted, 2003).  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Current research has discovered several economic drivers which influence the initiative for venture 
capitalists to engage in innovation, e.g. the past performance of venture capitalists (Balboa & Marti, 2000), 
GDP growth (Gompers & Lerner, 1998), the state of the IPO market (Jeng & Wells 2000; Black & Gilson, 
1998) (Berlin, G&L), and the stock market capitalization growth (Jeng & Wells, 2000). However, little of 
this literature has viewed venture capitalists as a distinct actor group in a macroeconomic context – to 
some degree, neglecting the overall picture of how venture capital is related to other actors in the 
innovation system. Hence, the following will initially provide an understanding of the dimensions within 
the innovation system, and will later review how venture capitalists are perceived in this system.     
 
Structuring the system 
In order to ensure the most favourable involvement of venture capitalists in a larger macro economic 
perspective - i.e. to focus on the relationships that carry innovative capacity – there is an obvious need to 
understand the systems approach. A dominant part of the systems of innovation literature focuses on the 
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national level. The central theoretical and empirical contributions within this approach have been 
published during the last decades by the works of Lundvall (1992), Nelson (1993), Edquist (1997), setting 
forth a framework allowing for a systems approach in understanding the possibilities and opportunities 
in innovation (Lundvall, 1992, 2000). The national perspective in analyzing the innovative capacity of 
nations has become widely diffused and is now an integral part of the analytical tool-box of such 
organizations as the OECD and the European Commission.  
The functioning of the system rests on the ability for all actors to interact. Interaction is facilitated 
through proximity and collaborative initiatives; joint research activities and licensing agreements 
between public and private sector actors. In this capacity, private sector actors can access and leverage 
the pure science competencies generated in public organizations. Institutions and the public sector can 
therefore realize the transfer and application of its technology into commercially viable products, thus 
achieving objectives for enhanced social welfare. Investigating venture capitalists as actors in a macro 
perspective helps us illuminate the possible potential of the venture capitalist in more general terms than 
a micro perspective would do. 
The main assertions in the innovation system are intuitively and empirically based on a set of 
components, the relations between these components and the influence of institutions (Niosi, 2002, 
Edquist, 2001, Carlsson et. al, 2002)1. The components comprise a set of interlinked organizations of 
which the core is constituted by those organizations that produce, use and diffuse new knowledge. 
Relations comprise the links between these organizations, be they of formal, informal, human, regulatory 
or of commercial kind. A striking feature of the systems approach is the relevance of institutions. In the 
systems literature the term institutions is used to worked with from two angles, one as a complex set of 
normative structures, regimes and routines (Lundvall, 2000), and another as formal and explicit 
organizations (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). Though it is not the purpose of this paper to theoretically 
clarify this duality, it is important to stress that the term institutions in this paper falls between these two 
concepts and is used to describe both objects pattern behaviour and more formal organizations that create 
these objects. Yet, what is in our interest is to introduce the terms of formal and informal institutions. 
Formal institutions namely describe the previously mentioned “formal organizations” while the informal 
institutions refer to the existence of attitudes, norms and behavioural patterns constituting the innovation 
culture. The formal institutions in the innovation system are often equal to Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff´s 
(1996) components in their Triple Helix model. 
The influence of informal institutions on the innovativeness of the national economy is only slightly 
touched upon in previous research of this kind. Yet other contributions in scientific literature, outside the 
definition of innovation systems, point to the fact that informal institutions are also decisive for the 
innovativeness of a national economy (Saxenian, 1994). Schertler (2002) argued that a highly educated 
population might not be the same as a very entrepreneurial population with a lot of start-ups, but the 
very nature of the businesses that highly educated people are likely to start making venture capital 
funding very relevant. Distinguishing formal and informal institutions becomes a key element. As argued 
by Carlsson et al. (2002; p. 242):  
A technological system has a number of different types of actors: firms, organizations, policy bodies, 
venture capitalists, etc. To evaluate the performance of a system, therefore, means to evaluate each of 
these players, not primarily as single entities, but connected in the entire system.  
Hence we become aware that analysing the level of formality also becomes a key parameter in analysing 
actors in the innovation system. 
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Venture capital in the innovation system 
When analyzing venture capitalists from a systems perspective, one needs to know how they relate to 
other actors in the environment. Taking a financial perspective on innovation, a very fundamental 
element is the distribution of venture capital investments (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Hellmann and 
Puri, 2000; Kortum and Lerner, 2000) even though the macro economic benefits to some degree are 
acknowledged (Jaffe, 1996; Griliches, 1992). Other similar attempts have been made to illuminate the 
potential of venture capitalists from the entrepreneurship literature (e.g. Arrow, 1974; Evans & Jovanovic, 
1989; Amit, Gloten & Muler, 1990). These strands of literature however reveal only limited attention to 
macro economic dimensions and places more emphasis on the individual actor in the system.   
Based on research on industry clusters, it is known that venture capitals are often used as a proxy for 
clusters of success (Nilsson, 2001). This statement is followed up by Cooke (2002, p. 134) who argues: 
Probably the key limitation on regional initiatives for advanced technology is funding for basic and 
applied research, since most regional administrations do not have remotely enough of such capital, 
especially in biotechnology. The second limitation is venture capital and other sources of investment 
capital for the commercialisation stages of biotechnology, although this is less of a limitation in certain 
cases. 
The research of Nilsson (2001) also reveals a diversification in types of investors as markets mature. 
Based of research from the Swedish market, venture capitalists serve a special duty in the innovation 
process, which reflects their competencies (Karaömerlioglu and Jacobsson, 2000). Karaömerlioglu and 
Jacobsson (2000) argue that the development of a venture capital market is also governed by the 
institutional set-up and economic context in which it operates. More specifically they argue that the 
growth of the venture capital industry is determined by its size, diversity and competence. Eilasson 
(2000) follows this line of argumentation in his work on competence blocs from institutional theory. In 
this framework he refers to venture capitalists as actors who should guide the selection of successful 
innovations through their competent filters.  
Much of the research which has been conducted on venture capitalists, reveal only limited attention to 
the macroeconomic positions. The center of attention is how capital is distributed to entrepreneurs, and 
less on what makes this actor group unique. As argued by Van Kersbergen and Waarden (2001. p. 1):  
[…] the concept of institutions has mostly been reduced to organization sets that provide resources, 
possibilities, and constraints for innovation: banks, venture capital providers, research organizations, 
training ‘institutes’, unions, and standardization agencies. The literature recognizes that the organizations 
that make up `national systems of innovations’ are influenced by ‘institutions’, now used in the more 
specific meaning of `norms, habits, conventions and rules’ of a society. However, the laer remain largely 
unexplored”. 
By looking at some of the ways researchers have perceived venture capitalists in relation to the system of 
innovation, much of this seems plausible. It becomes evident that the venture capitalist is not considered 
a direct actor subset in the system, but merely as a resource provider. Many scholars within systems of 
innovation have implicitly treated venture capitalists in this way (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 
1996, Freeman, 1999). Fremann argues in Venture Capital as an Economy of Time (1999) that venture 
capitalists are an important participant in the innovative process as they provide funding for new 
ventures and also help build the new ventures. He further argues that this is done by making social 
connections to other important actors. 
In combining systems of innovation theory and research of venture capitalists’ present research, we 
discover a gap. In research on systems of innovation, we seek to explain how actors are connected and 
why. Ironically studies of venture capitalists in a contextual framework provide limited foothold for 
explaining their unique behaviour in connection to these actors. This leads us to be believe that Van 
Kersbergen and Waarden (2001) arguments are also valid for venture capitalists. As indicated, venture 
capitalists are predominantly viewed as resource providers, making their exact role and potential difficult 
to analyze. To an even greater extent it becomes difficult to determine what makes them distinct from 
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other actors in the innovation system. Consequently their relations to other actors in the innovation 
system and their possible position and role in the innovation systems become open-ended. What seems to 
be missing is unfolding their relative involvement in the innovative process and their level of formality. 
Consequently the following case of the Danish venture capital market has been selected as an 
illustrative example of the arguments presented in the paper. The case serves as a practical illustration of 
how venture capitalists have tried to position themselves in relation to other innovation actors. Based on 
the case and our knowledge of systems theory from organisational behaviour, a framework will be 
presented in this paper to illustrate the uniqueness of venture capitalists in relation to other actor groups. 
 
VENTURE CAPITALISTS IN THE DANISH SYSTEM OF INNOVATION 
In order to provide examples of the current role and positions of venture capitalists in the innovation 
system, the following case functions as an illustration (Eisenhardt, 1999; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The 
empirical evidence offers a rich illustration of how venture capitalists perceive themselves in relation to 
actors in the innovation system.  
The data presented here consists of 25 in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted in 15 venture 
capital organizations. The organizations were selected according to their industry focus with the 
intention to cover as many different sectors as possible (Yin, 1984). All the chosen organizations render 
traditional venture capital services, by which we have excluded informal investors such as business 
angels as well as corporate investors. 
The interviewees from the 15 organizations were all selected from top and middle management in 
order to get data from seniors with several years of experience. It was the intent to interview somebody 
who represents the strategy of the venture capital investor. The interviews were carried out from 
November 2002 to March 2003. The interviews covered a wide range of themes relating to network 
interaction, selection criteria, knowledge sharing, political influence and the incentives to increased 
interaction as an actor in innovation-related setups to mention a few. Each interview lasted approxi-
mately 2 hours and were all tape-recorded and transcribed. Transcribed interviews were sent back to 
interviewees to rule out possible misunderstandings. Later the context of the individual interviews was 
organized in themes relating to the overall theoretical framework for this paper. In the following 
empirical case a combination of citations and explanations will be used. Each citation has been selected 
based on its appropriateness for explaining and exemplifying the role of venture capitalists in this 
context.    
Additionally the case is supported by peer review articles, books, news services, venture capital 
statistics etc. 
 
Role and position in the innovation system 
The Danish venture capital market is relatively young compared to the rest of the European countries 
and especially the United States. The market was initiated in the late 70’s and the early 80’s. From 1982 to 
1985, 10-15 new venture funds were established. The positive development, however, did not last and a 
few years later the number was reduced to only a few (Christensen, 1998, 2000). After this downturn, it 
took almost 10 years before focus once again was on venture capital in Denmark. In 1992 the 
establishment of the governmental institution, the Danish Investment Fund, again shaded light on the 
entrepreneurs. The focus has remained since 1994, although the market experienced a downturn after the 
year 2000. Today, the market for venture capital is growing, which is supported by statistics concluding 
that the total number of venture capital companies increased from 33 in 1998 to almost 70 today (EVCA, 
Vækstfonden 2003). The same sources also report a high level of diversity in the types of investors. We 
know from the venture capital research (e.g. Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Cowling, 1999) that venture 
capitalists pursuing different strategies also have a significant impact in engaging in innovations. 
No. 1-2. 04. P. 41.64                                               VEST                                                               vol. 17 
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 91  
 
The Danish venture capital industry is still trying to find its feet and define what kind of role it should 
play in the innovation system. Lars Bruhn, managing partner of the venture capital company IVS A/S and 
former chairman of the Danish Venture Capital Association, clearly states: “I hope that we will get more 
venture capitalists in the market that take active part in influencing the political agenda”. Trends towards 
a more mature market have however started to show. As an example, it can be mentioned that the Danish 
Venture Capital Association (DVCA) is increasingly making an impact. In 2002 to 2004 DVCA had 
established several commiees in order to influence the political agendas and ensure the right climate for 
venture capitalists. Trends towards a greater interest in developing the market however, have started to 
show by the Danish Government. The DVCA succeeded in getting 5 out of 10 suggestions accepted by 
the government in 2003.  DVCA has established several committees in order to influence the political 
agendas and ensure the right climate for venture capitalists. The latest committee which has been 
established is trying to support and promote education in entrepreneurship and venture capital. This 
initiative also tries to create the link between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Other committees are 
responsible for supplying historical market data, which can later be used, or decision-making and 
international comparison.  
It is argued by Thor Birkmand, Futuri Invest, manager of Slottsbacken Funds, that such initiatives are 
needed as“…entrepreneurs are not as well aware of venture capital to help them grow their business as 
in many other countries”. He further argues, “… as a result of the immature Danish market many 
entrepreneurs perceive venture capitalists as hunters that shoots around and pick up whatever ends of on 
the floor”. He stresses however that many venture capitalists operate in an immature fashion, in the most 
sense more like traditional financial institutions than venture capitalists. Most of the initiatives in DVCA 
still remain on the basis of volunteers. In order to gain more momentum on a macro economical level 
Thomas Weilby Knudsen (Chief Financial Officer) InternetventuresScandinavia A/S stresses “Even 
though IVS do not formally have a task in this context, we do prioritise active work in organizations such 
as DVCA [Danish Venture Capital Association] and other organizations, in order to improve conditions 
for innovation”…“As IVS is dependent on attractive investment cases, it is part of our concern”. These 
statements give indications that only a limited proportion of the Danish venture capital industry has yet 
started to influence agendas on macro economic level – becoming a more formalised group of actors. As 
part of this development, a number of actors see the possibilities and incitements to pursue a more formal 
existence in the innovation system. 
In relation to governmental influence, venture capitalists are also seeking additional help too boost the 
support to new ventures. Poul Andersson, CEO of the investment company BioVision, says “When 
venture funds move to a higher level on the scale of risk they leave an open gap where there is no funds 
to push the companies further on. If the early projects are not to die out there is more then ever a need for 
the government to take on a proactive role”. In this relation, Mark Sonne Kharazmi from Danske Venture 
Partners/Nordic Venture Partners argues that venture capitalists have just initiated actions that will 
influence government decisions. This initiative included a list of practical initiatives to improve the 
conditions for venture capitalists. Mark Sonne Kharazmi further argues that venture capitalists are 
starting to find niches in which they can specialize, thereby they will create a broader interface with the 
market, and become known to a larger group of actors.  
A large proportion of new venture capitalists in the market spend most of their time on developing 
their business structure while spending limited energy on positioning activities e.g. influencing the 
degree of innovation. This indicates little interest in fertilizing the grounds for new innovations.   
Many Danish venture capitalists count on the educational system to provide good investment 
opportunities. In relation to the educational system Henrik Albertsen, managing partner and CEO of the 
Danish venture capital company Nordic Venture Partners expresses: “We need to have an educational 
system, which is of international standard. It’s our job to discover, evaluate and capitalize on this 
research”. A similar quote from Thomas Weilby Knudsen (Chief Financial Officer) position the role of 
Internetventures Scandinavia A/S (IVS) in the Danish innovation system: “IVS sees its role as twofold: as 
a facilitator of the innovative environment, and as a partner. The facilitator role is visible through our 
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promotion and investment in companies, thus creating further growth and success stories about 
innovative entrepreneurs who succeed in building a business. As a partner IVS is highly dependent on 
sourcing for its investments opportunities. The innovative environment is an important source”. Directed 
by the quotes, it becomes obvious that the role ascribed to venture capitalists is focused on the area of 
facilitating the innovation process, rarely taking an active part in actual creation. This goes hand in hand 
with the early theoretical separation of markets. In relation to the involvement, the following quote 
answers the question of whether Internetventures Scandinavia A/S takes active part in the innovation 
process: “No, however, we do spend effort on improving conditions for entrepreneurs on different 
levels,” says Thomas Weilby Knudsen. 
The practical distinction of markets is very much grounded in traditional financial funding as 
provided by banks and other credit institutions. The common perceived value-adding element of venture 
capitalists lies in their ability to help entrepreneurs develop their idea into a viable business. These quotes 
provide some empirical perspectives: “We meet entrepreneurs who believe that having a significant 
technology is equal to a brilliant firm… it is one of our obligations to make these evaluations and aid 
management and entrepreneurs to best possible approach the market and then later on bring these to 
market” (Thor Birkmand, Futuri Invest, manager of Slottsbacken Funds). An additional quote further 
underline this point, “It is our role to provide capital, but also advise and make resources available that 
the entrepreneur didn’t have access to before” (Helle Busck Fensvig, Partner, Danske Life Science). Helle 
Busck Fensvig further argues “This type of active involvement in the investment is something that is 
oen stated by Danish venture capitalists, but something that they rarely do”. Venture capitalists are 
however well aware that innovation is the main fuel for their business model. Indirect action for 
improving such conditions has therefore also started to be formulated as direct proposal to the 
government. DVCA tries through its committees to ensure that the pipeline is filled with new venture 
ideas, while at the same time creating general support to the industry. 
The case provides examples as to how venture capitalists see themselves in the innovation system. 
Only in rare cases venture capitalists take part in the process of idea creation and consequently early 
phase innovation, and acknowledging this fact, we find evidence that the heterogeneous nature of the 
venture capital market makes the result less significant. Henrik Albertsen, Managing partner, CEO of the 
Danish venture capital company Nordic Venture Partners illustrates this diversity by saying ”We 
represent some of the actors which are actively search for ideas at the universities … other actors are 
more relying on follow on investments which demands less active involvement”. This underlines that 
venture capitalists engage in investments at different stages and therefore also in the innovative process 
(Elango et al., 1995). Venture capitalists, who have the primary objective of investing in later stages, 
consequently run the risk of not being viewed as a direct component in the system as such, but function 
as a facilitating sub-layer providing innovations with financial resources for it to develop. Yet, some 
venture managers from the Danish case indicate that the sector is in a transitional phase and that in 
future perspective venture capitalists might gain enough market intelligence to identify special viable 
opportunities in the market and later on act on these. It is left unsaid if this will result in a higher level of 
engagement with the process of innovation or if venture capitalists will become competent in recognizing 
opportunities and later evaluate them. According to Henrik Albertsen (Managing partner, CEO, Nordic 
Venture Partners) it will most likely be the latter: ”…we are not here to create innovations… we are here 
to make evaluations and participate in the subsequent value adding process”  
Referring to Lars Bruhn´s (Managing partner, IVS A/S and former chairman of the Danish Venture 
Capital Association) statement of setting political agendas, one might however make the distinction 
between the level of engagement in influencing political agendas that will subsequently provide beer 
opportunities for the venture capital industry, and their direct engagement with the process of 
innovation. This indirect/direct influence will consequently provide important dimensions for analyzing 
the role of venture capitalists in relation to other actors. The case together with the previous theoretical 
review provides an indication that the degree of involvement in innovation is only one parameter when 
mapping the venture capitalist’s role and importance; the level of formality as an actor subset is equally 
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important. A better understanding of this connection is provided in the coming chapter. 
CREATING CONSENSUS 
It is historically grounded that venture capitalists are not as publicly known as other financial 
institutions. The early rise of the venture capital industry and its development towards maturity was 
initially constituted of “business angles”. A common characteristic of these business angles is that they 
are individual investors investing their private money (Mason and Harrison, 1992). Quite obvious these 
single individuals, not being part of a larger organization, were not as identifiable as the larger 
organization in the institutional landscape (Fenn and Liang, 1998). These elements have however shied 
in mature venture areas, yet we find these characteristics present in the Danish case. Comparing mature 
and immature venture capital industries thus show conspicuous differences in the degree by which 
venture capitalists have established themselves around a professional body or community. Evidently 
Danish venture capitalists to a lesser degree, have established themselves as an actor subset or 
community, whereby their official appearance as a collective in the innovation context is blurred. This 
problem is in many cases due to the fact that venture capitalists to a large extent have relied on their 
informal relations and specifically their ‘nose’ for sniffing up good investment proposals, reserving fewer 
resources for positioning activities. Mitchell Berlin (1998) argues that most venture capital firms often 
consist of small independent partnerships with a professional staff of between 6 and 12 people, including 
a few general partners and a small number of associates who are venture capitalists in training. This 
naturally makes the individual venture capitalist appear less formal than traditional banks, which are far 
greater in size (Berlin, 1998). 
Callahan and Muegge (2003, p. 641-667) argue that only:  
In rare instances, a venture capitalist may become involved in the development of a new venture before it 
is ready for investments of the size and type appropriate for VCs. More commonly, however, the deals 
seek out the VC, who often maintains a high profile in their investment community – spending significant 
amounts of time at business events and conferences. The timing of VC financial entry into an opportunity 
can depend greatly on the supply of and demand for good opportunities by VCs. 
Following this line of argumentation, researchers such as Hellman (1997) stress that if investors play an 
active role in the development of new start-up companies, the identity of the investor becomes an 
important determinant of the venture process. Trying to deal with this problem venture capitalists often 
make syndicate investments and exchange good proposals (Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1990).  
Even though research in this area is only an indirect representation of venture capitalists practice it 
does give a clear indication of how the relationship is between the innovation system and venture 
capitalists. Venture capitalists can primarily be seen as organizations that are willing to provide risk-
willing capital in return for an abnormal payoff (e.g. Block & McMillan, 1993). A central issue is to be 
found in the strong separation of markets for capital and entrepreneurial opportunities. Venture capitalist 
and the primary innovation network often do not see one another to have inter-correlated interests. There 
is a strong belief that separate organizations should do what they are best at (Thornton, 1999). In this way 
the components and relations in the system of innovation should be the ones providing innovations and 
venture capitalists should be the ones, exploiting these opportunities (Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and 
Venkatarman, 2003). 
A partial reason for this indirect position in relation to the innovation system is stemming from a 
strong belief that venture capitalists cannot contribute with any value in the innovative process. There is 
a common perception that the value that these organisations render should be brought in much later in 
the process: i.e. exploring the opportunities, staffing, growing the business etc. It is often argued that 
venture capitalists play a critical rule in the innovation process, not only as a source of finance to 
innovation but through other functions that lie at the core of high tech development (Burgelman, 1985). 
Another reason for the level of directness in the approach of the venture capitalists might also be found in 
not knowing where and how the contribution should take place. The venture capital actors in many cases 
carry traditions from traditional funding; such as we know it from banks and other financial institutions.  
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Taxonomy 
Condensing the illustrations from the Danish case and the present research on venture capitalists in the 
system of innovation, a framework starts to take shape. The clarity by which venture capitalists operate 
in the system with clear tasks to fulfil is only in the making in the Danish case. This development can be 
seen in perspective of network theory, where there is an increased focus on formal or informal positions 
as the locus of innovation (Pyka 1997, Waldstrøm 2001, Dahl 2002, Cross et. al., 2002). These theories help 
to provide one dimension of the position of venture capitalists: formality or informality. This dimension 
of formality/informality helps us determine the possible potential of venture capitalists and also provide 
an important element in the taxonomy. This determines to what degree venture capitalist are known in 
the system. The analytical context, when looking at formal/informal factors influencing innovation, 
implicitly touches upon the extent and scope by which formal and informal entities influence innovation. 
Adapting the formal/informal terms to the taxonomy with connection to the innovation process also 
reveals the concepts of direct/indirect influence on the innovation process i.e. are the actors formally or 
informally involved in the innovation process and is the involvement direct or indirect. Direct/indirect 
naturally refers to the degree involvement in the innovative process. 
As the purpose of the present paper is to analyse the potential of venture capitalists in the system of 
innovation as well as their influence on the system, the criteria of formal/informal actors and of 
direct/indirect participation in innovation are chosen to support the line of argumentation. From the 
Danish case it becomes evident that formal/informal and direct/indirect are central dimensions when 
mapping venture capitalists in the innovation system. What appears is a two-dimensional taxonomy 
categorizing central institutions in the system of innovation. As analytical criteria these create a two-
dimensional taxonomy in which it is possible to position the components in the innovation system. In 
relation to the taxonomy the location of the venture capitalists can later on be carried out in perspectives 
of various inputs from research as well as the Danish case.  
Schloser 1999 (p. 4) presents a similar model, and as he notes that 
[…]to simplify the model assume that only two values for each of the independent variables exist: for each 
either a high or a low value. It may however be added that the two dimensions can be considered 
continua. 
This of course is a simplification of reality, yet this categorization helps to disclose and systematize the 
components and relations involved in innovation in a quadrant model. As a result of the classification, 
the tracking of innovations and formal/informal institutions involved in these innovations can be carried 
out in a more systematic order than through traditional NIS analysis. This tracking and mapping process 
involves actors making it possible to conclude on innovations' pervasiveness (Schloser, 1999), while at the 
same time providing with a common set of analytical variables that are constructive to cross-system 
comparisons. 
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Figure 1: Components and relations in the innovation system2 
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Primary innovation network (Formal/direct) 
The primary innovation network is basically constituted of the explicit core of the innovation system 
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorf 1996, Nowotny et. al, 2001). As can be seen, the group comprises public 
research institutions and universities as well as private companies – yet all with direct responsibility for 
the generation and application of new knowledge within their fields, and at the same time participating 
in collaborative arrangements and networks. The entities in this quadrant of the figure are the same that 
are worked with in the theories of the triple helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorf, 1996) and the mode 2 
knowledge production (Gibbons et. al, 1994, Novotny et. al, 2001).  
As an example, the development of S&T policy and the diffusion of these policies highly influence the 
processes of innovation as well as implementing programmes that facilitate the development of new 
technologies and set forth future research goals. A collective characteristic of the group is a close and 
continuous interaction with other components in the innovation system and awareness of their position 
and contribution to the system as a whole.  
 
Background innovation facilitation (Formal/indirect) 
Background innovation facilitation represents formal components indirectly affecting the innovation 
system – not as directly carrying innovations from idea stage to actual development but through their 
influence on the systems ability to actually run. Taking the example of the policy system, it is evident that 
the development of policies that support business goals are essential, otherwise hampering the firm’s 
autonomy of action. The educational systems can be regarded from the same perspective – feeding the 
system with both qualified manpower and knowledge needed to develop new products and processes. 
Shertler (2002) concluded that human capital, defined as the number of people employed in research and 
development relative to the total labour force, is a good explanation for the level of venture capital, i.e. 
the higher the percentage of the workforce that works in research and development, the more often they 
innovate. 
 
Reflexivity and action patterns (Informal/direct) 
This section deals with the same agents as the first, but the starting point here is the relational network. 
The informal character of the factors constituting this quadrant has proven to influence innovation to a 
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great length. While these factors often are not bound within any formal organization, they frequently are 
the sources of both strategic and operational success. Studies (e.g. analysing collaborative arrangements 
between universities and industry) are increasingly pointing towards the importance of informal 
networks. (Powell, 1996; Jones et. al, 1997, Lundvall, 1992)  
The most indicative examples of informal networks are the networks of individuals – constituted by 
former fellow students, colleagues etc. Moreover many organizations have placed themselves in 
networks of informal character. Networks of this kind first and foremost exist because they bring people 
together and because there is a need for continuous cultivation of ones network (Pyka, 1997).   
 
Values and attitudes (Informal/indirect) 
This section comprises a sub layer of historical and cultural features that primarily show themselves as 
attitudes and behavioural patterns in society – entrepreneurial culture (Hornsby, Kuratko & Zahra, 2002). 
The layer can be characterized as the innovation culture from which entrepreneurial behaviour, risk-
willingness, adoption of new technologies and general social attitude towards the system as a whole 
emerges (Kuratko, Hornsby, Naffziger & Montagno, 1993). These factors influence the behaviour on mar-
kets, strategic decisions and political processes, thus indirectly influencing the innovation processes.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Four different positions are revealed in the previous figure and as indicated, there are both institutional 
and organizational overlaps between the quadrants. At this point, it is important to emphasize that one 
quadrant in the taxonomy is not better than the other, but each quadrant carries specific benefits 
depending on the task at hand. It will however be argued that in order to use and exploit the potentials of 
venture capitalists in the innovation system, the best foundation will be a formal direct position. From 
this position, venture capitalists will have a better starting point for influencing the agendas in the other 
quadrants and contribute to the overall performance of the system.  
During the innovation process, it is important that venture capitalists recognize and finance 
commercially viable opportunities (Stasch, 1994). They represent a vital actor subset for the innovation 
system to perform. A consequence of separation of markets venture capitalists however, often take an 
informal and indirect part in early phase of innovations even though studies indicate that direct and 
formal involvement host potential value for the venture capitalists (Husted & Vintergaard, 2004; 
Vintergaard & Husted, 2003).  
Venture capitalists are highly dependent on accessing new unique ventures, which can provide them 
significant return – the “raw material” in their business model. In addition, it is argued that one of the 
most significant impediments for many companies is too few mainstream ideas (Block & MacMillan, 
1993; Tidd et al., 2001). If venture capitalists have no access to a sufficient number of unique ideas, the 
venture unit will not be able to create a sufficient number of profitable ventures and will eventually cease 
(Block & MacMillan, 1993:94). Etzkowitz et. al (2001) stress that commercialisation of university science 
largely depends on a marriage between venture capital and university scientists. Such involvement will 
also benefit the innovation system by providing better exploitation of the capabilities and resources 
which venture capitalists possesses i.e. increasing the level of innovation. 
It is argued in this article that through a more formal and direct role in the innovation system, venture 
capitalists will surpass the position as intermediaries and will gain access to a larger stream of ideas. 
Obtaining this position is however only achieved through collective means. Venture capitalists have to 
learn to become more proactive and direct partners in the process of innovation while also ensuring a 
more formal position. Pari passu, it is also important that other actors and the policy system support this 
process. Only through a collective effort will the system harvest from a new actor group in the system.   
Even though reconfiguration of the venture capitalist in the innovation taxonomy model has 
appealing outputs, there are strong demands on the venture capitalist as a specific group of actors and on 
the rest of the actors in the system. In order for venture capitalists to achieve the possible benefits of 
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innovation and achieve a direct and formal position in the system, several actions can be proposed: 
 
Dynamic participation. The first initial consideration is to establish concrete actions in order to 
achieve a fruitful position in the innovation system. In order for this to manifest itself, proactive 
initiatives need to be taken from the collective of venture capitalists. Simultaneous efforts from other 
actors of the “primary innovation network” should strive to include the capabilities of the venture 
capitalists. The reason to take active part in the system as such is naturally twofold: 1) for venture 
capitalists to gain access to and benefit from innovations (Vintergaard & Husted, 2004) and 2) in order to 
facilitate the system as such. As earlier illustrated, indicators have shown that active involvement in the 
process leads to a potential higher profit. Simultaneous direct and formal participation will also enhance 
the facilitation of the other parts of the system of innovation. As described in relation to the separation of 
markets, it is often taken for granted that innovations and thereby entrepreneurs automatically generate 
venture ideas and that no initiatives are necessary to facilitate them. The type of actions that can be 
proposed could be to accommodate stronger ties between venture capitalists, universities, government 
and other parts of the “primary innovation network”. 
 
Setting agendas. In order to achieve a formal position in the innovation system, an important element 
is to take part in influencing agendas (political and institutional) in the formal and informal networks that 
constitute the relations between different components in the innovation system. Doing this will enhance 
the position and resource allocation and focus will move in a desired direction. In order to achieve such a 
position, the venture capital actors must nevertheless learn where and how to position themselves in such 
a structure. Huxham and Vangen (2000, p. 1166) argue that:  
Structures thus play an important leadership role because they determine such key factors as: who has an 
influence on shaping a partnership agenda, which has power to act, and what resources are tapped. 
They further argue that when the structure of collaboration is part of a system of multiple overlapping 
partnerships, the influence on the agenda may be even more significant (Huxham & Vangen, 2000). By 
taking active part in influencing the agendas in the network, corporations will also have a greater chance 
of gaining a central position in the network. 
 
Reconfigure the innovation network. Knowledge on how to position oneself, influence the common 
agenda and to actively interact in the innovation system is essential. Given proactive presence in the 
network, one quite evidently becomes more interesting as a collaborative partner (Powell et. al, 1996, 
Cross et. al, 2002). In general it is often important to understand the extent to which the network as a 
whole is reliant on one both as individual and as group. Understanding how ones enactment might 
impact connectivity and information flow is critical to ensuring network resiliency. The network relations 
discussed above of course applies within the systems of innovation. As argued by Seufert et. al 1999: “the 
locus of innovation should be thought of as a network of inter-organizational relations”[p.181]. In relation to the 
presence in the system of innovation, he further argues that successful organizations position themselves 
at the hubs in the center of overlapping networks stimulating rewarding research collaborations among 
the various actors. 
A direct position in the system cannot be based purely on facilitating the system. A central task for the 
primary innovation network is learning how to interact and create networks in order to be able to 
manage their position in the innovation system (Powell et. al, 1996). Seufert, Krogh and Bach (1999) argue 
that individuals in an organization should be able to recognize personally relevant knowledge within the 
organization, which can be exploited. The ability to create and participate in a network and to 
contextualize one’s knowledge (Gibbons et. al, 2001) has to be seen as something that can be learned, but 
also something that often depends on personal traits.    
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Have something to offer and the ability to absorb. Following argumentation above, the actors in the 
primary innovation network need to engage in network formation and also have something to offer in 
terms of knowledge production, reputation etc. Venture capitalists will not become part of a value-
creating innovation system unless they contribute with unique competencies that are not already present 
in the network. The absorptive capacity of other actors in the system in this sense becomes a necessary 
precondition in order to be able to make use of the resources and capabilities possessed by venture 
capitalists. Powell et al. (1996) argues that a partnering decision depends on each partner’s size and 
position in the “value-chain” and the level of technological sophistication. They further argue that to 
remain current in a rapidly moving field, an organization must be involved in the research process. 
Passive recipients of new knowledge are less likely to appreciate or be able to respond rapidly. In 
industries where knowledge is crucial, companies must be experts in both in-house research and in 
cooperative research with external partners, such as university scientists, research organizations, and 
skilled competitors.  
 
Boundary objects 
We acknowledge that a formal and direct position will improve the position of venture capitalists. 
However, there exists a continuum of reasons why venture capitalists do not engage themselves in early 
stage technology development.  
A central issue stems from the strong separation of markets. Venture capitalists and entrepreneurial 
organizations do not perceive mutual interests. There is a strong belief that separate organizations 
should do what they are best at. In this context, the national system of innovation should create 
innovations and the venture organisations should exploit these opportunities. Secondly, there is a strong 
belief that venture capitalists do not deliver value-added services to the innovative process. The common 
perception is that the value provided by these organisations emerges much later in the process: i.e. 
exploring the opportunities, staffing, growing the business etc. It is oen argued that venture capitalists 
play a critical role in the innovation process, not only as financial source, but also through other 
functions that lie at the core of high tech development (e.g. Block & MacMillan, 1995, Gompers & Lerner, 
2000). 
Thirdly one of the central problems for the level of separation of venture capital and the innovation 
systems might also be found in not knowing where and how the contribution could take place. The 
venture capital players in many cases carry traits from traditional finance institutions as banks and other 
financial institutions.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Following the reasoning above, venture capitalists that are presently informal entities in the system can 
earn potential benefits by taking a more formal and direct part in the system – a shift demanding 
collective effort. It is likely to believe that the shift will follow temporary trajectories until reaching the 
formal and direct sphere. It is pertinent to mention that utility cannot be ascribed to one position or the 
other, as well the shift not binding the venture capitalists to a distinct area or place within the primary 
innovation network or the background innovation facilitation – yet it constitutes a shift in self-perception 
and the degree and type of interaction with other key innovation actors.  
Conclusively, it is still important to note that despite the possibilities of a transition towards a more 
formal role in leveraging innovations, venture capitalists are actually feeding on the formality of the 
system, or rather the rigidity of institutions affecting the other primary network actors. Values and 
attitudes are holding the formal actors in rigid positions, eventually preventing i.e. banks and credit 
institutions, from providing the innovation system with services comparable to those delivered by 
venture capitalists. A diversified strategy of combining a formalized and direct involvement in 
innovation, influencing the formation of norms and values as well as becoming present in network 
relations e.g. brokering in university-industry relations, is important. 
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1 The discussion on how to formulate the exact properties of a National System of Innovation has many 
strands. Niosi (2002) provides with a picture of the semantic core of the concept. 
2 Inspiration comes from Schloser 1999. Look to Liu and White 2001 for another taxonomy.
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3.2 Study II – Jørgensen and Vintergaard (2006) 
 
Connecting Company Strategy and Network Identity
In: Managing Dynamic Networks Organisational Perspectives of Technology Enabled Inter-
Firm Collaboration. Klein S. and Poulymenakou A. (eds.) Heidelberg: Springer 
Heidi Jørgsensen, Christian Vintergaard  
Copenhagen Business School 
Abstract: Current literature has explained how strategic interorganisational relations can be of concern for 
management. However when it comes to explain the causalities between theses relations and corporate strategies, it 
is less elaborated. As companies today more than ever operate in networks of relations it is of crucial importance to 
understand how these networks should be dealt with in relation to corporate strategy. The aim of this empirical 
study is thus to conceptualize how strategic relations are managed in accordance with the overall corporate 
strategy. Thus it tries to answer: Are there important connections between a firm’s network strategy and its 
corporate strategy? 
Key words: Strategy, network, relational embeddedness, redundant and non-redundant relations network identity, defenders, 
analysers, prospectors and reactors 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Are there important connections between a firm’s network strategy and its corporate strategy? 
Over the years, a considerable amount of resources have been spent on studying the making of 
corporate strategy. The main focus has been on analysing single companies in isolation in order 
to understand how they behave and perform. Today, however, managers increasingly stress the 
importance of engaging in strategic relations beyond the isolated firm. Since the expected 
benefits of engaging in a network of strategic relations are high, the concept of networks or 
networking has gained increasing momentum. As a result, previous measures of effective 
strategy, i.e., those that focus on the position of a company within an industry (Porter, 1980) or 
the internal resources and capabilities of a company (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991), have 
become inadequate for predicting the effect and effectiveness of corporate strategies. The 
concept of networking is well suited to explain how networks of strategic relations can be a 
concern of management. But it lacks insight when it comes to explaining the relation of strategic 
networks to corporate strategies. It is this relation that we will shed light on here.  
Common sense suggests that companies that differ as to corporate strategies would also differ as 
to the management of their strategic relations. At present, research enables us neither to verify 
nor disprove this assertion as the focus has been on the issues such as explaining the factors that 
have lead to focus on interfirm cooperation (Gulati et al., 2000), determining what constitutes a 
network and how to maintain and/or develop a company’s network relations (Holm et al., 1996; 
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Håkansson and Johanson, 1993; Miles and Snow, 1992; Ritter, 1999), and determining how to 
develop a network perspective (Gulati et al., 2000; Dyer and Singh, 1998). While the literature 
on strategic alliances (e.g., Bresser, 1989) strives to connect network behaviour with business 
strategy, the link between corporate strategy and network strategy still calls for further 
theoretical investigation and empirical exemplification. Hence this paper strives to conceptualise 
the processes by which strategic relations are managed in accordance with the overall corporate 
strategy.  
To this end, the paper applies the well-known framework from organisational behaviour 
developed by Miles and Snow (1978) to provide distinct categories of firm level or corporate 
strategies. We do acknowledge the shortcomings of the model (Zahra and Pearce, 1990, 753; 
Namiki, 1989). However, as pointed out by Torres and Murray (2002) in contrast to Porter, 
Ansoff and others, Miles and Snow’s framework “characterises entire organisations as an 
integrated and dynamic whole, taking into account the interrelationships of strategy, structure 
and process” (Torres and Murray, 2002, 2). Another question concerning the applicability of the 
framework is the strong categorization of each business typology’s behaviour. Shortell and Zajac 
(1990) studied the reliability and validity of Miles and Snow’s business typology. They 
concluded: “researches can use the typology with increased confidence in future work on 
organizations and their strategies” (Shortell and Zajac, 1990, 829-830). Zahra and Pearce (1990) 
assessed the status of prior research on the Miles and Snow typology. They concluded that, 
overall, the predictions put forward by Miles and Snow in regard to the typology relating to the 
three different element of the adaptive cycle are supported.  
To sum up, questions can be raised regarding the validity of some of the elements of Miles and 
Snow’s typology or framework for organisational behavior in general. However, most studies 
support the validity of Miles and Snow’s typology and argue for the wide applicability of the 
framework. As stated by Torres and Murray (2002) “The Miles and Snow (1978) model has been 
a robust, integrated, contingency framework for exploring diversity. It sheds light on the nature 
of diversity in strategy and form by illuminating the simple underlying order.” (Torres and 
Murray, 2002, 2). Despite the shortcomings and the significant developments in the field of 
strategic management since the 1970s, the original framework provides very workable groupings 
that clearly illustrate the point of this paper.  
Three case studies from the Danish biotech industry will be drawn into the analysis to exemplify 
and illustrate how a company’s corporate strategy is directly correlated to how it manages its 
strategic network identity. The following section will provide a theoretical overview which 
includes an introduction to Miles and Snow’s (1978) framework as well as descriptions of each 
case company. Furthermore, the methodology and a review of existing network literature will be 
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presented. Section three will contain the analysis where theory will be linked to the findings 
from the cases. Finally, due to the linkage between the business typology of a company, its 
patterns of network behaviour and subsequent network identity, the importance for company 
strategy is to know how to manage these relations. We will present the linkage between these 
issues in a framework. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Overview 
 
Strategic models such as Porter’s (1980) three generic strategies and Ansoff’s (1965) theory of 
strategic direction both provide useful tools for analysing company positioning in relation to 
strategy. Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategy-structure configuration (compared to the other two) 
has the additional advantage of incorporating the interrelationship between company strategy, 
structure and processes. This makes it a more illustrative framework when categorizing network 
strategies.  
A focal premise of Miles and Snow’s (1978) typology are patterns of competitive behaviour. 
Their framework provides four business typologies: Defenders, Prospectors, Analysers and 
Reactors. The business typology of a company is illustrated by the way a company relates to the 
“adaptive cycle” which consists of three intricately interwoven problems that affect 
organisational behaviour: 1) the entrepreneurial, 2) the engineering, and 3) the administrative 
problem (Miles and Snow, 1978). It is often said that managers have to relate to a range of 
different problems; nevertheless, according to Miles and Snow, they can be categorised into 
those three main problem areas (Torres and Murray, 2002). The entrepreneurial problem 
concerns the choice of product and market domain. A company has to decide whether to focus 
on a wide or narrow product/market domain. The second problem is related to the company’s use 
of technology, i.e., processes that favour scales of economies or effectiveness and flexibility 
(engineering problems). A correlation exists between the choice of production process (as an 
enabler) and the company’s choice of product/market domain. Lastly, the administrative problem 
deals with the organisational structure of the company (centralised versus decentralised). 
Inherently, a company has to deal with all three problems simultaneously but depending on the 
business typology of the company, the problems will be prioritised differently. A short 
introduction to the four business typologies as well as a description of the corresponding case 
company will be given below. It is however important to keep in mind that when using 
typologies, a variety of companies are dichotomised into narrow categories. Consequently, 
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corresponding case companies were chosen to illustrate and exemplify the main characteristics 
of the typologies in this new field (Glasser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1999).  
The cases are all drawn from the Danish medical industry. By limiting the analysis to a particular 
country and industry, the paper tries to overcome some of the possible biases of identifying 
changes in network behaviour based on different industry contexts. The framework for network 
behaviour in this paper will not be country- or industry-specific.  
The cases were identified (Yin, 1984) based on the characteristics of business typologies 
developed by Miles and Snow (1978). Each case was selected on the basis of how well it 
exemplified the relation between the three different parameters of product/market domain, 
organisational structure and production processes. For this purpose, secondary data (corporate 
communication such as annual reports, press briefings, etc.) was used to single out a number of 
qualified companies. The primary data was gathered through several rounds of semi-structured 
interviews with these companies in 2003/ 2004. The first round of interviews was conducted to 
verify what typology the company belonged to. This was done by presenting a list of questions 
that reflected how the companies are related to the three dimensions of the adaptive cycle. The 
next round of interviews was constructed so that insight was obtained as to how each case 
company relates to issues of networking. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed in 
order to assure a more accurate interpretation. Based on the information from the interviews, the 
data was analysed by linking the various answers to the parameters identified as important for 
network behaviour in the theoretical part of the paper. This provided a comprehensive picture of 
patterns of network behaviour. By incorporating the data from the case studies, the individual 
typologies were linked to specific network behaviour; providing for the identification of each 
business typology’s network identity. In the paper, the identity of each case company and the 
names of the respective interviewees will be kept anonymously. The companies’ names will be 
replaced with synonyms, reflecting their identity.   
 
2.1 The Defender 
 
Defenders want stability. Stability is achieved by reducing the organisation’s vulnerability to 
changes in the environment as well as uncertainty through a series of decisions and actions. 
Stability and reduced uncertainty is crucial for the defender’s entrepreneurial problem (Shortell 
and Zajac, 1990). A defender’s success depends on its ability to stay competitive within its 
chosen domain, which is defined by price and/or quality, i.e., by relying on high efficiency. As a 
consequence, the engineering focus of a defender tends to be on efficient production processes 
(Torres and Murray, 2002; Shortell and Zajac, 1990). However, to ensure the success of this 
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operating process, a defender must maintain a high level of internal control through a highly 
centralised organisational structure (Tuominen, 1997; Torres and Murray, 2002). It can be 
argued that defenders tend to ignore developments outside their core market, consequently 
achieving growth through market penetration in their current domain (Miles and Snow, 1978). A 
defender’s strategy could thus be characterised as the most stable of the business typologies. 
 
Case 1: Respiratory A/S  
Respiratory A/S provides a rich illustration and exemplification of a defender. The company is a 
leading pharmaceutical company in the field of allergy diagnosis and treatment. Respiratory A/S 
was founded in 1923 and has approximately 1000 employees. What characterizes this defender 
company is its perusal in centralising its organisational structure with the main focus on 
streamlining production processes in order to obtain efficiency gains. Secondly, Respiratory 
A/S’s core product portfolio is relatively focused around products to cure allergies from 
diagnosis to treatment. To support this strategy, their Director of Strategic Marketing & Sales 
explains, “Our aim is to have a limited number of product lines out of which two are focused on 
tablets and one on injections”. Another clear example of the company’s defender strategy is its 
focus on quality. As the Director of Strategic Marketing & Sales argues, “We seek to 
differentiate ourselves on quality – meaning that we aim at setting the standard within the 
industry”. As can be seen, many of the central strategic issues for Respiratory A/S fit well into 
the characteristics of a defender.  
Respiratory A/S’s current external relationships centre around four big established companies. 
Each relationship has a specific objective but seen as a whole, all four serve to improve or 
maintain the company’s leading position within the field of allergy diagnosis and treatment. The 
relationships are long-term and based on close personal ties. Respiratory A/S also governs a 
range of relationships of minor importance. These are based on weak connections. The Director 
of Strategic Sales & Marketing explains, “We do have some minor relations with smaller 
companies but they are not presented as much as other more important strategic relations”. 
 
2.2 The Prospector 
 
Contrary to the defender, a prospector interacts dynamically with its environment and is 
continuously on the look out for new business opportunities (Miles and Snow, 1978). A 
prospector’s solution to the entrepreneurial problem focuses on a relatively wide product/market 
domain (Morgan et al., 2000). The strategy of a prospector is often associated with innovation, 
and companies that pursue this strategy are often trying to promote change (Miles and Snow, 
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1984). The engineering problem is to increase effectiveness. This allows for more flexible 
production processes. Correspondingly, the solution to a prospector’s administrative problem is a 
decentralised organisational structure (Torres and Murray, 2002). Compared to the reactive 
posture of a defender, a prospector can thus be characterised as being very pro-active.  
 
Case 2: Innovator A/S 
The strategy of Innovator A/S unmistakably exemplifies the basic ideas of a prospector. 
Innovator A/S is a biotech-based company, which has become the world leader in industrial 
enzymes. The company was recently spun off from another major pharmaceutical company and 
has approximately 3.700 employees. The organisational structure gives a first indication that 
Innovator A/S is a prospector. Senior Director of Innovator A/S explains, “There is a very short 
distance between top management and lower levels. Our focus is on easy flow of communication 
between all employees and levels”. Secondly, the target market and the product portfolio are 
very broad as the company is represented within 120 countries and carries over 700 different 
products. Thirdly, and very typical for a prospector, Innovator A/S is dedicated to a strategy of 
continued innovation of new products as well as development of new business areas. The Senior 
Director of Innovator A/S explains the strategy, “At the outset, we were only into enzymes. But 
we have to continue developing new areas such as bio-polymers and bio-pharmaceuticals. It is 
our vision to keep building new areas”. These are not based on enzymes but they do provide 
synergy when combined with the enzyme business. As is typical for the prospector, the focus is 
thus not specifically on efficiency but instead on effectiveness.  
Innovator A/S has a different perspective on strategic relationships, which also serve many 
different functions. That is, many of Innovator A/S’s strategic relations are with the company’s 
biggest clients. Coupled with the long development process of new products in this industry, 
these strategic relationships are generally long-term and personal. The reason for this strategy, 
according to the Senior Director of the company, is that “You have to make it work on the 
personal level. Otherwise it cannot function on the commercial level”. If an opportunity arises or 
other changes make current relationships obsolete, Innovator A/S will have to eliminate existing 
long-term relations. Senior Director of Innovator A/S explains the necessity of this in relation to 
its strategy: “When changing business focus we sometimes have to change our strategic 
partners”. Innovator A/S also has an array of informal relationships with smaller companies or 
organisations. These types of relations often serve the purpose of accessing information that 
currently lay outside Innovator A/S’s core business areas. 
 
2.3 The Analyser 
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Defenders and prospectors represent the two ends of a continuum, i.e., the two extremes. The 
analyser typology can be found between the two (Miles and Snow, 1978; Hougaard and Bjerre, 
2002). The analyser’s entrepreneurial focus aims at positioning itself within a domain defined by 
both change and stability. As a consequence, focus is both on innovation as well as maintaining 
its more traditional markets (Torres and Murray, 2002). This duality is also reflected in its 
solution to its engineering problem. A balance is found between technological flexibility and 
stability (Touminen, 1997). Correspondingly, an analyser has to accommodate its organisational 
structure to encompass both the stable and dynamic domains of its operations. A common 
example of this type of strategy is found in corporate venture companies (Burgelman, 1983; 
Vintergaard, 2005; Husted and Vintergaard, 2004).  
 
Case 3: Derma A/S 
The research- and development-based pharmaceutical company Derma A/S aptly illustrates the 
business typology of the analyser. Derma A/S was established in 1908 and employs roughly 
3200 people today. The company’s area of expertise is in dermatology and critical care of 
humans. It is the vision of Derma A/S to become a global leader in the field of dermatology. The 
first indication of Derma A/S’s analyser strategy is that Derma A/S is currently searching for a 
new area of expertise while simultaneously retaining its present business focus. Explaining this 
strategy, Executive Vice President of Marketing & Sale explains, “For our company it is very 
important to have access to innovation. We are therefore looking for a third leg to stand on 
which does not have to be directly related to our existing business areas”. The company’s 
product domain is thus a blend of its core focus within dermatology and critical care and those 
derived from research in new areas of business – clearly a perfect example of an analyser 
strategy. Secondly, the company is committed to a decision making process that is quick and 
founded on sound principles. This is supported by a relatively flat organisational structure. 
Explaining this structure, Executive Vice President of Marketing & Sales argues, “You have to 
keep the finger on the pulse in order to make some qualified decisions. It is therefore important 
to have a flat organisational structure”. Due to Derma A/S’s unique position between a defender 
and prospector strategy (i.e. analyser) it can sometimes be hard to pinpoint any specific 
characteristics of its production processes. The standpoint is however that efficient production is 
important.  
At present, Derma A/S has very few strategic relations of any importance. Each relation is only 
to provide Derma A/S with access to resources necessary for the development of a specific 
product. Supporting this strategic move, Executive Vice President of Marketing & Sales 
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explains, “It is important to have all the experts in-house. In that way we are able to explain to 
others what we want them to do for us. The final product is however always entirely developed 
inside the company”. Derma A/S’s network relations are in general long-term and personal. The 
reasons for relationships being long-term are that the R&D process in general is very time 
consuming. In addition to its more stable strategic relationships, Derma A/S is recognised as a 
venture capital investor in small companies and consequently has several more informal 
relationships with minor companies.  
 
2.4 The Reactor 
 
Reactors have often been described as being positioned in-between the other typologies. 
Companies belonging to this typology fail to respond reliably to changes in the environment as 
no consistency exists between the choice of domain, organisational structure, and processes 
(Torres and Murray, 2002). Reactors perceive changes and opportunities in its external 
environment but, owing to a lack of internal focus and coordination, it becomes impossible to 
respond successfully (Touminen, 1997). 
Touminen (1997) proposes that a reactor should not be seen as a unique type but rather an 
illustration of defenders, prospectors and analysers that find themselves “stuck in the middle”. 
Supporting this argument is the fact that other researchers have refrained from working with this 
business type (Hambrick, 1993; Touminen, 1997). Furthermore, Miles and Snow’s study of the 
Electronics and Food Processing industries found that only 2 out of 27 companies analysed could 
be characterised as reactors (Miles and Snow, 1978, 193). As a consequence, this paper will not 
include this business typology in the analysis and only three cases will be presented to exemplify 
the business typologies. 
Based on the three dimensions of the adaptive cycle, the business types can each be fitted into 
the framework below hereby illustrating how each of them is situated compared the others.  
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Figure 1: Miles and Snow’s framework, Adapted from Touminen (1997) 
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2.5 A New Strategic Strand: Networks 
  
A central question in strategy research has been why companies behave and perform differently. 
Until recently, the focus has mostly been on the company’s internal resources and capabilities 
(i.e. the resource-based view of the firm) (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Hamel and Prahalad, 
1996) and how they position themselves within a market, i.e., the industry structure view (Porter, 
1980). What characterises both views is that they tend to see companies as single entities. A 
trend towards interfirm cooperation has become apparent (Gulati et al., 2000) whereas the 
company and its network have become intertwined and cannot be separated.  
 
 
2.6 Networks Representing Relations 
 
No clear definition of strategic networks exists. However, the majority of research focuses on the 
kinds of relationships that bind these network structures together (Gulati et al., 2000). As defined 
by Anderson et al. (1994), business networks should be seen as connected relationships. The 
focal company can through its own relations be connected to third parties. Thus, the network 
does not consist exclusively of dyadic relations but relations established among various 
companies. Håkansson and Johanson (1993) and Håkansson and Snehota (1997a, 1997b) identify 
the companies within a network as actors which are bound together by dependencies. 
Accordingly, actors are the various organisations or individuals represented within the network, 
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whereas resources are the elements that are central for performing the activities, hereby forming 
activity chains and structures (Håkansson and Snehota, 1997a). According to Blau (1968) 
business relations, in many cases, can be compared to social relations with different levels of 
embeddedness.  
Rowley et al. (2000) defines the level of relational embeddedness as being dependent on the use 
of either weak or strong ties. Strong ties facilitate the exchange of important information and 
tacit knowledge since strong ties are built on a high level of trust and insight (Granovetter, 
1992). This coincides with Blau’s (1968) ideas. Companies bound together by strong ties often 
mutually adapt their processes and therefore often become very dependent on each other 
(Rowley et al., 2000). Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that the adaptation process 
between the two actors can be related to various areas (Johanson and Mattsson, 1994). How 
much the actors have to adapt to each other thus varies depending on the area of interest. Hence, 
little adaptation is needed if the objective is to access information as opposed to knowledge. 
High level of relational embeddedness, i.e. the use of strong ties, can exist while still having a 
low level of dependency. Weak ties, on the other hand, do not facilitate the same type of 
information exchange and for that reason do not involve the same degree of dependency. Their 
function is to provide novel information by functioning as “gatekeepers” to other companies 
(Granovetter, 1973). Whether or not strong or weak ties enhance performance is contingent on 
the environment (Rowley et al., 2000). Strong ties are more efficient in settings with low 
uncertainty and high demand for exploitation of existing product/processes. Where uncertainty is 
high and exploration is crucial, relationships bound together through weak ties are the best 
solution (Rowley et al., 2000). Nevertheless, Rowley et al. (2000) argue that a mix of the two 
types would be beneficial. This argument is supported by Burt (1992) who states that a 
company’s possibilities within its strategic network are maximised by incorporating what he 
refers to as “structural holes”. Non-redundant network ties (e.g., network ties with little overlap) 
can therefore also be seen to provide a company with innovative possibilities if it wants to 
expand into new areas. In other words, by adding loosely coupled relations represented by weak 
tie binding mechanisms, a company can avoid getting stuck in an unwanted position (Ibarra, 
1992). Hence, it becomes interesting to analyse how much the level of relational embeddedness 
influences a company’s strategic relations. Secondly, the mixture of redundant and non-
redundant relations also seems to play an important part in how a company chooses to design its 
strategic relations.  
 
2.7 Network Identity 
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What still seems to be an open-ended question in the discussion of strategic networks is the 
formation and development of relationships that constitute the network structures (Ahuja, 2000). 
One explanation for networks to occur, according to Ahuja (2000), is systematically related to 
inducement and opportunities. Dyer and Singh (1998) support this argument by stating that a 
company’s critical resources may span company boundaries. Opportunities on the other hand 
relate to a company’s prior patterns of relationships. According to Ahuja (1998) the position held 
in prior network structures influences a company’s opportunity to form new relationships. 
Granovetter (1992) likewise emphasises that a company’s history of relations and actions will 
play a part in shaping the present situation (Granovetter, 1992; Mattson, 1986). It follows that a 
company must not only be willing to establish relationships but also has to be an attractive 
partner (Ahuja, 1998).  
Anderson et al. (1994) also emphasise the importance of “opportunities”. Each company has a 
certain network identity. Network identity refers to how the focal company sees itself in a 
network, and how other actors within the business network perceive it. The opportunities open to 
the company as well as the inducements are thus often dependent on the company’s network 
identity. As argued by Ahuja (1998) as well as Granovetter (1992), it is not only the present but 
also the past that influences a company’s network identity (Anderson et al., 1994; Ford et al., 
1986). Network identity can thus have a considerable influence on a company’s strategic options 
in the future, making it of fundamental importance.  
Now, several specific elements can be identified to influence companies’ strategic options when 
engaging in strategic relations. What seems to be the most important of all, however, is the issue 
of network behaviour and hereby network identity. Company behaviour is defined by the internal 
construction of the company, i.e., strategy, structure and processes. It is thus argued that 
company network behaviour is defined by these three elements. A company’s network identity is 
naturally mirrored by its network behaviour but other elements also affect network identity. 
Issues such as past and present network relations, how the company is linked to the partner’s 
resources, the type of relations established also have a great influence on the network identity. 
Network behaviour is thus dependent on the individual business typology. This is based on the 
fact that network identity is dependent on a company’s relations with other actors and links to 
their activities as well as resources.  
Consequently is becomes necessary to determine how the company relates to elements that are 
found to have an influence on network behaviour. The level of relational embeddedness, i.e., the 
development of weak/strong ties and level/area of adaptation as well as the issue of 
redundant/non-redundant relations have to be established. Furthermore, the importance of what 
incentives drive the respective business typology to engage in strategic relations as well as its 
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prior history of relations should not be overlooked as they are often mirrored by the company’s 
network identity.  
 
3. Analysis 
 
We will use Miles and Snow’s (1978) framework to categorize network identity and link it to 
business strategy. Each of the business strategies and examples will be linked with the literature 
on networks and discussed separately. Thus the individual domains (technology: effectiveness 
vs. efficiency, product/market: wide vs. narrow, structure: centralised vs. decentralised) of the 
strategies will be related to how they influence network management. 
 
3.1 The Defender 
 
3.1.1 Product/Market Domain  
Respiratory A/S produces medication for patients with allergies and asthma, which constitutes a 
minor part of the bigger group of respiratory diseases. According to the Director of Strategic 
Marketing & Business Planning, Respiratory A/S is in a market, which can be characterised as 
fairly stable, allowing the company to focus on the exploitation of its opportunities. According to 
the Director of Strategic Marketing & Business Planning, Respiratory A/S’s business strategy is 
based on, “What we try to do with our research and development strategies is to bring new life to 
existing products” and “We are very focused on the respiratory area”. When reviewing the 
network literature, a company following this type of business strategy is said to be strongly 
relationally embedded, thus making use of strong tie binding. In the case of Respiratory A/S, the 
Director of Strategic Marketing & Business Planning argues that personal relations become of 
crucial importance for the partnership to work, “We have established strong relations in 
particular with our partners Bayer and Maxygen. It is a question of setting up a personal relation 
of some kind”. This is closely linked with the general nature of the company’s relationships. 
These are sought on the basis of the future partner’s core competencies that should complement 
those of Respiratory A/S. The company creates a strong chain of relations with its strategic 
partners. This is illustrated by the strategic relation established with Maxygen - a leading 
company in the field of gene manipulation. The background for the strategic relation is the co-
development of a new gene manipulated allergy vaccine. Strategic relations are often established 
with organisations that complement Respiratory A/S in areas that lie outside its own focus. 
Interdependency arises because Respiratory A/S relies on access to certain activities provided by 
its strategic relationship partners. Strong ties therefore have to be established to create the level 
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of trust necessary to make the transfer of resources possible. When analysing Respiratory A/S’s 
choice of its product/market domain from a network point of view, strong connections exist 
between its business strategy and its relationship to partners. Contracts could very well be used 
to protect these relations.  
 
3.1.2 Production Process 
Companies such as Respiratory A/S need to focus on efficiency. As pointed out by the 
company’s Director of Strategic Marketing & Business Planning, “We would like to drive the 
development away from the use of a wide area of vaccines and instead develop a minor set of 
vaccines. That would give us some sure production gains”. Respiratory A/S needs to establish 
strategic relationships with organisations, which can somehow ensure that efficiency is 
maintained or improved within the company’s existing product/market domain. By having a 
targeted product portfolio that covers the domain, therefore, efficiency can be obtained in terms 
of economies of scale. Respiratory A/S has established strategic relationships with companies 
within each of the areas they cover, i.e., diagnosing, prevention and treatment of allergies. 
Efficiency gains are obtained through its strategic relationships in that the quality of its products 
is ensured so as its sales volume.  
 
3.1.3 Organisational Structure 
Respiratory A/S is currently striving to streamline its organisational structure. According to their 
Director of Strategic Marketing & Business Planning, “We are working on streamlining the 
organisation so that it becomes more centralised”. This indicates that it will be difficult for a 
company like Respiratory A/S to maintain relations that are based on different levels of 
relational embeddedness and types of ties. The reason for these types of relations is that 
defenders are often highly dependent on access to activities performed by its strategic 
relationship partners. As a consequence, a considerable amount of resources have to be spent on 
each relationship. A consequence of a centralised organisational structure where decision-
making is slow and where time and resources are strained can make it difficult to maintain the 
company’s strategic relationships. Relationships built on a high level of trust involve mutuality, 
which forces defenders, in most cases, to form strategic relationships with organisations with 
similar characteristics. Respiratory A/S holds some relationships, which are based on weaker 
ties: the Director of Strategic Marketing and Business Planning states, “We do run some business 
relationships of minor character with small bio-tech companies. They are however only related 
to projects of little significance”. These relationships may function as non-redundant 
relationships or as structural holes. This will provide Respiratory A/S access to information 
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outside its established strategic network and a safety net in case of crises in the established 
strategic relationships. In sum, a general alignment exists between the organisational structure of 
a defender and the indications of network behaviour. 
 
3.1.4 Network Identity 
As has been shown, Respiratory A/S depends on access to resources outside its internal 
boundaries. Strong incentives exist for it to establish business relationships with organisations 
possessing the needed resources. However, the opportunities available to the company depend on 
its prior history of relationships as well as the present situation of the company (Ahuja, 1998; 
Anderson et al., 1994). Due to Respiratory A/S’s leading position within its field, we presume it 
has had a considerable level of success. Furthermore, the fact that the company paid attention to 
the issue of prior relationships indicates that it is aware of the dangers of being negatively 
influenced by less successful relations. The Director of Strategic Marketing & Business 
Planning, Respiratory A/S argues, “You do take into account who the company has been 
working with before and the outcome of it”. Consequently, Respiratory A/S benefits from a 
positive network identity. A defender furthermore has access to a considerable amount of 
resources and information through their business relationships as they have a high degree of 
relational embeddedness making them attractive as partners and thus enlarge its opportunity set. 
The majority of the business relations established by Respiratory A/S are based on strong ties, 
which exhaust a considerable amount of resources. This can have a negative influence on its 
network identity and hereby limit its set of opportunities. 
 
3.2 The Prospector 
 
3.2.1 Product/market Domain 
Innovator A/S is situated within one specific business environment. The Senior Director of 
Innovator A/S however states, “It is an industry that keeps on changing. New applications and 
opportunities are constantly arising and our clients (are) constantly pushing for new products”. 
Innovator A/S has to continually introduce new innovative products and seek to develop new 
markets. The Senior Director of Innovator A/S, says that “This is our living (introducing new 
products). Within all areas - also totally new products”. In order to successfully follow its 
explorative strategy, it is important for Innovator A/S to have the resources needed to follow up 
on new opportunities. Therefore, strategic relationships will in most cases be based on a 
relatively low degree of relational embeddedness and weak tie binding. This avoids locking 
resources into permanent relations. The Senior Director of the company refers to the strategic 
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relationships established by Innovator A/S as strategic accounts rather than as relationship 
partners. Innovator A/S puts a great deal of effort into maintaining its clients and therefore seeks 
to develop personal relations between the companies. As the clients in some cases also represent 
strategic relationships, these relations naturally become long-term and based on personal 
understanding. The Senior Director of Innovator A/S states, “You have to have a personal 
understanding to make things work. Building personal relations takes time”. Nevertheless, 
personal relations are not only developed because the strategic relationship partner is a client. 
Personal relations also serve the purpose of enhancing the success of the relationship itself.  
Using the strategic relations established with Procter & Gamble (P&G) as an example, it 
becomes clear that Innovator A/S is searching for strategic relationship partners that provide 
access to knowledge about the future demands of the industry. Hence, as the area of interest for 
the strategic relationship is built on exchange of information, the level of adaptation and hereby 
also interdependency in the relationship is limited. The Senior Director explains this by arguing 
as follows: “Some of our customers (strategic relationship partners) will be the same but as we 
move away form technical applications over to medical devices and the pharmaceutical business, 
the customers (strategic relationship partners) will become new ones”. Hence, the level of 
relational embeddedness may be high in accordance with the level of personal involvement. 
However, interdependencies in terms of production are not created since the main purpose of the 
strategic relations established is to access information. It is therefore fair to argue that from a 
network point of view, alignment exists between Innovator A/S’s choice of product/market 
domain and established types of strategic relationships.  
 
3.2.2 Production Process 
For organisations dedicated to a wide exploration of new products, it is of crucial importance to 
have a production system that allows for flexibility. For Innovator A/S this means that focus is 
on the ability to use the same facilities for various purposes, e.g., enzymes and micro-organisms 
can be grown in the same tanks etc. Hence, synergy exits between all of Innovator A/S 
businesses as stated by their Senior Director, “Synergies between new businesses and back to 
what we do today will always be present”. Innovator A/S has therefore established strategic 
relations with some of the biggest customers in the various markets. E.g., in the market for 
animal food, Innovator A/S has developed a strong strategic relationship with Roche, which is 
one of the most dominant producers. It is thus reasonable to argue that according to indications 
from the network literature as well as empirical data, prospectors will mainly engage with 
organisations providing access to information on new developments both inside and outside their 
current business areas.  
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3.2.3 Organisational Structure 
Prospectors need an organisational structure that can help support the dynamic nature of their 
business. The organisational structure of Innovator A/S provides a good example. As stated by 
the Senior Director of Innovator A/S, “Even though it looks like our organisation is very 
hierarchical it is actually very flat. There is a very short distance to the top. You can discuss with 
all people and management as well”. The flexible structure of Innovator A/S should thus enable 
it to handle a number of different strategic relationships to access a wide area of information. 
Furthermore, Innovator A/S seeks to avoid tying up resources with a specific relationship. As 
stated by the Senior Director, “When we change business focus we have to change partners”. It 
is therefore unlikely that business relationships will be established with defenders as this 
typology often invests a considerable amount of resources in its relations. Nevertheless, even the 
most capable organisation has its limits in terms of resources available. Having non-redundant 
relationships is therefore wise as they demand less attention while at the same time providing 
access to unavailable information. Coupled with a decentralised organisational structure, the 
strain on resources diminishes, thus facilitating the handling of a larger number of strategic 
relationships.  
 
3.2.4 Network Identity 
A company’s network identity is a question of the incentives it offers and the opportunities 
available to it. In relation to its current situation, Innovator A/S benefits from being positively 
known as a leader within its field. Furthermore, the fact that Innovator A/S cooperates with some 
of the biggest companies within various industries adds positively to its network identity. 
Innovator A/S nonetheless have to be careful not to overstretch its engagement in too many areas 
as this will drain resources and hereby have a negative effect on its network identity. However, 
as Innovator A/S emphasises the existence of synergy between all areas of business as well as a 
satisfactory level of personal understanding and involvement (i.e. medium level of relational 
embeddedness) the danger of damaging its network identity is diminished.  
 
3.3 The Analyser 
 
3.3.1 Product/Market Domain 
Currently Derma A/S is trying to explore new business areas but it has not yet decided which 
area to target. Derma A/S Executive Vice President of Marketing & Sales explains, “We are 
searching for a third leg to stand on. It’s somewhat a matter of what falls into our hands”. The 
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company is thus following a dual strategy of exploitation and exploration. Within existing areas, 
the goal of Derma A/S is, according to Executive Vice President of Marketing & Sales, “To 
become the absolute leading company within dermatology. It demands new products but it does 
not necessarily mean that we have to be the biggest”. Henceforth, the company is securing its 
position within current markets primarily by introducing new products while still improving 
existing ones. As can be seen from the previous sections, strategic relationships established by 
companies following a strategy of exploitation often have a higher degree of relational 
embeddedness than the ones established by companies focused on exploration. As Derma A/S 
follows a dual strategy, it engages in strategic relations of different characteristics. The strategic 
relation with, e.g., GlaxoSmithKlein (GSK) is long-term and based on Derma A/S having access 
to GSK’s databank of products of interest for dermatological research. The Executive Vice 
President of Marketing & Sales explains that strategic relationships often become long-term 
solely due to the fact that the basis for these relationships (R&D) is a time-consuming process. It 
therefore becomes important to establish personal relations and hereby to develop a certain level 
of relational embeddedness. Still, Derma A/S makes sure that they do not suddenly get locked 
into a relation they cannot get out of. It is important to notice that contrary to Respiratory A/S, 
Derma A/S does not engage in joint development of a specific product. As the example with 
GSK illustrates, Derma A/S however establishes strategic relations with the purpose of accessing 
resources that are vital for the further development of its own products. Interdependencies are 
thus created, as Derma A/S does not posses the competencies necessary for the development of 
these activities internally. The fact that Derma A/S also functions as a venture capital investor in 
minor companies illustrates the more explorative side of its dual strategy. The level of relational 
embeddedness here is much lower as these relations have often been built on weak ties. These 
business relations are thus not established with the intent to access certain resources or activities. 
Derma A/S holds a range of informal contacts. Consistency exists between the product/market 
domain of Derma A/S and established strategic relationships.  
 
3.3.2 Production Processes 
Companies that are focused on the exploitation as well as explorative side of business need to 
apply a production system that can follow up on this dual strategy. Derma A/S illustrates this 
point well as the strategic relationship with the company Halas Pharma is based purely on the 
development of new production methods. As mentioned by the Executive Vice President of 
Marketing & Sales: “we aim to be just as efficient as a generic producer. We are therefore 
constantly optimising on all fronts”. In addition, effectiveness is sought in the way that existing 
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production facilities can be used for various purposes: “Our newest product will be produced on 
our two fabrics using existing production systems”.  
It is important to remember that an analyser has to strike a balance between exploitation and 
exploration and that the production system is merely a means to an end. The previously 
mentioned relation with Halas Pharma is however a direct example of one that is intended to 
improve efficiency. Overall Derma A/S seems to establish strategic relations, which can enhance 
efficiency. However, as the company is searching for a new area of business, the issue of 
effectiveness is likewise considered. 
 
3.3.3 Organisational Structure 
The organisational structure of an analyser often becomes a centralised and decentralised 
structure. In the case of Derma A/S, the organisational structure is according to the Executive 
Vice President of Marketing & Sales: “a very flat organisational structure with little distance 
from the lower levels of the organisation to the top”. When following a dual strategy like Derma 
A/S’s, it is important that the organisation is capable of working with different types of 
organisations. Prospectors are organized to make quick decisions. If relationship partners are not 
organized accordingly, decision-making processes will become slow and problems may arise. On 
the other hand, defenders are characterised by slower processes and if working with a strategic 
partner who makes quick decisions, the defender might interpret the partner as superficial. 
Therefore, the organisational structure of an analyser is created to make room for working with 
both types. The Executive Vice President of Marketing & Sales explains: “It is a question of 
having some effective decision making processes and making sure that you have the time you 
need to make qualified decision”. In order not to put the organisation under too heavy pressure 
from having to deal with different types of strategic relations it is of vital importance that the 
analyser has the correct mixture of redundant and non-redundant relations. Since Derma A/S 
engages in more stable relations while functioning at the same time as a venture capital investor, 
it seems to illustrate this point well.  
 
3.3.4 Network Identity 
The two major incentives driving Derma A/S to establish strategic relationships are: its need for 
complementary resources and access to information outside its more stable area of business. As 
analysers in general have a good reputation among defenders, prospectors as well as other 
analysers, they have abundant opportunities available. Based on the age of Derma A/S and its 
current position, it can be argued that the company has had success with its prior relationships. 
Further supporting this is the fact that Derma A/S takes the question of network identity 
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seriously. As commented by the Executive Vice President of Marketing & Sales: “What we are 
looking at is their (future partner’s) prior relationships, the size of the company, how flexible 
they are and if they seem to be on the same wave length as us”. In addition, the company’s 
ability to engage in different types of strategic relationships as well as its current position within 
its more stable area of business indicates that the company has a rather positive identity. It can 
however have a negative influence that the analyser has to allocate its resources among strategic 
relationships requiring different levels of relational embeddedness. As the analyser uses its 
activities within the more stable environment to secure its activities within the less stable ones, it 
can be difficult for it to free up resources needed to “nurse” its strategic relationships within 
minor areas. Derma A/S does however cope well with this problem as non-redundant relations 
are used to obtain information on new business opportunities, which require few resources. It 
hereby secures that the sufficient amount of resources available to handle the strategic 
relationships requires a higher level of relational embeddedness. 
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4. Framework and Discussion 
 
The illustration below highlights how different typologies are linked to the network dimensions.  
Table 1. Findings linking business typologies with network behaviour 
 
Level of relational 
embeddedness 
 
Incentives to establish strategic 
relations 
 
Weak ties Strong ties Complementary resources 
Market 
information 
No. of 
redundant 
relations 
No. of non-
redundant 
relations 
Strategic 
relationship 
partners 
Defender Few Many High Low Many Few Mostly defenders 
Prospector Many Few Low High Few Many Mostly analysers or 
prospectors 
Analyser Some Some High High Some Some Defenders, analysers 
and prospectors 
 
As can be seen from the findings above some main differences exist as to how each business 
type relates to networking. Defenders have a tendency to get more engaged and create a higher 
level of interdependency with their strategic relationship partners than analysers or prospectors 
do. This is due to a focus on exploitation of existing products/markets. The main incentive for 
establishing strategic relations is thus access to complementary resources that can help secure the 
company’s position. Non-redundant relations therefore become less important as their main 
purpose often is to provide information from outside the existing area of business. Prospectors, 
on the other hand, get less relationally embedded because they focus on the exploration of new 
products/markets. Access to information thus becomes the driving force for establishing strategic 
relations that can secure its position. A low level of interdependency is thus created, as the 
prospector is not dependent on certain activities/resources. It hereby follows that non-redundant 
relations are preferred over redundant relations as they provide the needed type of information. 
Finally analysers seek to find a balance between levels of relational embeddedness as well as 
levels of interdependency that stem from its activity/resource chains, as they are dedicated to the 
exploitation as well as exploration of products/markets. It thus follows that access to 
complementary resources as well as information drives the company to establish business 
relations. Consequently non-redundant relations become just as important as redundant relations.  
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This paper has made a first attempt to link business typologies with network behaviour and 
identity. Evidence has been provided that a clear systematic connection in fact exists. It has been 
shown that defenders, prospectors and analysers each relate differently to the various elements 
defined as parameters of network behaviour. From the analysis, support has thus been provided 
to show that patterns of network relations can be established on the basis of the business 
typology of a company. The results of the analysis make clear that the relation between business 
typologies and network identity and behaviour is an important element, which should not be 
overlooked when pursuing company strategy.  
Based on the present paper, insight has been gained as to how the relations between the business 
typology of a company and patterns of network behaviour can become of importance for a 
company’s network relations. Hence a first attempt has been made to link a company’s strategy, 
structure and processes with indicators of network behaviour. This offers the strategy field a 
conceptualisation that affords an understanding of how to manage networks and it offers the 
network literature a better understanding of who links with whom and why. An attempt has been 
made to link the field of organisational behaviour to the literature on networks, and subsequently 
to contribute to the understanding of how different types of companies best make use of their 
network relations.  
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3.3 Study III – Husted and Vintergaard (2004) 
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Abstract  
A common shortcoming, both in the literature on corporate venturing and in practice, is insufficient or no attention to the 
ability and responsibility of firms to stimulate and influence the creation of innovative ideas that can lead to new ventures. This 
paper focuses on the initial process of corporate venturing and explores how corporate venture management can stimulate the 
generation of genuinely original and dynamic ideas by establishing and maintaining a venture base. The following concrete 
actions are proposed in order to promote and improve the functionality of the venture base: take responsibility, secure access, 
acquire network capabilities, gain competencies in how to influence the vision and agendas in knowledge-creating networks, 
contextualize, and invite to discussion at an early stage. The paper is mainly conceptual in nature but draws on 22 semistructured 
interviews conducted between 2000 and 2002 with managers of corporate venturing departments at six multinational Danish 
firms in knowledge-intensive industries. The interviews are used to illustrate the main arguments of the paper.  
© 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.  
 
Keywords: Corporate venturing; Venture base; Innovation; Knowledge networks  
1. Introduction  
Since the early 1990s, corporate venturing has become a significant method for business development (Block & 
MacMillan, 1993; Burgelman, 1983, 1985; Gompers & Lerner, 1999). The popularity is mainly due to the presumed 
ability of corporate venturing to facilitate continuous growth by embracing high-level innovation and accessing 
cutting-edge technological development. To some companies, corporate ventur-ing has become a core concept in 
their strategic planning (Burgelman, 1983).  
Corporate venturing has also received considerable attention in academic literature (McNally, 1997). Much of this 
attention has been focused on the later stages of the venturing process (Block, 1982; Block & MacMillan, 1993), 
such as the organizational setup of the corporate venture activity (Block & MacMillan, 1993), the criteria for 
developing a portfolio of ventures into a winning entity (MacMillan & Day, 1987), the development and growth of a 
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venture (Simon, Houghton, & Gurney, 1999), and possible exit strategies (Gompers & Lerner, 2001). In practice, 
too, we find a strong focus on the later stages of the venture process. Corporate venture firms often rely heavily on 
their ability to develop firms around ‘‘winning’’ ideas and too little on how they can promote the development of a 
continuous flow of high quality ideas.  
This paper suggests that one of the most crucial aspects of a corporate venturing strategy is the ability to secure a 
steady flow of genuinely innovative ideas. It further argues that corporate venture firms need to stimulate the flow of 
ideas by participating actively in the process of developing and shaping new ideas. In other words, corporate venture 
firms must work systematically with their venture base from where new ideas for ventures emerge. The venture base 
is defined as the web of internal and external sources of oppor-tunity-creating activities that can foster new ideas for 
ventures based on the knowledge production of the sources themselves or a combination of knowledge resources.  
The development of genuine high technology innovations (from the venture base) demands a combination of 
scientific skills and intellectual capacity that exceeds the capabilities of an individual corporation (Powell, Koput, & 
Smith-Doerr, 1996; Seufert, Von Krogh, & Bach, 1999). In particular, when learning and knowledge for innovation 
is dispersed, learning about new opportunities depends on participation in a network of knowledge-generating 
relations (Powell, 1998). Since the venture base transcends organizational boundaries, we will apply a network 
perspective on the very complex process of shaping the venture base. The paper also draws on the insight of the new 
production of scientific knowledge as taking place in close interaction between knowledge-creating institutions with 
various norms, values, and justification criteria. As a consequence of this Mode 2 production of knowledge, ideas 
will not only be conceived and shaped in an individual institution, but also in the interplay between a number of 
network-organized players. Finally, the paper will provide arguments for how corporate venture companies can 
influence the venture base in order to increase the quality and flow of original ideas.  
 
2. The study  
Our study is based on 22 semistructured interviews conducted at six multinational Danish firms between 2000 and 
2002. The six companies all had corporate venturing departments, though with some variation in their level of 
experience. At one end of the scale, one of the firms had more than 20 years’ experience in corporate venturing and 
a number of extremely successful exits, and at the other were two firms with less than two years’ experience and no 
exits at all. The other three companies included in the study all had between four and eight years’ experience in 
corporate venturing activities.  
All interviewees had held positions in corporate venturing at top and middle management level for at least two 
years. This was an important criterion for their selection as study participants. Each interview lasted between 2 and 3 
hr. All interviews were taperecorded and transcribed verbatim.  
The interviews served an important role in drawing our attention to barriers faced by corporate venturing units in 
the early stages of the venturing process, especially in terms of ensuring a sufficient inflow of genuinely innovative 
ideas from which selection could take place. In the paper, the findings of the study will primarily be presented as 
quotations and serve to underpin and illustrate the theoretical arguments.  
 
3. Corporate expectations of venturing  
Corporate venturing is a strategy for business development. It involves investment in high-risk activities that 
generate new businesses within or closely related to the activities of the parent corporation, i.e., it is a business 
development strategy that seeks to generate new businesses for the corporation in which it resides (Von Hippel, 
1977). Corporate venturing can be used strategically to encourage corporate renewal in the parent organization 
(Elfring & Foss, 1997), as a growth driver by investing in ventures with high growth potential, or to diversify the 
core business of the parent by investing in ventures in diverse industries (Block & MacMillan, 1993). The ideas for 
new businesses can originate either inside the organization or externally. Activities hosted by the corporate ventur-
ing unit will often be new to the organization and require the parent company to extend their resources by acquiring 
new equipment, people or knowledge (Biggadyke, 1979). Moreover, corporate venturing activities are characterized 
by a significantly higher risk or failure rate and greater uncertainty (Block & MacMillan, 1993). The characteristics 
below appear to distinguish corporate venturing from other business development strategies such as takeovers, 
corporate R&D, traditional venture capital financing, and joint ventures (Albrinck, Hornery, Kletter, & Neilson, 
2001).  
Firstly, a corporate venture involves a significantly higher risk of failure or substantial losses than the core 
business of the organization and is therefore often characterized by greater uncertainty. Furthermore, the ventures 
undertaken are typically subject to less strict management of internal costs than usual research and development 
activities (Block & MacMillan, 1993). A corporate venture should involve an activity new to the organization, 
defined broadly as new products, processes, and technologies that can contribute to the organization.  
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Secondly, in a corporate venturing setup the returns on investments are partly financial and partly strategic 
(McNally, 1997). The aim is that ventures will be managed separately at some time in the future. A venture is a 
semiautonomous entity optimally controlled by one manager. While returns on pure venture capital investments are 
based solely on financial measures, corporate venturing investments are also strategic in the sense that they aim to 
develop the base business of the corporation (Burgelman & Doz, 2001). The reason for undertaking a venture is to 
increase and/or improve the resource base of a company and/or its competitive situation in the market while at the 
same time offering a potential financial gain.  
Thirdly, corporate venturing often operates over a longer time frame than traditional business development: 
compared to the traditional business development process, the aim is to manage developments that extend beyond 
the development time for current activities. Many of the technologies and services are projected so far into the future 
that the organization has only a vague idea of the actual outcome. The consequence of long time frames is also 
reflected in the measures of new venture success (Albrinck et al., 2001), which should emphasize value creation and 
long-term returns, such as capitalized ROI at the time of exit. In the early stages, measures tend to focus on reaching 
specific milestones. Funding is provided based on these well-defined achievements, sometimes by outside investors 
in order to provide the new venture target with external validation (Gompers & Lerner, 1999).  
Fourthly, corporate ventures are expected to yield above average returns. The return is tightly linked to the risk 
associated with the investment, as investors believe they can gain an above average return by seeking and 
discovering market inefficiencies.  
A corporate venture relationship is commonly based on resource exchanges between a parent company and a 
portfolio of small ventures. Our interviews in the case organizations also illuminate the range of corporate incentives 
for engaging in corporate ventur-ing. One manager points to the ability of corporate venturing to increase corporate 
agility. He states:  
The aim of the investments was ‘speed to market’ ...[we] wanted to get onto the market quickly when the decision 
[concerning the venture division] had been made. (Venture manager, telecommunications industry)  
Other managers emphasize the strategic value:  
The ventures are to be used strategically. The projects are not to be sold at their peak, but used more strategically. 
Utility has to be seen in terms of new products and technological features complementing our existing portfolio of 
activities. (Venture manager, high technology industry)  
The decision [to go into corporate venturing] was strategic as we wanted to be better able to meet the 
technological development while simultaneously creating synergies between future ideas and present services. 
(Venture manager, telecommunications industry)  
In order to achieve these benefits the parent company is expected to contribute both financial resources and 
knowledge resources in management, marketing, production, etc.—all resources to which small ventures seldom 
have access. Well-established technology and knowledge-based companies in particular find corporate venturing 
useful to increase their speed and levels of innovation, while maintaining many of the advantages of large resource 
pools. The relevance of choosing corporate venturing as a business development strategy also relates to the 
characteristics of the business environment, with the following characteristics particularly conducive to establishing 
corporate venturing activities (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; McNally, 1997):  
• The industry is subject to changes on many fronts emanating from small firms. 
• The firm is under threat from new entrants to the market with new technologies that undermine its current 
capabilities.  
• Future business will depend on new capabilities that are not currently central to the organization.  
• Retention of key staff in technical departments has become a challenge.  
• The corporation is being approached with numerous investment proposals by both internal and external sources.  
Companies with a strong technology base are often more inclined to participate in corporate venturing. Such 
companies frequently see an additional advantage in the contribution of corporate venturing to technological 
intelligence. Through evaluating and cooperating with small ventures with a different understanding and perspective 
on technology, the parent company creates a ‘‘window on technology.’’ This window is expected to accelerate 
product development, the ability to recognize new market developments, and the development of new 
technologies—all crucial competences in volatile and uncertain environments (Block & MacMillan, 1993). In our 
empirical data, we also find strong indications that access to innovation is a major reason for undertaking corporate 
venturing:  
[Working with corporate venturing] improves the internal ethos in the direction of innovation ... it teaches the 
employees to think in innovative paths. (Venture manager, telecommunications industry)  
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Corporate venturing is seen predominantly as a way for large, established companies to transform their 
organizations through a process of strategic renewal based on the acquisition of new capabilities (Zahra, 1996; 
Zahra & Covin, 1995). The strategy is a transformation of large corporations often operating in mature or stagnant 
business areas (Ginsberg & Hay, 1994). At the same time, it is a strategy to seek new ways to be innovative and 
flexible and to gain knowledge that may be parlayed into future revenue streams (Greene, Brush, & Hart, 1999).  
Many of the characteristics discussed above could not be developed and exploited by other types of business 
development strategies, but require the structure and strategy that this concept brings. The arguments above 
emphasize this specific type of business development strategy, but also stress what is often the most essential input 
in a corporate venture, namely original ideas. 
  
4. Ideas—the raw material  
One of the features of corporate venturing activities is the expectation of above average returns on successful 
investments. Therefore, the business idea, around which a potential new venture is formed, should also reflect the 
possibility of achieving an above average return. Taking a Schumpeterian view (Schumpeter, 1934, 1950), one 
could argue that successful entrepreneurial development of new combinations of resources is a kind of rent for a 
significant period of time. In this view, even if a resource does not yield rents in the long run, as long as the process 
of adjustment to the zero-rent state is slow, substantial quasi-rents may still be earned in the middle run. This type of 
competition is not the traditional one based on price but rather the continuous and universal search for substitutes to 
replace the less desirable.  
Corporate venture firms need access to a significant flow of high quality ideas from which selection can take place 
(Burgelman, 1983). If the corporate venture does not have access to an appropriate number of unique ideas, the 
venture unit will not be able to create a sufficient number of profitable ventures and will eventually cease (Block & 
MacMillan, 1993). As observed by a corporate venture manager in a pharmaceutical company:  
I see the greatest obstacles to development in the venture market to be associated with competen-cies—of the 
entrepreneurs and the venture capital providers—these are greater than the structural and legislative constraints.  
A top venture manager makes a similar observation in the high technology industry:  
The lack of unique ideas is the most serious obstacle to further growth in the number of ventures.  
Corporate venturing needs a critical population of ideas and certain requirements in the quality and 
innovativeness of these ideas. A further important point is that aiming for one viable business idea often leads to 
positive spillovers to other potential projects (Haddad & Harrison, 1993).  
Current corporate venturing literature has recognized these elements, but has paid only limited attention to the 
initial stage of providing a steady flow of high quality and innovative ideas for venturing opportunities. In most of 
the literature on corporate venturing, the flow of ideas is often viewed as rich and generous or is not treated 
explicitly at all. For example, Burgelman (1983) almost ignores the idea stage when discussing the 
conceptualization and pre-ven-ture stages of the development process: ‘‘As the definition process takes shape, an 
idea for a new business opportunity evolves into a concrete new product, process or system around which a pre-
venture team of people is formed. As a result of the successful technical and market development efforts of this pre-
venture team, it grows into an embryonic business organization. These stages take place in the context of the 
corporate R&D department’’ (Burgelman, 1983: 231).  
However, it may not be so straightforward. The characteristics of corporate venturing as a business development 
strategy as outlined above emphasize that corporate venturing requires innovative ideas away from the core business 
in order to fulfill expectations. Only a very small proportion of incoming proposals receive capital from investors 
(Gompers & Lerner, 1999). This may indicate a lack of highly innovative and viable proposals that meet the criteria 
for corporate venturing activities.  
For many companies, the most significant impediment to create renewal and growth is too few and too traditional 
mainstream ideas (Block & MacMillan, 1993; Tidd, Bessant, & Pavitt, 2001). Block and Macmillan’s (1993) 
analysis of how to influence the idea population focuses on explaining under what conditions the internal and 
external environments are good sources of new ideas. Their starting point is that corporate venture firms should be 
receptive to ideas generated both inside and outside the organization. However, they do not consider whether firms 
should take more active steps to encourage the development of innovative and viable ideas, nor do they discuss in 
any detail how corporate ventures should ensure access to ideas.  
A common feature of all the discussed characteristics of corporate venturing as business development is the need 
for genuine and viable business ideas. Gompers and Lerner (2001) argue that some organizations, particularly 
research-based organizations, establish corporate venturing activities because they have a surplus of ideas that they 
cannot utilize or capture value from within their mainstream activities.  
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However, we also see that the creativity and ability in these organizations to generate new and innovative ideas 
wanes as the most innovative people become involved in established ventures.  
The data also indicate strongly that venture managers experience a shortage of truly innovative ideas and view 
this as a major impediment to the development of the corporate venturing activity:  
The greatest challenge for our corporation at present is to gain access to the ideas that are in the market. Filling 
the idea pipeline is the foundation for the success of our corporate venture department. (Venture manager, high 
technology industry)  
... there are no restrictions in the venture depart-ment—the only restriction is within the individual employee, 
though they are restricted by not being entrepreneurial enough. (Top venture manager, high technology industry)  
The lack of unique ideas is the most serious obstacle to further growth in the number of ventures. (Venture 
manager, high technology industry)  
The respondents share the view that not only is it crucial to have sufficient critical mass in the population of ideas, 
but also that they face a serious shortage of genuinely innovative ideas. They also point to the failure of the research 
systems to provide them with a steady supply of genuine input and innovations.  
A key problem in our area is to attract a sufficient number of investment proposals that are based on research at 
an international [high] level. (Venture capitalist, middle manager)  
The government should provide students with a high-level basic education and develop fundamental research at 
the universities. There are too many unambitious researchers at the universities who are not given the proper 
incentives [to provide ideas]. (Venture capitalist, middle manager)  
This further illustrates the importance of focusing on the main input to the corporate venture process, namely 
ideas that can subsequently be turned into ventures. When analyzing the elements that are central to the concept, it 
seems obvious that a central activity to corporate venturing should be those processes that facilitate the generation 
and shaping of new venture ideas.  
We have argued that the main challenge in corporate venturing is to ensure a steady supply of original ideas. In 
the next section, we will discuss the features of the venture base of a firm. It will also be argued that an additional 
benefit in allocating managerial attention to designing an appropriate venture base is that the underlying knowledge 
will become socially robust. Particularly for systemic innovations, this can lead to faster acceptance in the market 
and coordinated action in the value chain. This challenge can be addressed by studying the firms’ venture base.  
 
 
5. Insights into the venture base  
Corporate venture units have different strategies for addressing a slow and insufficient inflow of new ideas for 
ventures activities. One option is to focus on more mature technologies and firms, and develop the venture portfolio 
by acquiring small, technology-based companies. Another option is to expand the scope for new potential ventures 
by exploring activities less related to the core business activities of the parent company. A third option to boost the 
portfolio is through invitations to co-invest with other investment funds. In this section, as an alternative to the 
strategies mentioned, we suggest that one of the most crucial aspects of a corporate venturing strategy is the ability 
to secure a steady flow of genuinely innovative ideas. Following this line of argument, corporate venture firms need 
to stimulate this flow by participating actively in the process of developing and shaping new ideas. Corporate 
venture literature has already observed that ideas for venturing activities spring from the venturing bases of firms 
(Block & MacMillan, 1993; Hanan, 1976). The venture base refers to the opportunity-creating activities that can 
foster new ideas for ventures. These activities are embedded in knowledge-creating actions that will lead to innova-
tion. However, surprisingly little attention has been paid to developing an understanding of how these venture bases 
function and under what conditions they can systematically generate ideas leading to breakthroughs. A venture base 
is made up of the opportu-nity-creating activities of a firm and its environment, which can serve as major resources 
for starting new ventures (Block, 1982). It is argued in this paper that the ability of the venture base to attract and 
shape innovative ideas is grounded in the capacity of the venture base to span organizational boundaries and its 
ability to contextualize the knowledge production underlying the innovations.  
Block and MacMillan (1993) is one of the few works to touch on the importance of ensuring the full commitment 
of the overall organization to the venture bases. The arguments concerning the venture base provided by Block and 
MacMillan (1993) are, however, primarily from an internal perspective and mainly address the topic of constructing 
a venture base in order to gain maximum benefit from existing in-house competencies. The argument also rests on 
the belief that a single person or a small group of individuals is sufficient to create new and innovative ideas capable 
of changing current paradigms. However, as also illustrated by the following quotes, the internal source of ideas is 
                         K. Husted, C. Vintergaard / Journal of World Business 39 (2004) 296–306                             301
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 129  
seldom sufficiently rich to provide the corporate venture organization with a critical mass of ideas:  
Even though we have come quite far in the establishment of a corporate venture department here at our company, 
we are constantly faced with the problem of finding internal ideas with great potential ...(Venture manager, high 
technology industry)  
We search for unique ideas at universities and conferences, virtually everywhere researchers meet and exchange 
ideas or search for partners ... (Top venture manager, biotechnology industry)  
We are dependent on inventions generated by the external market enabling us to create new ventures ... (Top 
venture manager, high technology industry)  
Moreover, radical new knowledge creation is not likely to occur within the boundaries of a formal organization 
with its restricting rigidities and bureaucracies. Today, it seems more likely that cooperation between a number of 
participants increases the chances of new and innovative developments. Arora and Gambardella (1990) and Powell 
et al. (1996) argue that the locus of innovation should be thought of as a network of interorganizational relations. It 
has proved to be valuable to analyze knowledge creation as a social activity embedded in a dense web of social, 
economic, contractual, and administrative relationships. Since sources of innovation are more commonly found in 
the interstices between organizations with various perspectives, learning occurs within the context of participation 
and invitation to a community and may require various kinds of organizations and organizational practices to access 
that community (Powell et al., 1996). It has even been stressed that competition should no longer be regarded as a 
game with a zerosum outcome (Thurow, 1980), but rather as a positivesum relationship in which new competencies 
and resources develop, in tandem with advances in knowledge.  
Interorganizational learning in networks is viewed as conducive to innovation because the dynamics of 
knowledge creation are endogenous to a particular network of actors (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). The building and the 
harvesting of a venture base demand capabilities that greatly exceed those of an individual person or single firm. 
Knowledge creation occurs in the context of a network community, one that is fluid and evolving rather than tightly 
bound or static (Powell et al., 1996). Thus knowledge creation is an ongoing social construction process, which is 
linked to the conditions and context under which learning takes place. In this way, the venture base becomes transor-
ganizational, relying on activities in networks between firms, universities, consultants, customers, suppliers, national 
laboratories, and media.  
A number of statements from the corporate ventur-ing managers interviewed also underline the importance of 
focusing on the early stages of the venturing process in the form of the venture base. For example, on their sources 
of innovations and their effort in accessing and interacting with these sources, they state:  
We are aware of our increasing dependence on universities such as the University of Southern Denmark—we are 
initiating many activities to ensure that we can establish our brand as a venture company. It’s a new situation for us. 
(Venture manager, high technology industry)  
We have located our business on [a science park] to benefit from the creative research environment— we know 
that we must build relationships with scientists and universities to gain access to ideas. (Venture manager, 
pharmaceutical industry)  
The last statement in particular illustrates a corporate awareness of learning and innovations as a phenomenon 
that occurs in relationships in which new competencies and resources develop, in tandem with advances in 
knowledge. Within these networks, corporate venture firms need to learn how to transfer knowledge across 
partnerships to enable them to keep pace with the most promising scientific or technological developments and 
through these actions develop a more genuine and unique venture base. Similarly, venture managers state that a 
central requirement for corporate venture firms is to generate venture ideas in collaboration with their environment:  
Idea generation is a process where one has to draw inspiration from outside while remembering what 
competencies one possesses oneself. (Venture manager, high technology industry)  
We are dependent on the research results developed at technical universities. So far, we have been very dependent 
on the ideas that were created at the Technical University of Denmark [DTU]. To be as close as possible to the 
innovative environment, part of our own activities are located at DTU. (Venture manager, high technology 
industry)  
The corporate venture firms with access to a more diverse set of competencies and activities and those with more 
experience in collaborating stand a better chance of developing opportunity-creating activities in information-rich 
positions.  
Participating in this kind of broad network also ensures the creation of a high level of socially robust knowledge, 
which can prove useful in new venture generation in the next stage. Gibbons et al. (1994) suggest a model for 
knowledge production, referred to as Mode 2 (as opposed to Mode 1). In Mode 2, knowledge is carried out in a 
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context of application: it is characterized by transdisciplinarity and heterogeneity and is more plentiful and transient. 
‘‘Mode 2 is more socially accountable and reflexive. It includes a wider, more temporary and heterogeneous set of 
practitioners, collaborating on a problem defined in a specific and localized context’’ (Gibbons et al., 1994: 3). In 
contrast, Mode 1 is organized hierarchically and tends to preserve its form. Mode 1 is most often identical to what is 
meant by ‘‘science.’’ In short, we are experiencing a shift from Mode 1 science, which is expert, discipline-bound 
and self-referential, to Mode 2 knowledge production.  
In terms of production and development, the venture base context is of crucial importance. However, not simply 
context in the sense that greater attention must be paid to the end users of science—not even in the sense that 
context helps to define scientific problems and to select appropriate methodologies—but in the more fundamental 
sense as a result of its contextualization into reliable knowledge. This kind of knowledge is being progressively 
redefined—or superseded by—knowledge that is socially robust (Nowotny, Gibbons, & Scott, 2001). In this connec-
tion, the venture base is developed and shaped during the process of contextualization in order to generate 
opportunity-creating activities that are socially robust.  
Late modern innovative developments are increasingly characterized by interdisciplinary collaboration in contexts 
of application resulting in the hybridization of knowledge production. Participatory procedures involving scientists, 
stakeholders, active citizens, and users of knowledge are needed to transform knowledge claims into trustworthy, 
socially robust, usable knowledge about the realities that matter in social and environmental changes and in the 
transition to sustainability. As illustrated in the quotations below, some of the interviewees have started to work on 
the boundaries of the corporate venture and other organizations such as research institutions:  
Much of our work to get new products and ideas is done in collaboration with researchers and students at the 
technical universities. (Venture manager, high technology industry)  
You should help researchers by providing them with what they need to develop their idea ... Recently, I lent 
equipment to a researcher in order for him to carry out his research ... If the researchers ever need to collaborate 
with a company, I think we will be top of his list ... (Venture manager, biotechnology industry)  
Following this line of argument, the aim is to further ground and test the developments to socially robust 
knowledge as this would: (1) become valid not only to the corporate venture company but also outside the 
organization, (2) gain validity through the involvement of an extended group of experts, and (3) include ‘‘society’’ 
as the genesis. In order for this to happen, a space needs to be created where the transdisciplinary can meet and 
where problems are formulated and negotiated, i.e., an agora. During this process, a better understanding of the 
content of the venture base will emerge, and interested parties will have the opportunity to reply in a public space or 
network formation.  
The conditions for systematic knowledge creation and utilization in the corporate venture base do not emerge or 
develop spontaneously, but require a much more deliberate and reflexive design of the venture base, supporting 
value creation by embodying truly innovative ideas in new ventures controlled by the firm. This kind of value 
creation is dependent on a certain degree of coordination of both knowledge creation and use in the venture base 
among the individuals in organizations and across organizations. These design and coordination efforts converge 
around shared social processes. Until now, such efforts have mostly emerged sporadically and as a result of self-
organization, but for firms that have chosen corporate venturing as their growth strategy, there is an increased 
urgency for intentionally designing and developing their venture bases. The following section outlines these main 
challenges for corporate venture mangers.  
 
6. Nursing the base: management recommendations  
This paper argues that, because of its significance, the venture base demands special attention. In the section 
below, a number of concrete actions will be proposed to promote and improve the ability of the venture base to 
generate original ideas. There are at least six areas that managers need to consider in relation to their venture base.  
 
6.1. Take responsibility  
It is often taken for granted (both in the academic and the business community) that the bases and thereby venture 
ideas appear from nowhere or serendipitously in the external environment and that no initiatives are necessary to 
facilitate them. However, companies cannot be passive, rather they need to take active part in creating the bases 
from which ideas can spring. These actions should be focused both on encouragement of employees and on 
engagement in sources of innovation outside the organization. Therefore, parent companies need to take 
responsibility for knowledge production in networks and in the process of conceptualizing knowledge (Munk & 
Vintergaard, in press). 
                         K. Husted, C. Vintergaard / Journal of World Business 39 (2004) 296–306                             303
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 131  
 
6.2. Secure access  
In order for a corporate venture company to engage in network formation, it must also have something to offer in 
terms of its own level of knowledge production, reputation, etc. Companies will not become part of a value-creating 
network unless they can contribute something that is not already present in the network. Powell et al. (1996) argue 
that a partnering decision depends on each partner’s size and position in the ‘‘value-chain’’ and the level of 
technological sophistication. They further argue that to remain current in a rapidly moving field an organization 
must be involved in the research process. Passive recipients of new knowledge are less likely to appreciate 
technological advances or be able to respond rapidly. In industries where knowledge is crucial, companies must be 
experts in both in-house research and in cooperative research with external partners, such as university scientists, 
research hospitals, and skilled competitors.  
In addition to focusing on their ability to secure access to external knowledge and their ability to assess the value 
of and assimilate the external knowledge, companies must also consider the organizational economics involved in 
any relationship. An effective win– win situation for the actors in a network, for example, the research-based 
institutions and corporate ventures, is to share the value potential created in the network by offering equity in the 
venture.  
 
6.3. Network capabilities  
Companies need to learn to interact and create networks in order to be able to manage the venture base. Seufert et 
al. (1999) argue that individuals in an organization should be able to recognize personally relevant knowledge 
within the organization which can be exploited in the organization. The ability to create and participate in a network 
and to contextualize one’s knowledge should be viewed as something that can be learned, but also something that 
often depends on personal traits.  
6.4. Competencies in how to influence the vision and agendas in knowledge-creating networks  
An important part of managing the venture base is to take an active part in influencing agendas in the network. 
Doing this will enhance the content of the venture base as resource allocation and focus are shifted in a desirable 
direction. In order to achieve such a position, the corporate venture must nevertheless learn where and how to access 
or structure a network formation and a community for contextualization. Huxham and Vangen (2000) argue that: 
‘‘Structures thus play an important leadership role because they determine such key factors as who has an influence 
on shaping a partnership agenda, who has power to act, and what resources are tapped.’’  
They further argue that when the structure of collaboration is part of a system of multiple overlapping 
partnerships, the influence on the agenda may be even more significant. By taking active part in influencing the 
agendas in a network, corporations will also have a greater chance of gaining a central position within it.  
 
6.5. Contextualization  
In order to shape the venture base during the process of contextualization, there are strong demands on the 
company to disseminate and negotiate new knowledge to a wide range of stakeholders. These types of stakeholder 
must hold central positions and originate from a transdisciplinary background. The dissemination and negotiation 
can occur both through formal and informal processes and events, such as committees, workshops, and seminars and 
telephone, fax, and e-mail, through which the communications of collaboration take place. Informal processes may 
take many forms and may be important for a number of reasons. The way in which and the frequency with which 
members communicate, for example, are obvious components of processes. Similarly, some processes obviously 
encourage members to share information and develop a common understanding of issues, whereas others hinder 
active communication (Huxham & Vangen, 2000).  
 
6.6. Invite to discussion at an early stage  
A common error in the phases of building a venture base is that the process of contextualization occurs too late in 
the development. As a consequence, the final business proposal will receive a lower evaluation due to both a lack of 
quality and a lack of appropriateness. Therefore, corporations must overcome the traditional paradigm of 
‘‘knowledge hoarding’’ and create new methods and incentives for knowledge sharing. Even though knowledge 
sharing is a necessity for the venture base to develop, knowledge-sharing hostility both at individual and 
organizational levels hampers such development (Husted & Michailova, 2002).  
Based on analysis of the characteristics and corporate expectations of corporate venturing as a business 
development strategy, we conclude that the underlying generation and shaping of ideas should be of central concern 
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to corporate venture managers. This paper has elaborated on this initial process of corporate ventur-ing and explored 
how to design and benefit from setting up a venture base. In order to foster innovation from the venture base, it is 
important to realize that innovation is not created in an individual firm or between firms of homogenous character, 
but in the interfaces and overlaps between various industries and disciplines. Many corporate venture firms work 
with a number of preferred partners at a local level and maintain working relationships with a number of 
international players in the venture capital market. However, the conditions for value creation through the 
incorporation of truly innovative ideas in new ventures controlled by the firm do not emerge or develop 
spontaneously. To enable corporate venturing to contribute continuously to value creation in an organization, 
managers need a much more deliberate and reflexive design of the venture base, supporting value creation by 
embodying truly innovative ideas in new ventures controlled by the firm.  
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This paper develops a conceptual understanding of how corporate venture managers recognize 
and discover opportunities in a network environment. In an effort to create a better understanding 
of who is involved in the process, this paper reports on the development path of several 
entrepreneurial opportunities of the Danish corporate venture capitalist, Danfoss A/S. This paper 
distinguishes itself from previous research done on entrepreneurial opportunities by creating a 
holistic and conceptual framework, which broadens and expands the perception of the market 
participants involved in processes of recognition and discovery. Consequently the paper offers 
insight into a diversified group of actors who mix and match technological and market 
capabilities in a constant process of recognition and discovery. 
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Introduction 
 
Based on the current debate on entrepreneurial opportunities this paper uses corporate venture 
strategies to show how opportunities develop and take shape in the interaction between actors. 
While this paper argues that opportunity recognition and discovery is a series of events, 
including many different actors, it develops a conceptual framework for understanding the type 
of actors involved, one that may prepare corporate venture capitalists to better access new 
innovative opportunities.    
From Austrian economics we know that entrepreneurial opportunities rarely appear 
prepackaged, ready to be served. Central to Austrian economics in light of entrepreneurship is 
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what entrepreneurs think, what they do, etc (Hayek, 1945; Kirzner, 1979). Hence it is central in 
Austrian economics to focus on how knowledge and information is produced and distributed 
between individuals and consequently how they act. The discovery of new entrepreneurial 
opportunities becomes a key challenge for individual entrepreneurs in this regard. The source of 
the opportunities here separates defenders of Austrian economics into those who believe that 
new opportunities are based on different accesses to existing information (Kirzner, 1973, 1997) 
and those who believe they are based on new information used to recombine information 
(Schumpeter, 1934). More research suggests that both types of opportunities can exist in the 
same market (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Schumpeterian opportunities are however more 
radical and less frequent and will most often be of interest for venture investors. 
As information on the market and technology is unevenly distributed, the process of 
recognizing and discovering entrepreneurial opportunities becomes a collective act involving 
many actors (Soh, 2003; Hayek, 1945). This makes the search for new investment opportunities 
a key challenge for corporate venture capitalists, a process which demands interaction with other 
market participants. In entrepreneurial research, opportunities often refer to entrepreneurs 
bridging technological innovations with potential commercial markets, suggesting the 
connection of means and ends (Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and Venkatarman, 2003; 
Venkatarman, 1997; Shane, 2000). Divergent to this research, others have focused on 
opportunity recognition and discovery within established firms (Tidd and Taurins, 1999; Leifer 
et. al., 2000). In light of Austrian economics, this paper builds on these strands, by presenting a 
coherent framework of the passageway opportunities travels, and consequently the actors who 
are involved in this process. To frame the analysis, corporate venture capitalists serve as the 
center of analysis, albeit they are surrounded by many other actors. This strategy has proven 
successful for many organizations over a broad industry spectrum with, e.g., 3M and The 
Raychem Corporation as notable success stories (Block and MacMillan 1993). 
Conventional companies often experience significant difficulties in managing entrepreneurial 
opportunities and ideas compared to individual entrepreneurs (King et al., 2003). Some authors 
have claimed that the best strategy for profitable growth is to develop new ventures (Burgelman, 
1984). Correspondingly, technological innovations have been seen to emerge when the resources 
of small firms are combined with those of large ones (King et. al, 2003). The business 
development strategy of corporate venturing has helped many companies in their efforts to 
manage entrepreneurial opportunities. 3M still represent one of the best known examples of how 
innovation is created within large corporations (Block and MacMillan, 1993). NMP, however, 
which is part of the Nokia Group, headquartered in Finland, represent a good example of a 
corporate venture search for technological innovation outside (Keil and Vilkamo, 2003). NMP 
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engages in close cooperation with leading companies within narrow technological areas, and 
hence strives to integrate innovation.        
Companies pursuing a corporate venturing strategy often possess a combination of strong 
technological and market knowledge as they scrutinize new entrepreneurial opportunities. This 
contrasts with traditional venture capitalists that have less market knowledge. Due to corporate 
venture capitalists’ access to information and knowledge, their strategy makes a significant case 
for analyzing entrepreneurial opportunities, as it helps to develop a broader understanding of 
recognition and discovery (Soh, 2003). In accord with Austrian economics, this paper posits that 
different actors perceive opportunities differently depending on time, with whom they interact, 
etc. In contrast to the traditional perception of opportunities, which focuses on the entrepreneur, 
this paper also includes other actor groups in the process of discovery and recognition on an 
equal footing.  
Building on the research on opportunities provided by authors such as Sarasvathy, Dew, 
Velamuri, and Venkataraman (2003), this paper details a theoretical interpretation of how 
corporate venture capitalists recognize and discover entrepreneurial opportunities3. Opportunity 
recognition refers to the process of combining existing technologies and markets, whereas 
discovery describes the process where only one of the variables exists. Recognition and 
discovery refers to processes that will be referred to as “passageways” in this paper. 
Understanding these concepts will enhance our understanding of the progressive development of 
the given opportunity, as it is being shaped in a network environment. This network constitutes 
many different actors who all take roles in facilitating innovation. Bygrave (1987, 1988) argues 
that venture capitalists work with a broad network that facilitates the investment project. These 
networks can be of a very diverse nature and include many different individuals and 
organisations. Some of the network are build on a few strong ties where as other are more 
openendend and exchangeable. 
The passageways describe the development process that an opportunity takes, as it is being 
recognized and discovered by different actors. The passageways are formed by exchange of 
information and resources between key actors of which corporate venture capitalists only 
constitute one group. This paper therefore describes the passageways that have proved powerful 
for analyzing actors. Where other papers have successfully answered the question of why and 
what opportunities companies search for (Tidd and Trewhella, 1997), this paper contributes to 
answer the question of how this unfolds and how is involved.   
                                                 
3 This paper recognizes the concept of “opportunity creation” (Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and Venkatarman, 2003) 
as one including creation of both means and ends. The concept will however be imbedded into opportunity 
recognition and discovery. 
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Initially a review of exciting research on entrepreneurial opportunities will be provided. This 
will be followed by an examination of corporate venturing as a significant strategy designed to 
recognize and discover opportunities. The contribution of the paper is presented in a conceptual 
framework, describing processes and actors. The dynamics and theoretical arguments behind the 
framework will be illustrated in multiple cases of the passageways that the entrepreneurial 
opportunities has travelled on their way to the Danish corporate venture capitalist, Danfoss A/S. 
 
 
Conceptual Background 
 
A review of the perceptions of entrepreneurial opportunities and a theoretical appreciation of the 
strategy of corporate venturing will demonstrate why this framework is particularly well suited 
to provide insight on the passageways of recognition and discovery.  
 
 
Entrepreneurial opportunities 
 
An entrepreneurial opportunity is often used to describe the business idea that the venture 
initially possesses (Long and McMullan, 1984; Bhave, 1994; Hills et al., 1997). In more recent 
literature, opportunities have also been studied within existing firms (Stevenson and Jarillo, 
1990; Venkataraman, 1997). When reviewing the entrepreneurship and general innovation 
literature, it becomes evident that the definition of opportunities reveals large deviations (Sane 
and Venkataraman, 2001; Singh, 2001). 
Entrepreneurial opportunities differ from the larger set of other profit opportunities because the 
former requires the discovery of new means and ends relationships, whereas the latter also 
involves optimization within existing means/ends relationships (Kirzner, 1997). One opportunity 
may however imply several different modes of exploitation (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), 
being a behavioural phenomenon and an approach to management involving a process 
(Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). 
Christensen, Madsen and Peterson (1994) offer a definition of opportunities in the business 
context, where they define an opportunity as a new profit potential through (a) the founding and 
formation of a new venture, or (b) the significant improvement of an existing venture. This turns 
profitability and commercial issues into key parameters. Others have argued that while an 
opportunity to create value is a necessary part of the entrepreneurial process, it is not sufficient to 
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generate wealth for the entrepreneur (Casson, 1982). The entrepreneur also needs to gain control 
over the relevant resources before any profits can be realized.  
Casson’s (1982) definition elaborates on new profit potentials by defining opportunities as 
situations in which new goods, services, raw materials and organizing methods can be introduced 
and sold with a profit (Casson, 1982). Shane and Venkataraman (2000) subscribe to Casson's 
(1982) definition of entrepreneurial opportunities, but extend it to a conceptual element of 
entrepreneurship. In response to the definition by Shane and Venkataraman (2000), Singh (2001) 
argues that many opportunities would be jeopardized when analyzed from the perspective of 
profitability. He argues for the possibility that technological advances and ventures lose their 
“status” as opportunities if they later turn unprofitable. In this vein, Singh (2001) proposes: “that 
an entrepreneurial opportunity should be defined as a feasible, profit-seeking, potential venture 
that provides an innovative new product or service to the market, improves on an existing 
product/service, or imitates a profitable product/service in a less-than-saturated market (Singh, 
2000)”. He further argues that by focusing on feasibility and profit seeking, an opportunity can 
be defined prior to venture founding and profitability (Singh, 2001).  
From a corporate venture capitalists perspective, opportunities need to promise a specific 
technological advance and a significant future commercial potential to earn Schumpeterian rents 
(Shane and Cable, 2002; Schumpeter, 1950, 1934). This originality and uniqueness is many 
times found in radical innovations i.e.: “discontinuous events unattainable through incremental 
adjustments of the pre-existing state of affairs” (Lundgren, 1995:17).  
Based on the above review, it becomes evident that entrepreneurial opportunities are analyzed 
in the light of the entrepreneur as a single individual. This neglects the fact that the process often 
includes many actors and that it is equally important in established organisations and for venture 
capital organisations. This view is particularly evident in neoclassical research on 
entrepreneurship (Kirzner, 1997), leaving little room for understanding how larger organizations 
manage this task.   
 
 
Corporate venturing – Strategizing for recognition and discovery  
 
Corporate venturing is a business development strategy by which established companies 
invest in the creation of innovative ventures to create financial as well as strategic returns 
(Burgelman, 1983, 1984). Corporate venturing is predominantly seen as a way for large, 
established companies to seek new ways to be innovative and flexible (Kanter et. al. 1991). This, 
however, is not the only motivation. In fact, there exists a multitude of related motives for 
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launching a corporate venture, such as securing growth and responding to competitive pressure 
(Block and MacMillan, 1993), improving corporate profitability (Zahra and Coving, 1995; 
McGrath, Venkataraman, and MacMillan 1994; Zahra, 1991), generating strategic renewal (Guth 
and Ginsberg, 1990). Above all, corporate venturing is seen as a significant strategy to identify 
new business ideas (Block and McMillan, 1993; Burgelman, 1983; Husted and Vintergaard, 
2004).  
The majority of literature on corporate venturing stresses that this strategy is tailored for 
managing new investment opportunities (Rind, 1981). Without entrepreneurial opportunities, 
corporate venturing will not exist. Burgelman (1984) argues that firms “sooner or later, have to 
find and exploit opportunities in marginally related, even unrelated areas” (p. 154). Corporate 
ventures depend on ideas and opportunities as the main input for pursuing a strategy. However, 
not all ideas are entrepreneurial opportunities, and many opportunities do not fit in corporate 
venturing (Block and MacMillan, 1993). Hardymon, DeNino and Salter (1983) further claim that 
one of the keys of success for venture capital investment is the simultaneous cultivation of a 
steady stream of attractive investment opportunities. Likewise, Winters and Murfin (1988) have 
found that one of the “most important factors for the strategic success of a corporate program is 
the creation of a high-quality deal stream.” (p. 208). They also argue that venture capital 
investment can give the corporation a unique view of development in technologies and 
businesses of strategic interest. This makes recognition and discovery of opportunities key 
activities for corporate venture managers (Sykes, 1986). 
Corporate venturing literature has also pointed to directions where opportunities may be 
recognized and discovered. Block and MacMillan (1993), for instance, argue that opportunities 
“can be found within the firm itself, in the industries, in the markets that it serves, and in the 
external environment” (p. 99). Likewise, Block (1982) emphasizes the fact that corporate 
ventures have access to both internal and external opportunities. These opportunities are often 
referred to as a “window to technology” (Winters and Murfin, 1988; Hardymon, DeNino and 
Salter, 1983). In fact, the discussion of internal (e.g. Burgelman, 1983; Sweetig, 1981; Tidd and 
Taurins, 1999; von Hippel, 1977) and external (e.g. Sharma & Chrisman, 1999) corporate 
venturing is very much grounded in where the entrepreneurial opportunities come from (i.e. the 
opening of their passageway). Previous venture capital literature, however, has focused on 
opportunities as they are explicated in business plans, and not on the early development 
processes as presented in the entrepreneurship literature. The venture capital literature from 
Burgelman (1983), Burgelman et al. (1986), Burgelman and Syles (1984) however lets us know 
that opportunities are often recognized thorough a process. In line with Austrian economics, 
research has also proven that sharing information in a network is key for finding new investment 
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opportunities (Bygrave, 1987, 1988; Dotzler, 2001). Who and how different actors are involved 
in this process however remains less examined in the literature.  
In corporate venturing, three distinct elements make the strategy especially suited for 
recognizing and discovering opportunities. First, it is often argued that organizations cannot 
simultaneously create new opportunities and take care of what they already have without a 
change of strategy and organizational setup (Drucker, 1974). Perusing corporate venturing is 
often done with an intention to contain and maintain innovative internal and external processes 
(Chesbrough, 2000) by means of an organization that is more innovative and flexible than the 
firm itself (Greene, Brush and Hart, 1999). The semi-autonomous organizational structure, which 
is the nest for portfolio ventures, is often located within the established company, providing the 
necessary flexibility for ventures to grow (Block and MacMillan, 1993).  
Secondly, investing in new opportunities is a risky business. Both venture capitalists and 
corporate venture units invest risk-willing capital to create new businesses. They are interested in 
high risk/high reward investment opportunities (Rind, 1981). The process of recognizing and 
discovering new opportunities and developing them into novel businesses involves a high level 
of uncertainty (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Managing this risk forces venture managers to 
constantly focus on recognizing and discovering new opportunities. 
Lastly the returns on investment in corporate venturing should be partly financial and 
strategic, contrary to the expected returns from pure venture capital investments (Burgelman, 
1983). Hence, it is often an equally important goal to fulfil the strategic objectives of the parent 
corporation researchers (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Block & Subbanarasimha, 1989; Block, 1982). 
In 1989, Block and Subbanarasimha conducted a survey among 43 US and 149 Japanese 
companies which concluded that the most important reasons for companies to initiate corporate 
venturing activities were of strategic origin (Block and MacMillan, 1993). Having a bilateral 
goal objective forces extraordinary attention to recognition and discovery, as they need to 
specify their search for new opportunities.    
The literature provides rich evidence that opportunity recognition and discovery are central 
management issues in corporate venturing. While corporate venturing literature may be most 
strongly influenced by the need for managing investment opportunity, little covers how 
recognition and discovery unfolds and especially who is involved. Even though Winters and 
Murfin (1988) argue that a deeper involvement in the venture capital process may give corporate 
venture capitalists a better chance for recognition and discovery, it provides only limited 
knowledge about who it involves. 
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Passageways Paved by Recognition and Discovery 
 
Venkataraman (1997) claims that one of the most neglected questions in entrepreneurship 
research is where opportunities come from: why, when and how certain individuals exploit 
opportunities. This appears to be a function of joint characteristics of the opportunity and the 
nature of the individual (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).Understanding these characteristics, 
however, are of utmost importance if one is to ensure that corporate venture capitalists get more 
alert and exposed to opportunities (Kirzner, 1973). From Austrian economics we know that, due 
to asymmetry in information, not every individual or company perceives the same opportunities 
(Hayek, 1945; Kirzner, 1997; Soh, 2003). Additionally, due to their different cognitive schemes, 
the process of recognition and discovery will take different approaches and end up with different 
results (Kirzner, 1973, 1997). This changes the traditional process of recognition and discovery 
into a series of events, which includes a variety of actors.   
Building on these arguments, this paper takes the problem to another level by arguing that 
opportunities are not a matter of “particular individuals” (the neoclassical interpretation of the 
entrepreneur), but a combination of individuals (Schumpeter, 1934). It has become known that 
recognizing and discovering opportunities demands a combination of scientific skills and 
intellectual capacity that surpasses the capabilities of one individual (Seufert, Krogh and Bach, 
1999; Powell et al., 1996). In networks, discovery of the beholder of either the technical or the 
market side of the opportunities becomes a key challenge for corporate venture capitalists.  
In 1997, McNally conducted a survey that indicates that companies should actively seek 
investment opportunities. He further argues “Potential investees are most commonly identified 
either through continual scanning for investment opportunities or via intermediaries” (McNally, 
1997). Similarly, Burgelman (1987, 1988) argues that investment opportunities are found in 
business networks. This will lead us to focus on some of the key actors surrounding venture 
managers in corporate venturing, actors who are involved through iterative process of 
recognition and discovery of opportunities. 
From the research of Singh, Hills and Lumpkin (1999), we know that an idea can develop into 
an opportunity. This process is inherently a process of creativity which involves different actors 
who engage in a series of recognitions and discoveries (Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and 
Venkatarman, 2003). This harmonizes with the Austrian perception of an entrepreneur as an 
ever-changing actor in the market (Kirzner, 1997). As ideas about technology or markets are 
exchanged and negotiated between actors, they may become entrepreneurial opportunities. The 
type of actors that are involved will change, however, as will the passageway of the idea and 
opportunity. 
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Passageways and Actors 
 
Even though this paper evolves around corporate venture capitalists, one needs to be aware that 
e(i)ntrepreneurs and other actors in the market many times are the ones who initially recognize 
and discover opportunities. From Austrian economics, we know that the opportunities will be 
shaped and developed in between different actors (Kirzner, 1997). That is, corporate venture 
capitalists can therefore discover and recognize opportunities from private venture capitalists, 
individual entrepreneurs and other actors in the market. Likewise, corporate venture capitalists 
may well discover an unexploited technology from an e(i)ntrepreneur which can be enriched into 
a commercial product that a private venture capitalist might later recognize. This process often 
consists of the mixing and matching of technological and commercial capabilities, including a 
series of recognitions and discoveries.  
Many opportunities come from entrepreneurs or present employees (intrepreneurs) (von 
Hippel, 1977; Sweetig, 1981; Burgelman, 1983; Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). In other situations, 
opportunities are recognized and discovered directly from other private or corporate venture 
capitalists through networks (McNally, 1997; Bygrave, 1987, 1988; Dotzler, 2001). Yet 
supplementary, opportunities can also be based on a broader set of market-based developments, 
such as university research (Etzkowitzz and Leydesdorff, 1997), macro economical tendencies 
(Block and McMillan, 1993), corporate spinouts (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003), lawyers etc. While 
acknowledging the wide range of different organizations and actors, which can potentially be 
involved in recognition and discovery, this paper categorizes these into four distinct groups of 
actors: corporate venture capitalists, private venture capitalists, e(i)ntrepreneurs and a collective 
group of researchers, lawyers, bankers etc (all actors in the market).  
It becomes evident that the passageways of opportunities are the product of these four 
different actors groups who recognize and identify opportunities in different ways depending on 
the situation. While the model below is a simplification of the types of actors involved, it does 
help us to understand the complexity of the process. More importantly, when framing the 
passageways, valuable insight is given to the relations between actors. In some incidences, 
venture capitalists obtain information from entrepreneurs in other cases it from researchers, 
lawyers, bankers etc. Consequently, the four by four matrix presents 16 different situations for 
information and resources exchange. Each square represents a unique situation for recognition 
and discoveries.  
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Table1. Recognitions and discoveries of opportunities between actor groups 
 Corporate venture 
capitalists recognizes or 
discover opportunity from:
Private venture capitalists 
recognizes or discover 
opportunity from: 
E(i)ntrepreneurs 
recognizes or discover 
opportunity from: 
Researchers, lawyers, 
bankers etc. opportunity 
from: 
Corporate venture 
capitalists. 
i) Industry syndicators v) Industry partners  iv) Industry gap seekers xiii) Gain seekers  
Private venture capitalists ii) Alliance partners vi) Venture syndicators x) Gap seekers xiv) Gap followers 
E(i)ntrepreneurs. iii) Corporate 
traditionalists 
vii)  Traditionalists xi) Technology seekers xv) Success spotters 
Researchers, researchers, 
lawyers, bankers etc. 
iv) Innovation analyses viii) Trend analyses xii) Trend seekers xvi) Combiners 
 
Each square in the table has been related a synonymous name of an actor. Based on a description 
of the matrix the reader will also become aware of the different dynamics, which are imbedded 
in recognition and discovery. Additionally, we find supporting evidence from Austrian 
economics that actors do in fact perceive opportunities differently depending on with whom they 
interact –nine different scenarios:    
i) Industry syndicators: This kind partnering structure happens when two or more corporate 
venture firms pass on an investment opportunity. This commonly happens when a venture 
is spun-off. An alternative situation could be where two corporate ventures can benefit 
from the investment simultaneously. These types of investments are often in high tech 
opportunities which are mutually beneficial and don’t cause a competitive situation. Other 
reasons could be complementary capabilities and exchange of experience.   
ii) Alliance partners: An alliance partner network is important, especially for established 
corporations that wish to work with new and untried markets (Albrinck et al. 2000). 
McNally (1997) argued, “Co-investments with venture capitalists (parallel investments) are 
a potentially beneficial way of identifying investment opportunities and also accessing the 
investment expertise of the venture capitalist” (p. 111). For corporate venture capitalists, 
private venture capitalists are a good source for accessing investment opportunities as they 
often have a lager flow of opportunities.   
iii) Corporate traditionalists: The difference between intrepreneurship and entrepreneurship 
amounts to whether there is talk of an internal or external corporate venture. The 
opportunity is a result of entrepreneurial action, which has materialized into a business idea 
or business plan. As early as 1934 Schumpeter recognized the added value of 
entrepreneurship for society (Schumpeter, 1934). Peter Drucker summarizes it with the 
following words: “Entrepreneurs see change as the norm and as healthy. Usually they do 
not bring about the change themselves. But – and this defines entrepreneur and 
entrepreneurship – the entrepreneur always searches for change, responds to it, and exploits 
it as an opportunity” (Drucker, 1995).  
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iv) Innovation analysists: It is necessary that corporate venture capitalists be receptive to new 
developments and impressions in the surrounding market. Hence, they investigate 
opportunities from a broad range of stakeholder in the market, just like private venture 
capitalists.  
v) Industry partners: The situations where private venture capitalists identify opportunities 
from corporate venture capitalists are most often syndicate investments and venture spin-
offs. The syndicate situation is often a matter of using the complementary capabilities from 
the corporate side and the private investor. The opportunities can both be from 
intreprenerurs and some that corporate venture capitalists have found elsewhere in the 
market.       
vi) Venture syndicators: This relationship often constitutes a syndicate investment situation 
between two or more venture capitalists in a network (Bygrave, 1987). In order for venture 
managers to gain access to an opportunity from other private venture managers, there is a 
reversible commitment to provide these managers with other venture opportunities. A 
common characteristic of this type of opportunity is that they are presented as venture 
proposals/ business plans and sometimes even established ventures. Selling an investment 
to another venture capitalist is also a variant of this relation. 
vii) Traditionalists: Opportunity recognition and discovery by private venture managers from 
e(i)ntrepreneurs is the most commonly perceived form in the literature. It is often proposed 
that the venture manager will never experience opportunities if an entrepreneur hadn’t 
already been faced with the opportunity. This mode differs from “Corporate traditionalists” 
by having less easy access to innovations created within the corporate firms.  
viii) Trend analysis’s: Many private venture capitalists also have extended networks bridging 
organizations with highly diversified backgrounds to secure innovation (Bygrave, 1987; 
Husted and Vintergaard, 2004). For trend analysis’s, the market also constitutes actors 
differently from entrepreneurs. Some venture managers have become skilled in identifying 
opportunities from basic research at universities (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1997). Many 
universities carry great entrepreneurial potentials, which can be exploited in a commercial 
manner (Etzkowitz, 2003).  
ix) Industry gap seekers: Industry gap seekers have very similar characteristic as gap seekers 
who identify opportunities from private venture capitalists. In this specific case the 
entrepreneur will discover opportunities which are more firm specific and less market 
driven. Industry gap seekers often discover opportunities in connection to the products and 
services already provided by the corporate venture corporation. The opportunities can be 
complementary to the current product portfolio, but they can also be replacements.     
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x) Gap seekers: A gap seeker could be an entrepreneur discovering opportunities from a 
previous investment by a private venture capitalist. In other cases the commercial 
experience of the venture capitalist might have a positive spillover on the entrepreneur. As 
Wright and Ennew (1997) argue, “Venture capitalists making investments may invest both 
in entrepreneurs starting new ventures and those who purchase a venture through a 
management buy-out or buy-in” (p. 227). They further find that entrepreneurs exiting from 
one venture also are likely to make use of venture capital again (Wright and Ennew, 1997). 
These kinds of entrepreneurs (serial) can therefore later be a major asset for many venture 
capitalists. 
xi) Technology seekers: The perception of an opportunity differs depending on the particular 
entrepreneur (Kirzner, 1979). Some entrepreneurs have a strong technological focus 
whereas others have a stronger focus on bringing the venture to market. Connecting 
entrepreneurs of heterogeneous character often leads to more original ideas (Husted and 
Vintergaard, 2004). It will also lead to opportunities not previously thought of. The pre-
organization period as defined by Katz and Gartner (1988) as the stage where the nascent 
entrepreneur realizes or “sees” (to use Penrose’s (1959) word) a potential opportunity to be 
exploited. Stevenson, Roberts and Grousbeck (1989) define entrepreneurship as a process 
by which individuals either on their own or inside organizations pursue opportunities 
without regard of the resources they currently control.  
xii) Trend seekers: According to Cooper (1981), an entrepreneur informally and intuitively 
perceives an opportunity, based upon some feel for the market (in Teach, Schwartz and 
Tarpley, 1989). Kirzner (1979) labels this skill, “entrepreneurial alertness”. He defines this 
concept as “the ability to notice - without search - opportunities that have been hitherto 
overlooked” (p. 48). Kirzner (1979) stresses the element of surprise. An individual may 
discover a previously undiscovered opportunity in sheer ignorance (Kirzner, 1997). The 
initial resource configuration assembled by the entrepreneur will need constant adjustment 
to respond to new opportunities and threats as they arise in the market/ environment 
(Penrose, 1959; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). While the venture remains young, the 
entrepreneur may be able to personally monitor environmental trends and developments. 
However, as the organization grows, opportunity discovery must be delegated to 
subordinates (Greiner, 1972). It is argued by Yeung (2002) that many entrepreneurs most 
often use their personal contacts to obtain particular information or knowledge about a 
potential market opportunity gap 
xiii) Gain seekers: Much like “Industry gap seekers”, gain seekers represents a group of actors 
who discover opportunities from corporate venture capitalists. An example of such 
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situation could be a university researcher or student who discovers a new opportunity as a 
consequence of an industry-science relation. Such relation can foster both market and 
technology opportunities.    
xiv) Gap followers: One of the most obvious examples of gap followers could be identified 
during the last venture capital boom. During this period, venture capitalists clearly 
indicated that they would focus their investments within specific technological areas. This 
made the market recognize and discover a multitude of opportunities i.e. a process of both 
recognition and discovery. During this boom many universities also started to streamline 
their organizations better to meet commercialized standards for their research in, i.e. the 
entrepreneurial university (Etzkowitz, 2003; Etzkowitz, Schuler and Gulbrandsen, 2000). 
xv) Success spotters: In the case of success spotters, the market can recognize and discover 
opportunities from the few successful entrepreneurs. Acknowledging that some 
entrepreneurs have gained success from their innovation, often times drive others to pursue 
similar actions. The Austrian view of entrepreneurship suggests that the heterogeneity of 
beliefs about asset values gives rise to both entrepreneurial opportunity and the discovery 
of market prices (Casson, 1982, Kirzner, 1979, 1989).  
xvi) Combiners: This type opportunity recognition and discovery is probably the most 
commonly known and the most frequently exercised. There is continual interaction in the 
market and different actors with numerous backgrounds, transfer opportunities. In the 
market, participants exchange both commercial and technical potential to shape 
opportunities.  
 
 
Method and case data 
 
Several empirical examples will describe the actors shaping the passageways of entrepreneurial 
opportunities and hereby provide the reader with a better understanding of how opportunities 
develop under a continuous process of recognition and discovery (Glasser and Strauss, 1967; 
Eisenhardt, 1999). The case company, PMC Porous Media Combustion GmbH (PMC), will 
function as the main case and therefore illustrate some of the characteristics of the above 
conceptualisation. In addition two other cases will highlight nuance the framework and ad 
additional perspectives. 
 
Data collection  
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The case companies are all among Danfoss A/S Corporate Ventures’ seven investments. PMC 
has been followed over a five-year period providing the case with longitudinal characteristics 
(Bijleveld et al. 1998). The other case has been followed for the same amount of years, but their 
complete development will not be included. The last empirical data was collected in last quarter 
of 2003.  
The case descriptions have been selected out of a sample of approximately 14 entrepreneurial 
opportunities, which Danfoss A/S has been involved in. The cases have been selected based on: 
1) the degree to which the passageway is illustrative, 2) the comprehensiveness of types of actors 
involved, and 3) their representation of the other investments (Yin, 1984). More then 100 hours 
of indepth interviews with top-level venture management provide the basis for the analysis. All 
interviews have been semi-structured (Eisenhardt, 1999; Glasser and Strauss, 1967). They have 
been recorded and later transcribed in order to condense central issues of interest and find 
correspondence to theory (Glasser and Strauss, 1967). In addition to the primary data, secondary 
sources such as peer review articles, newspaper articles, web pages, internal newsletters, have 
been used. The author has reviewed confidential material, which has provided further knowledge 
about the development of Danfoss A/S.  
 
 
Data analysis and presentation 
 
In order to organize the case, PMC’s development path is recorded, starting with its initial 
development. The central phases in the developments are registered according to its impact on 
future developments, such as the key actors involved. Hence, the critical incidents in the progress 
of the case serve as a guideline for the case description. The case reports also on the 
development path from the time before venture management showed interest in the project. 
Examples of two other cases (Nanotron Technologies and Ossacur) will be included for further 
details of the process.  
Danfoss A/S was founded in 1933 by Mads Clausen, and it has since developed from a one-
person firm to a global corporation with an annual sales turnover in 2001 of 1,930 billion EUR 
and about 16,600 employees. Danfoss A/S is today Denmark's largest industrial group and 
belongs to the leaders in research, development and production of mechanical and electronic 
components for several industrial branches. The first products manufactured by Mads Clausen 
were valves for refrigeration equipment. Danfoss A/S started manufacturing compressors and 
radiator thermostats in the 1950s, for which the markets were growing rapidly. In the 1960s and 
1970s, Danfoss A/S introduced different types of hydraulic components, electronic frequency 
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converters and flow meters. The increasing energy prices in the late 1970s made the radiator 
thermostat a significant growth area. Today, Danfoss A/S is a global market-leader within 
radiator thermostats, accounting for about 10% of Danfoss’s A/S total turnover (Frøslev 
Christensen, 2002). As a consequence for organizational restructuring and a genuine need for 
new innovations, Danfoss A/S Corporate Ventures was developed in 1999.   
PMC focuses on a specific burner technique, which can be used for central heating. The 
innovative media combustion technology makes it possible to launch a new class of burners for 
central heating. Danfoss A/S is currently producing components for central heating burners.  
The two other cases are: Ossacur, which is a medico project and one of the first investments, 
Danfoss made. Ossacur creates biocompatible surfaces. The second example is Nanotron 
Technologies which is a company that sells advanced wireless technologies. It is the intention of 
Nanotron Technologies that at one point in time all the product in Danfoss should be able to 
communicate by wireless means. 
In order to illustrate the passageway of PMC from the initial patent to the final venture in 
Danfoss’ A/S portfolio, several key incidents combining recognition and discovery will serve as 
an illustration: The patented technology for the PMC burner was initially developed at the 
Institute of Fluid Mechanics at the University of Erlangen, Germany (Lehrstuhl für 
Strömungsmechanik, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität, Erlangen). This was a technology transfer 
project. The Institute of Fluid Mechanics carried a series of projects, under the name, Invent. The 
project housed all the inventions and patents, which had been developed at this institute. 
The University of Erlangen discovered that some of the innovation from Invent had 
commercial potential. The university intended to exploit this potential in a commercial manner, 
but had difficulties in recognizing the commercial value, due to their limited feel for the market. 
This is a situation for “Combiners” as described in the present model. The model makes it 
difficult to determine when the researchers become “entrepreneurs”.    
Contrary to the case of PMC the development of Ossacur was initiated from technologies 
already present in Danfoss. A venture capital manager, explains how the project started: “We 
had a surface technology which was developed by Danfoss”. It later turned out. however, that the 
use of the product was being undermined by a superior technology. As a result nobody knew 
what to do with it. However it was discovered that the surface technology was biocompatible, 
which made it useable in another context. The question then became: what to do with something, 
which is biocompatible in a company like Danfoss, which has no knowledge of bio technical 
products. At a later point a researcher at the Dental College in Aarhus, Denmark showed interest 
in the biocompatible surface. Moving the project to a typical example of a “Combiners”. 
Contrary to PMC Ossacur moved from an intrepreneur to an actor outside of Danfoss.  
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As argued by a venture manager with reference to Ossacur “This gentleman thought that the 
technology was brilliant”. Due to the researcher’s professional background he could imagine that 
the technology might have potential. One could argue that he developed new information to 
recombine information and therefore developed a Schumpeterian innovation (Schumpeter, 
1934). 
During PMC’s process of commercial determination, it was the intention to spin the research 
from Invent out into a portfolio of ventures. Two professors and a PhD student could see the 
potential of one of these innovations (PMC), mostly driven by a technological affection. As a 
result of their investment in the project, they were provided with 49% ownership. At this time, 
the partners included APL GmbH (former owners of the basic patents on porous media 
combustion technology), Medutri GmbH (a pool of private persons, who have supported PMC 
GmbH since its establishment) and a Business Angel. Through this first round of financing, the 
project was given life and was established as a separate entity. At this point in the case one could 
argue that it had become an example of a “Trend seeker”. 
Later in the development process, professional money was needed in order to bring the 
product to a different level. The entrepreneurs (researchers) started by approaching manufactures 
of burners, but these were not interested. This would have made the process “Innovation 
analyses” or a “Trend analyses”. An alternative attempt was made by selling PMC. However, the 
entrepreneurs were asking a substantial amount for their company. Even though much of the 
development in the project was more than eight years old, it was difficult for the inventors to put 
together a business plan for their project.  
Very similar, Nanotron Technologies also approached Danfoss with the intention to make 
them invest, displaying “Corporate traditionalism”. An entrepreneur had developed a wireless 
technology platform, which was only tested in the laboratory. This platform was robust, i.e., isn’t 
interfered by other external electronic interference. The sensor could send a receive signals over 
a long distance while at the same time being very saving. Danfoss was interested as it would 
make their products wireless through a collective device. One could say that this case represents 
a relatively direct way to the investor. 
As part of the many research-oriented conferences in the field of burners, scientists from 
Danfoss A/S knew about PMC, but did not believe in the product. A primary reason was a 
development horizon of PMC, which was too long, and the project was too risky. A venture 
manager concludes, “being faced with this early stage technology at a conference couldn’t 
activate the R&D employees”. It was believed that their short-term focus prevented them from 
acknowledging the potentials of the project. In this connection, Danfoss A/S was contacted by 
PMC in the beginning of December 2002, in connection to a new financing round. The contact 
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was however made to the business divisions of Danfoss A/S and not the corporate venture unit. 
One could argue that the conceptual model should include a category for employees and not only 
intrepreneurs.    
As PMC was in need of further financing, a Danish venture capitalist was approached. He did 
not however have an initial interest, as he could not quite grasp the technology behind the idea. 
This is a typical barrier for “Traditionalists” in placing their investment. Even though private 
venture capitalists are being approached they often do not have the technical knowledge needed.  
A similar example was present in the case of Nanotron Technologies: As part of the 
investment process Danfoss also became a broker by opening syndicated investments with two 
other investors (“Industry partners”). A venture manger describes the difficult task by arguing 
that “it took a while before the right one’s were found – many where very hesitant about such a 
new technology, which hadn’t proven its value.” This provides a valuable difference in the 
investment focus of “Traditionalists” and “Corporate traditionalists”: Whereas private venture 
capitalists can have a difficult time analysing the technologies and are focused on financial 
returns, corporate ventures can more easily give up on the financial return for a strategically 
focused investment.     
The Danish venture capitalist in the PMC case had been evaluating the project and contacted 
the Danfoss A/S heating division, as he knew that they specialized in burner technologies. At this 
time, a prototype had already been developed. During this evaluation phase, the venture 
managers and other resource persons from Danfoss A/S visited the company to see PMC´s 
technology. The first reactions were that the technology was too close to the present core 
business of Danfoss A/S for it to become part of the corporate venture department, i.e. it should 
be included in the burner divisions of Danfoss A/S. The project was later brought into the burner 
division of Danfoss A/S as a separate unit. However, it turned out that PMC belonged to a 
different time horizon, making it a project for the venture department.   
Approximately a year after the investment was made, PMC was placed in the burning division 
for a second time in order to exploit synergies. A venture manager argues, “A technology [PMC] 
which is brought into Danfoss A/S might become interesting in 10 years from now– and that’s 
the reason why the venture division exists … We need to make sure that we can later include the 
investments in the divisions”. Trying to integrate the projects into the divisions is the new 
approach. “Keeping them as separate entities is no longer the way forward” argues a venture 
manager. The PMC project is today an integrated part of the heating division. However, “At this 
point PMC is still something which gets developed separately – something perceived as blue-sky 
research” says a manager responsible for the product. He stresses that “its very difficult to 
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compare the importance of day to day operations with very long-term and risky projects like 
PMC”.   
It has later turned out that there could be a possible technological fit between the burner 
technology and the technologies for fuel cells. Danfoss A/S had previously made an investment 
in a venture capital firm that focused on fuel cells: Conduit Ventures. The link between PMC and 
Conduit is the development of hydrogen, which is needed for running the fuel cells. Helium does 
not occur alone in the natural environment, but is tied to other atoms. Some of the places where 
hydrogen occurs is in natural gas and in fluent petrol. It has been proven that this reformation 
(separation of hydrogen) can be applied in the same media as the one produced by PMC. The 
technology can be used for preparation of the fuel. In the media the reformation process can 
happen in a more controllable environment.  
Danfoss A/S presently owns 12% of stock of PMC, whereas previous owners and other 
venture capital companies own the rest. All the other venture capitalists were brought in during 
the same round as Danfoss A/S, through which Danfoss A/S was able to find one investor. “It’s 
very important that the right people are brought in,” argues a venture manager. The manager 
further states, “We know one another from our network…  a funding process, however, is a chain 
of many actions, and takes at least a year to settle”. In addition, the venture manager argues that 
“getting access to the best venture demands that you use your network …. And this network can 
only be exploited if you are clear about your business objectives. This is a necessity…. it is 
important to be included in the international corporate venture networks. This keeps us up to 
date – and indicates new interment proposals”. This situation seems to be evident in the 
situations described by the model. 
In the special situation of “Alliance Partners” a venture manager argues as follows, when 
asked to consider the case of Nanotron Technologies: “The only reason for inviting other 
investors‘ money is that we feel that there is a tendency to invite other investor to ensure that 
they will received invitations later…we have a strong interest in gaining access to technologies 
that fit our line of business - we have a strong interest in signalling the interests that we have to 
as many fellow investors as possible”. He further argues that “one way to be recognised and 
invited is to have showcases to present – where we can show who we are and what we stand 
for”. Nanotron has functioned as such a case – “we know you because we know Nanotron” the 
venture manager agues. 
As the cases show, corporate venture capitalists play a central role in recognition and 
discovery of new investments opportunities. However it is important to acknowledge that 
opportunity discovery includes how a wide range of actors contribute to the process. While the 
conceptual framework identifies some of the key actors, the cases display great dynamism but 
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also reflect some of the barriers to the making of discoveries. While the conceptual model 
functions as good management tool for categorizing the actors involved in the discovery process 
it also indicates how to manage the process.   
 
 
Discussion and Future Research 
 
This paper has made a first attempt to develop a comprehensive framework for the actors 
involved in recognition and discovery of opportunities in corporate venturing. Corporate 
venturing has been shown to be an interesting case for exploring entrepreneurial opportunities 
because of their unique investment strategy. Acknowledging the limitation of the framework, 
this paper provides first insights to the passageways from which venture capitalists gain access to 
future ventures. One of the biggest limitations of the framework is found in the limited 
categories of actors. Whereas entrepreneurial opportunities are discovered between many 
different actors this analysis only focuses on four distinct types. In future research the categories 
could be expanded and made more elaborate. In addition, while the framework helps to 
categorize the different discovery situations it doesn’t tell us anything about the typical 
passageways of opportunities. Reaching a better understanding of these passageways may also 
prove to be a valuable managerial tool for corporate venture capitalists in their decision making 
process. 
However the article does shed light on the complex passageways which are not carried out by 
single firms or individuals, but through a symbiosis of actors such as venture capitalists, 
e(i)ntrepreneurs and the different actors in the market.  
The case further illustrates the relation between the burner division and the corporate venture 
division. This highlights the typical difference been daily operations and future development. 
Many of the reasons for implementing a corporate venture organisation is exactly because the 
division is monitored on their day to day achievement, which can cause corporations to lose 
long-term focus. It is however important to emphasise that the new venture needs to be 
connected to the divisions in order to ensure knowledge sharing and implementation.  
From the case of Ossacur we also see that, opportunities with related technologies are more 
easily discovered. Due to the fact that Ossacur was technology closely related to the business of 
Danfoss it becomes easier to make the discoveries even when they find exploration in other field. 
While the technology was closely related to Danfoss the market was new. The consequences are 
very much the dilemma of exploration versus exportation of resources. 
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Future research on the link between corporate venture capitalists and their search for 
opportunities would provide valuable insights into opportunity recognition and discovery as well 
as to the managerial talent for mastering this. Both from a supply and a demand side of 
opportunities, this holistic framework broadens our understanding of who can recognize and 
discover from whom. Hence it changes the traditional Neoclassical (and to some extend the 
Austrian) understanding of the entrepreneur as the only initiator and executer of opportunities. 
Understanding that the passageways of an opportunity can in fact be initiated by venture 
capitalists and not necessarily by the traditional entrepreneur adds to both venture capital and 
entrepreneurship research. Untangling the relationship between investor and invitee further 
challenges the traditional perception of the role of venture capitalists as pure financial resource 
provider (Munk and Vintergaard, 2004). 
While this paper has helped to broaden our understanding of the type of actors involved in 
discovery of opportunities it also raises the question of which actors to focus on and what 
initiatives must succeed. As the empirical cases also illustrate, some sources for discovering new 
opportunities take more effort to develop than others, but the mechanisms for making the 
discoveries also differ. Opportunity discovery from, for example, university researchers are 
determined by factors such as: industrial reputation, university/ industry relations, collective 
research projects etc. Syndication with private venture capitalists is a mater of providing 
complementary resources, access to future costumers etc. Corporate venture capitalists can 
discover opportunities from all actor groups; the limitation is often found in the resources and 
capabilities needed for using all channels. Going back to the example: university based 
opportunities are often very immature and risk and capital requirements are high. These projects 
can change in many different directions, but may also provide high strategic and commercial 
return. Syndications with private investors often carry less risk but the financial upside is also 
lower. Therefore as this paper suggests a broad portfolio of sources for discovering opportunities 
and a foundation on which to focus one’s attention depending on the overall strategies of the 
investors. 
In addition, it would be highly valuable from a managerial viewpoint for venture capitalists to 
predict the development path of a potential opportunity, by acknowledging the previous actors 
who have made recognitions and discoveries. From the cases we see that some recognitions have 
successful outcome whereas other do not. This accords with Austrian economics.  Forecasting 
the “blind allies” and the “highways” would prove very powerful for both venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs. This would lead to a more thorough understanding of the passageways – and 
possibly a categorization of their different kinds. Such knowledge would enable venture 
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capitalists to predict the shape of the passageway of an opportunity and, consequently, tell them 
when to invest.        
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Abstract 
This chapter is concerned with how corporate venture companies can design appropriate 
evaluation strategies to deal with the ambiguity of science based venture opportunities. We will 
especially discuss the implications on evaluation strategies when relying on dynamic innovation 
models instead of a linear model.  
Science based venture opportunities are especially difficult to evaluate due to the high level of 
uncertainty inherent in the research. Not to mention the intermediate nature of the research 
results. These two aspects make it difficult to translate research outcome into immediate market 
needs and profitable business ventures. Assessing research based opportunities and their 
potential value are further challenged by the fact that they are created in overlaps and the 
interfaces between the different industries and disciplines and, hence, embedded in a dense web 
of social, economical, contractual, and administrative relationships. Furthermore, exploiting 
research based opportunities is often very resource demanding which makes it even more critical 
for corporate venture firms to make the right investment decisions. This chapter addresses 
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corporate venture investors evaluation strategies through which dynamic and participatory 
actions can create knowledge which makes them better prepared for decision-making.  
 
Keywords: Corporate venturing, evaluation, innovation models, opportunities, venture base.  
 
 
Introduction 
Over a broad spectrum of industries, corporate venturing has proven to be a successful business 
development strategy for many organizations with e.g. 3M and Intel among the notable success 
stories (Block and MacMillan, 1993) and since the early 1990s, corporate venturing has been a 
widely applied approach to stimulate business development (Block and MacMillan, 1993; 
Burgelman, 1983; Sharma and Chrisman, 1999; Zahra, 1991).  
One of the most challenging tasks for corporate venture organizations is to decide which 
opportunities to invest resources in. The problems of evaluating venture opportunities is in the 
literature often assigned to aspects such as: idiosyncratic opportunity recognition (Shane, 2000), 
risk for opportunistic behavior on the side of the entrepreneur and/or inventor (Amit et al., 1990) 
and lack of crucial knowledge (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). On top of these generic difficulties 
off making investment decisions corporate venture investors additionally faces the challenge of 
satisfying a broad spectrum of expectations towards the venture besides the financial (Greene, 
Brush and Hard, 1999; Block and MacMillan, 1993; Burgleman, 1983) such as strategic renewal, 
business intelligence and challenging existing routines and patterns of behavior and similar - 
often intangible - benefits that can only be quantified with great difficulties.   
The literature on venture management suggests different evaluation strategies in order to reduce 
or cope with these tricky selection conditions. Among the proposed strategies are relying on self-
selection by the entrepreneur (Gompers and Lerner, 1999), environmental-selection (Volberda 
and Lewin, 2003), use of social networks for knowledge transfer and reduction of information 
asymmetry (Venkataraman, 1997), syndication of investment decisions (Sorenson and Stuart, 
2001) and use of checklists and selection criteria (Knight, 1988; MacMillan, Seigel, 
SubbaNarasimha, 1985).  
In search of high returns from venture investments, corporate venture firms are increasingly 
directing their attention to science based entrepreneurial opportunities (Sung, Gibson and Kang, 
2003; Husted and Vintergaard, 2004). Given the innovative nature and high capital demand of 
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the entrepreneurial opportunities coming from scientific communities, investors expect 
corresponding high rewards. However, science based entrepreneurial opportunities invokes all 
the mentioned selection problems and more too. For example the combined effect of high 
uncertainty and the intermediate nature of research results makes it even more difficult to 
identify a) which market needs the ventures aims at serving, b) the profitability of serving that 
market (Chrisman, Timothy and Fraser, 1995) and c) the cost associated with transforming 
research into marketable product. Evaluating science based entrepreneurial opportunities are 
further contested by the complexity and multi-disciplinarity in the underlying knowledge 
production. Moreover the knowledge production will often be dispersed over a number of 
institutions and organizations each contributing with some input to realizing and shaping the 
entrepreneurial opportunity.  
The paper argues that evaluation strategies applied by corporate venture companies, when 
evaluating which science based entrepreneurial opportunity to fund, largely reflect their core 
assumptions about the relations between research and profitable market activities.  
In the recent years there has been an occasionally heated discussion in a number of scientific 
fields such as philosophy, sociology, policy making, management and history of how to best 
analyses and map innovation (and research) processes. The linear model was developed in the 
late 40ties and has since then been popular for breaking down the innovation process from basic 
research, through R&D, and to marketable products. Inherited in the model is a presumption that 
innovative processes proceed along relatively predictable patterns. A growing body of literature 
has later criticized the linear model for resting primarily on anecdotal evidence and for being 
unable to capture the dynamics of science and innovation interaction (Stokes, 1997). Hence the 
extensive use of the linear model for guiding decisions in science policy, research organization, 
and the commercialization of research is so questioned. A widespread consequence is that 
institutions, routines and behaviors embedded in the linear model are taken up for evaluation and 
reconsideration. A number of alternative models for capturing the dynamics between science and 
innovation have emerged, e.g. the triple helix model that emphasizes the dynamics in the 
interplay at an institutional level (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorf 1997, 1998), in a similar vein but 
with an even broader scope Lundwall (1992) and Nelson (1993) suggest that innovative abilities 
and performance is embedded in social and structural characteristics of national innovation 
systems. Firm-level innovation models include e.g. the chain-linked model, which tries to 
capture the iterative and mutually shaping element in the interplay between research and 
innovation processes (Kline, 1985; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). Sociology of science suggests 
that research behavior and interaction with society is changing from the classic mode to Mode 2 
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research as a framework for understanding how research processes and researchers interact with 
society (Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny et al., 2001).  
The mentioned dynamic innovation models share the common assumption that the direction and 
outcome of scientific processes often are, and should be, under some influence of other interests 
than purely scientific ones. In other words, results and opportunities created in science should 
ideally reflect needs and agendas in the society they are made in. This mode of scientific 
knowledge production is expected to become: “more socially accountable and reflexive. It 
includes a wider, more temporary and heterogeneous set of practitioners, collaborating on a 
problem defined in a specific and localized context” (Gibbons et al., 1994, p.3). As a 
consequence of the changes towards new innovation models knowledge production, research 
agendas and new knowledge are negotiated and shaped in interaction with external stakeholders. 
Following this perspective new knowledge for innovation and science based ventures are not 
only tested against interdisciplinary scientific criteria but also confronted and tested in different 
business contexts and through public debate. In other words, the new knowledge is socially 
robust (Nowotny et al., 2001).  
However, both the literature on how to evaluate science based venture opportunities and the 
practice in many venture organizations appears to work on the premises of the linear model. 
Many of the current evaluation strategies seems to be occupied with how to cope with the 
evaluation of actual opportunities that have dripped out of the research pipeline instead of being 
concerned with emerging opportunities and tapping into the interactive dynamic between science 
and innovation processes.  
This chapter discusses how dynamic innovation-models influence the evaluation strategies of 
corporate venturing firms and hence their capacity to discover and evaluate new research based 
venture opportunities. The authors argue that a new perspective needs to be attributed to what the 
consequences is of applying a linear versus dynamic perspective to the evaluation process.  The 
chapter also argues that based on choice of innovation model, the corporate venture company 
will have access to various compensation mechanisms for addressing evaluation difficulties. The 
discussion is supported with a focus group study of evaluation strategies in Danish corporate 
venture organizations.  
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Research method  
The present study was conducted as a focus group exercise of 29 senior venture capitalists 
(investors, senior managers, partners etc). The group was meeting for a one-day discussion on 
evaluation problematic, to which the participants had been invited or volunteered.  
 
Procedure and analysis 
The focus group discussion was intended to be issue driven and theory based. That is the group 
was asked to find examples of a theoretical construct (evaluation of ventures) thereby elaborating 
and examining the venture process (see Lyons, 2000). In order to ensure this goal, the group was 
first introduced to some of the basic problems and issues when evaluating ventures. They were 
then subdivided into groups of approximately five to six people. The groups discussed a question 
for one hour, and were then invited to a common focus group meeting around the questions, 
which was facilitated by one of the authors. The discussed question functioned as an introduction 
to a broader discussion on evaluation techniques. The focus group discussion was recorded and 
transcribed into a textual account encompassing the key experiences and views of the group. 
This document was then distributed to the group for comments and feedback. 
 
Validity of the study 
Stratified purposeful sampling was employed ensuring that the group consisted of individuals 
representative of a number of disciplinary affiliations, work profiles and ages (Lyons, 2000). The 
group consisted of 26 men (90 per cent) and three women (10 per cent), whereof an equal 
distribution of directors, partners, senior manager and investors were represented. The original 
educational distribution of the venture capitalists were as follows: natural science (4), technical 
science (6), medical science (7), agricultural and veterinary science (3), social science (7), and 
the humanities (2). Out of the 29 participants, 15 had more then 5 years of experience in the 
venture capital industry. The spread of disciplinary orientation and task orientation ensures that a 
diversity of variations had the chance to occur, yet the common academic background facilitates 
a shared common experience (this is the maximum variation criteria elaborated by Lyons 
(2000)).  
Finally, since the participants volunteered to take part in the study they most likely represented a 
group of individuals who nurture an interest in venture capital management. However, the 
purpose of this study was not to describe a representative cross-section of attitudes to venture 
capital management, but rather to bring out new and useful suggestions and experiences in the 
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area of evaluating venture opportunities. In this regard, the group represented a sample of 
individuals, i.e. of persons who had something to say about the topic at hand. This has been 
shown to be a positive point of departure for focus group discussions (Milward, 2000). 
Throughout the discussion in this chapter we will draw upon input from the focus group exercise 
to illustrate and nuance the points we aim to make.    
 
Theoretical background and grounding  
Science based entrepreneurial opportunities  
Entrepreneurial opportunities are often used as the label for the business idea a new venture is 
built on (Long and McMullan, 1984; Bhave, 1994; Hills et al., 1997). The notion of 
entrepreneurial opportunity is central in entrepreneurship research. Some entrepreneurship 
researchers even forcefully argue that the field of entrepreneurship is differentiated from other 
fields of organizational studies such as strategic management by its focus on “…how, by whom, 
and with what effects opportunities to create future goods and services are discovered, 
evaluated, and exploited” (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000: 218).  
Following this line of logic Shane and Venkataraman (2000) further argues that following three 
sets of research questions are especially central for the entrepreneurship field: a) why, when and 
how opportunities for the creation of goods and services come into existence; b) why, when and 
how some people and not others discover and exploit these opportunities; and c) why, when and 
how different modes of action are used to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. The study 
presented in this chapter is mainly focused on the aspect of the second issue that relates to the 
deliberate choice to pursue and allocate resources to an entrepreneurial opportunity.  
While there is shared perception that the focus on studying entrepreneurial opportunities may be 
the unifying factor for delineating the field of entrepreneurship (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; 
Singh, 2001; Zahra and Dess, 2001) the field has not yet reached an agreement on a unifying 
definition of entrepreneurial opportunities. The first criterion which is generally agreed on, must 
obviously be that the opportunity do not exist before it is articulated in a form where it can be 
examined (Singh 2001). A central point of disagreement is to what extent entrepreneurial 
opportunities can be recognized without having been tested and acted upon. One argument is that 
many opportunities are not real opportunities in the sense they never lead to revenue generating 
activities, either because the opportunities are not acted upon for different reasons, implemented 
wrongly, or simply not supported by the market. Following this line of argument 
entrepreneurship research should concentrate on studying successfully implemented 
entrepreneurial opportunities. The arguments against this approach is a) that it is difficult to 
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define success in a universal manner, some opportunities may never become profitable by 
traditional measures but create value for its stakeholder in other ways, b) the success or failure of 
entrepreneurial opportunities is not only depending on the features of the opportunities but also 
on (and in some cases maybe even mainly) how the opportunity is enacted and exploited (e.g. 
Zahra and Dess, 2001; Vintergaard, 2005).  
Entrepreneurial opportunities are different from other profit seeking opportunities by  requiring 
discovery of new means-ends relationships (Kirzner, 1997) whereas most other opportunities are 
concerned with optimization with a well-established means-ends relationship. The element of 
exploration affiliated with entrepreneurial opportunities also contribute to explaining the 
difficulties of assessing entrepreneurial activities compared with assessing the profitability of 
other business activities. For the latter it is possible to apply standardized procedures and 
projections within the established means-end framework which will allow for comparison of 
different investment opportunities and actions. But since both the consequences of exploiting 
new opportunities are unknown and the range of means-ends combinations available - although 
not discovered yet - is also unknown, it is impossible or at least difficult to predict within an 
existing framework. 
 
Philosophy of opportunities  
A further theoretical discussion is concerned with whether entrepreneurial opportunities are 
created or discovered. One academic strand claims that the opportunities are objective 
phenomena just waiting to be discovered. As a consequence, opportunities should be analyzed as 
the product of active entrepreneurs trying to create their own golden opportunities. Differently 
e.g. Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; and Shane, 2003, work under the assumption that 
opportunities are not discovered before exploitation, but rather seen as the final result of a 
creative and social process (e.g. Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy, 2004; Gartner et al., 2003). This 
point makes distinct difference between whether entrepreneurs discover opportunities or they 
actively create opportunities to fit a specific economic and societal context.  
Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and Venkatarman (2003) suggest a conceptual framework based on 
distinction between opportunity recognition, discovery and creation. In this framework they try 
to “… model an entrepreneurial opportunity as a function, or a process or set of decisions, 
respectively” (p. 142). An opportunity is recognised when an entrepreneur combine existing 
technologies and markets. In this context “both sources of supply and demand exist rather 
obviously, the opportunity for bringing them together has to be recognized and then the match-
up between supply and demand has to be implemented either through an existing firm or a new 
firm” (p. 145). This view has its origination in neoclassical economies where resource allocation 
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can lead to efficiency in perfectly competitive markets. Contrary, the process of opportunity 
discovery describes the process where only one of the variables exists and the other needs to be 
created (technology or market). The last possible (and less frequent) situation, opportunity 
creation, is where neither market nor technology exists.  
 
Science based entrepreneurial opportunities 
There are several distinct characteristics that makes science based opportunities different from 
other opportunities, and which also further complicate the evaluation process. The first 
distinctive element derives from that the sources of science based ventures are more commonly 
found in the interstices between organizations and research institutions with various 
perspectives. When focusing on science based venture opportunities it is often emphasized that 
they are developed in the interfaces and overlap between the different industries and disciplines 
(Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Consequently, these opportunities are embedded in a 
dense web of social, economical, contractual, and administrative relationships, which influence 
the challenge of assessing the potential value of the opportunity. In these collaborative 
relationships it is often difficult to agree on who contributes with what and therefore who is the 
owner of the opportunity. This makes value assessment of the separate components of the 
science based opportunities a further distinctive factor. The problem often arises when venture 
opportunities derive from patented natural science which is later supplemented with market and 
managerial competencies. Since market and managerial knowledge is often brought in late in the 
process of creating or discovering an opportunity, it can often appear as if these competences 
receive a disproportional large value distribution. This can create some tension in the group that 
tries to discover or create an entrepreneurial opportunity. Similar problems can arise when two 
different natural science disciplines are combined to develop a novel new project.      
Furthermore, research results often lead to multiple benefits and application opportunities in 
different areas (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). In an analysis of the development path of a 
science based entrepreneurial opportunity in a corporate setting, Vintergaard (2005) found that 
the multiple application potential of research results is reflected in the search pattern for 
commercial use of the research result. Often this type of venture opportunities travels along very 
unpredictable patterns and can end up exploiting a very different entrepreneurial prospect then 
the one it originally believed it should exploit. The uncertainty and ongoing change in the 
formulation of the means-ends relations, makes evaluation of science based ventures particularly 
challenging.  
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Decision conditions for exploiting research based entrepreneurial opportunities 
Entrepreneurship normally implies that an opportunity is recognized or discovered and a 
potential entrepreneur has decided to exploit the opportunity (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). 
Already at this stage quite a number of opportunities are aborted and never developed into 
entrepreneurial activities. Corporate entrepreneurship involves an additional hurdle: besides the 
decisions and efforts of the entrepreneurial individual or team to exploit an opportunity they 
have recognized or discovered, then corporate support and corporate decision to exploit the 
opportunity, is a necessary condition for having achieved corporate venture evaluation. It is 
mainly the conditions for the corporate decision we address in this section.  
The corporate decision has at least three components. First, to clarify whether an opportunity is a 
real entrepreneurial opportunity, meaning that it can lead to a profitable activity or a false one, 
meaning it does not offer a new product or service generating an above average profit when 
introduced to the market. Second, clarifying whether the corporate venture company possesses 
the resources needed for acting upon the opportunity. Lastly, determine whether the resources 
are optimally deployed in exploiting the opportunity in question, instead of in another profit 
generating opportunity. Often these issues are tangled together and imbedded in evaluation 
conditions which complicate the value assessment.  
The most noticeable evaluation conditions concerns are: evaluation consequences, diversity on 
expectations, idiosyncratic nature of entrepreneurial opportunities, and asymmetric distribution 
of knowledge about the entrepreneurial opportunity. While each of these condition are relevant 
for all venture opportunities, their relevance and impact is intensified when evaluating science 
based opportunities. Below, we elaborate on these specific selection conditions in more details.  
The decisions whether or not to invest in a given venture opportunity, is often perceived as 
crucial because of the brutal selection consequences. Firms face the risk of either wrongly 
selecting a malign venture or wrongly rejecting a beneficial one (Elfring and Foss 2000). 
Wrongly chosen projects are not only costly but also prevent the venture organization from using 
its limited resources on other projects, and possibly even damaging the corporate image of the 
parent company and the venturing organization. Resource commitment and the following 
reduced flexibility is especially an issue in relation to exploitation of science based 
entrepreneurial opportunities since these opportunities are very resource demanding due to the 
need for maturing the research, new dedicated manufacturing facilities, slow initial market 
penetration etc. On the other hand, a too restrictive investment policy is often said to lead to loss 
of opportunities, as these companies will not recognize a golden opportunity when it presents 
itself. Wrongly rejected projects can also be of serious disadvantage for the firm, especially if the 
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opportunity is recognized and exploited by competing firms or firms who use the new 
opportunity to enter the industry of the corporate venturing firm that rejected the project. 
Especially in high competitive industries were lead-time is a competitive advantage, loosing “the 
winning” idea can have significant consequences.  
Besides, within corporate venturing the evaluation is further complicated by the mixed 
expectation towards the outcome of the venture investment. Corporate venturing is 
predominantly seen as a mean for large, well-established companies to become innovative and 
flexible (Greene, Brush and Hart, 1999). It is, however, not the only motivation - in fact, there 
are a number of related motives for setting up a corporate venture unit. Among those motives are 
securing growth and responding to competitive pressure (Block and MacMillan, 1993), 
improving corporate profitability (Zahra, 1996), stimulating strategic renewal (Wielemaker, 
Elfring, and Volberda, 2000, 2001; Guth and Ginsberg, 1990), fostering innovation and gaining 
knowledge that may be parlayed into future revenue streams (Venkataraman, MacMillan and 
McGrath, 1992). Additionally, these mixed expectations towards the benefits created by 
corporate venturing activities are also reflected in the composition of the investments boards of 
the corporate venture organizations and hence the decision process (Venkataraman, MacMillan 
and McGrath, 1992). Finally, it is rather common that corporate venture capitalists make their 
deals funded on an ad hoc basis (Siegel, Siegel and MacMillan, 1988), and formal approval is 
needed from corporate management (Block and MacMillan, 1993) resulting in a lack of stability 
and predictability in how corporate expectations are reflected in the investments decisions. 
Next, the ability to recognize entrepreneurial opportunities is dependent on prior knowledge, 
which is idiosyncratic in nature, and therefore will lead people to perceive opportunities 
differently (Shane, 2000). At the same time the individual way of perceiving entrepreneurial 
ideas is crucial for the venturing activities to earn an above average return on the successful 
investments (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). The venture idea should not be subjected to harsh 
competition because the opportunity would then become too obvious and therefore loose its 
commercial upside. Shared beliefs and interpretation of business opportunities among 
entrepreneurs would reduce competition and thereby the potential of earning entrepreneurial 
profit (Schumpeter, 1943). But the idiosyncratic nature of entrepreneurial ideas obstructs the 
evaluation process by increasing the difficulties of the potential investor in recognizing the 
potential of the proposed idea.  
Last, and maybe most important, the relation between the person who is promoting a new 
business idea (the entrepreneur) and the potential source of funding (the investor) is hampered by 
asymmetric distribution of knowledge (Amit et al., 1990). The entrepreneur possesses much 
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more information and knowledge about their business opportunity and themselves than potential 
investors do. The entrepreneur may exploit the asymmetric distribution of knowledge to his own 
benefit (Amit et al., 1990) leading to principal agent conflicts (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 
1981; Eisenhard, 1989; Gompers, 1995). Additionally, entrepreneurs are not very inclined to 
share all their knowledge with the potential investor before a favorable investment decision. This 
is due to the fear of a potential investor behaving opportunistic, turning down the entrepreneurs 
while still trying to exploit the business opportunity himself. The asymmetric distribution of 
knowledge poses a serious challenge to potential investors, particularly in making the investment 
decision. Difficulties in sharing the knowledge because of its predominantly tacit nature makes 
knowledge sharing between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalists even more challenging 
and can lead the entrepreneur to hoard knowledge unintended. It should however also be stressed 
that the potential investor in many situations also possesses knowledge which the entrepreneur is 
not aware, but is relevant for assessing an entrepreneurial opportunity. This is clearly illustrated 
in the following statement from a Danish investment director:  
“Venture capitalists are able to collect more information than the 
entrepreneurs because of better network relations. Venture capitalists 
have better opportunities to interview relevant people, confer with related 
projects in their portfolios, make a market analysis, use consultants etc. 
In conclusion it is my opinion that venture capitalists have a continuous 
flow of knowledge that the entrepreneur are less likely to have”. (Jacob 
Bratting Pedersen, Investment Director, Olicom) 
In general the interviewees argue that venture capitalists often have more knowledge of market 
issues than the entrepreneur whereas they have a more specific understanding of the 
technological matters. However, there is also a general awareness that markets attract new 
technology and visa versa. 
“… the entrepreneur will always have some information that the venture 
investor does not and the question is how to let the entrepreneur offer you 
the relevant insight. The investor often knows more about especially 
market conditions and probability for a projects’ potential due to 
experience and knowledge from networks. But also when it comes to 
technological issues investors gets valuable information from co-
investors and portfolio entrepreneurs meaning that the investor and the 
entrepreneur have different but perhaps complementary knowledge. 
(Søren Schifter, Partner, Novo Ventures, Novo A/S) 
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Whereas the brutal selection consequences is a contingency factor which investors cannot do 
much to address, then diverse expectations, the idiosyncratic nature of entrepreneurial potential 
and information asymmetry are all specific selection conditions which to a certain extent can be 
addressed by using appropriate evaluation strategies (Knight, 1988, 1994; Zutshi et al., 1999).  
 
Selection strategies 
The literature on evaluating investment opportunities in corporate venturing suggests a number 
of selection strategies for addressing the decision conditions for exploiting the research based 
entrepreneurial opportunities described earlier in the chapter. These strategies includes use of 
checklists and evaluation criteria (Knight, 1988, 1994; MacMillan, Seigel, SubbaNarasimha, 
1985), use of experts (Block, 1982), self- and environmental-selection (Volberda and Lewin, 
2003; Gompers and Lerner, 1999), staging of investment (Sahlman, 1990), syndication of 
investment decisions (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) and use of social networks for knowledge 
transfer and reduction of information asymmetry (Venkataraman, 1997).  
In this section we will argue that some of these strategies are more supportive and embedded in 
the linear innovation model whereas other evaluation strategies are supportive to the interactive 
and dynamic innovation models. It is characteristic for selection strategies within the linear 
innovation approach to focus on measurements and to apply a stepwise and progressive decision 
making approach whereas evaluation strategies supporting the interactive and dynamic 
innovation models tend to emphasize the investors’ ability to test and qualify the knowledge 
needed for evaluating which opportunity to pursue and which to turn down. Within this 
framework evaluation is approached as a continuous learning process involving a number of 
stakeholders with different interests and capacities. This make linear innovation models and 
evaluation strategies two ends of a means-ends-framework. 
The following sections will discuss the different evaluation strategies one by one, their relation 
to the two innovation models and their impact on the evaluation difficulties and consequences 
affiliated with science-based entrepreneurial opportunities.  
 
Evaluation criteria 
A significant part of the corporate venturing literature suggest to base evaluation on a normative 
list of investment criteria (Block, 1982; Block and McMillan, 1993; Knight, 1988, 1994, 
McMillan et al., 1985). This stream of literature recommends that in order to select the “best” 
entrepreneurial opportunity, corporate venture companies should develop and define both (1) 
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 172  
general criteria (i.e. those which may best reflect potential ventures' fit with the overriding 
strategy of the corporate venturing initiative) and (2) specific criteria which stems 
from encompassing various aspects of the general criteria (i.e. criteria relating to the 
specification of products, markets or technologies). The general criteria should reflect both the 
specific goals for the venturing activity and the corporate strategic goals of the parent company. 
The more specific criteria encompass; evidence of consumer needs, capability to satisfy these, 
competitive advantage, and various financial criteria (Block and Macmillan, 1993). In corporate 
venturing, it is important that the selection criteria also covers issues such as operational 
relatedness in terms of the degree to which proposals are related to the core capabilities of the 
mother organization and expected strategic importance for corporate development (Burgelman, 
1984). The criteria are applied to the evaluation of entrepreneurial opportunities matured into 
business plans.  
To complement this matter, the capability of the management team to manage the venture is an 
important substituting investment criteria (e.g. MacMillan et al., 1985; Hall and Hofer, 1993, 
Bachher and Guild, 1996). Venture capitalists often prefer to select an investment opportunity 
that offers a good management team of just reasonable financial and market characteristics 
(Muzyka, Birley and Leleux, 1996). Shifting the evaluation focus away from the entrepreneurial 
opportunity to the management team’s previous records is an attempt to reduce the effect of 
information asymmetry and idiosyncratic recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities. Two 
different interview statements further highlight the importance of the people behind the venture: 
“Very often it is about the people and the chemistry [the venture 
investors’ relation to the entrepreneur, red.]. A network can help you get 
an impression of the entrepreneur”. (Anders Trojel, Director, Corporate 
Licensing and Business Development LEO Pharma A/S) 
 
“... the best venture investors understand how to develop a company by 
applying their former experiences and by locating the right people 
together. First when these conditions are in place it comes to the idea 
itself. (Søren Schifter, Partner, Novo Ventures, Novo A/S) 
The selection strategy that relies on evaluation criteria very obviously support and reinforce the 
linear innovation models. This approach makes a clear distinction between users and producers 
of knowledge, and relies on the investor’s ability to make a complete and accurate evaluation at a 
fixed point in time (Kline, 1985). Relying on the use of investment criteria presumes that venture 
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capitalists follow a natural progression when the science based venture opportunity has already 
been developed. Implicitly there is also an assumption that investors hold all relevant 
information for decision-making. Empirical and theoretical observations however argue that 
venture opportunities rarely develop along predictable paths (Vintergaard, 2005; Kline and 
Rosenberg, 1986) and thus investment criteria cannot stand alone.  
Obviously, working with investment criteria does not solve the information asymmetry problem, 
but only what to do with the information when first gathered and how to secure representation of 
different stakeholder interests in the decision making process. Likewise venture managers only 
have limited time to apply these criteria in the first approaches. One venture manager argues: 
Venture capitalists have a large number of projects to assess. In the first 
round you only spend 30 minutes listening to the entrepreneur. Therefore 
very few venture capitalists spend time proactively estimating market 
potential; more often you pick out the most promising 15-20 projects for 
further studies. (Lars Dybkjaer, Venture Partner, Danisco) 
 
The weakness of relying on selection criteria as the main selection strategy is supported by 
observations that the selection criteria are more or less identical across the venture industry and 
national borders (Zutshi et al., 1999) furthermore it is even more difficult to observe any 
differences in selection criteria between high performing and low performing venture-
companies, and between the criteria applied by inexperienced venture manager and the 
experienced managers (MacMillan and Day, 1987). 
 
Self- and environmental selection 
Economists suggest that the problem of information asymmetry can be overcome by applying 
mechanisms of allocation of contractual rights, staging of capital, and risk shifting, to provide 
entrepreneurs with strong incentives to self select and disclose more information about their 
business opportunity and themselves to the potential investor (Gompers and Learner, 1999). In 
this case the contract between the entrepreneur and investor shifts the risk of wrongly selection 
form the investor to the entrepreneur by specifying a number of sanctions to the entrepreneur e.g. 
loss of shares, if the entrepreneurial opportunity proofs to be a false opportunity or a wrongly 
executed opportunity resulting in a underperforming venture. The premise is that it would be 
foolish of the entrepreneur to accept these conditions if he is in doubt about the promises of the 
venture or his own abilities (Sahlman 1990). The self- and environmental selection can be 
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reinforced in corporate ventures by specifying a limited number of selection criteria and then 
disseminate these criteria throughout the organization in order to achieve a greater organizational 
sense of purpose and direction (Block and MacMillan 1993). Transparency in selection criteria 
stimulate “self-screening” among the potential entrepreneurs in the organization and can, 
therefore, contribute to reduce the disadvantages of information asymmetry and at the same time 
lessen the investor’s use of resources spend on identifying and evaluating business ideas.  
One of the interviewees argues that there is an alternative approach to obtain information of the 
entrepreneurial firm called: “Residual due diligence”:   
 “‘Residual due diligence’ which means that venture investor is 
committed to the board of the project/company for a negotiated period of 
time in order to gain a better impression of the company and the 
entrepreneur. On the one side you have a good opportunity to estimate 
the potential of the investment. On the other hand you risk ‘falling in 
love’ with the project and thereby reduce the objectiveness in your 
assessment”. (Claus Warming, Sportgoods Holding A/S) 
The “residual due diligence” approach is however very costly and it also requires that the 
investor must have serious intention in investing. Otherwise both parties waste time. 
Shifting risk to the entrepreneur does not change the underlying linear assumption that selection 
is taking place when research results have been matured to a level or articulation where they can 
be subjected to analysis and selection. The advantage is, however, that the investor and the 
entrepreneur in principle do not need to share beliefs and interpretation of business opportunities 
in order to exploit the opportunity. However, attempting to deal with information asymmetry by 
moving risk from the investor to the entrepreneur is not completely waterproof. The main 
reasons are a) the entrepreneur’s over-optimism about their business opportunity and 
overconfidence in their own abilities may promote inefficient self-selection (Shane and Cable 
2002) and b) if the venture eventually fails the investor still risk loosing all the invested capital. 
 
Staged investments 
Another strategy to deal with the specific conditions for selection in corporate venturing is by 
staging the investments (Sahlman, 1990), hence committing fractions of the entire investment on 
an ad-hoc basis (Gompers, 1995; Sahlman, 1990). The funds will be provided to funding 
exploiting an entrepreneurial opportunity according to specified milestones. Though a multi-
stage structure the venture capitalist will have more control over management and the operation 
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of the portfolio business (Sahlman, 1990). One advantage of this strategy is that capital is only 
injected with the same speed as knowledge is disclosed by the entrepreneur to the investor. This 
knowledge will additional be validated through action to a certain extend. Additionally, staged 
investments also enable investors to limit the losses when choosing to invest in the wrong 
venture and at the same time reduce the risk of wrongly dismissing promising ventures.  
 
Use of experts 
Lack of critical knowledge can for example be tackled by employing a venture analysis team for 
evaluating proposals and producing recommendations for selection (Block, 1982). The team 
should contain people with market, technical and financial skills combined with empathy and 
understanding of the venturing process, and outside experts should be used as sources of critic 
and resources (Block, 1982). From the corporate venture literature we know that investment 
criteria are part of the section strategy. However the investment analysis based on the criteria 
will always reflect the information asymmetry of the investment. Including a broader set of 
actors as external experts with different backgrounds and perceptions to perform the evaluation 
will ensure a more diversified and tested set of information on which to deploy the criteria. The 
experts are either paid on normal market conditions or give the opinion in expectation of return 
of similar favor in the future. However the use of experts holds the risk of missing novel 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Experts are trained specialist within a specific knowledge domain 
and tend to reject variations which are not recognized within their existing domain. The 
following quotation further highlights the upside and risk of relying on experts:  
“…experts can be used in order to reject the worst cases and thereby 
increase the probability of selecting the right project. The worst 
nightmare, however, is to reject a coming winner”. (Kristoffer Gandrup, 
Partner, Keystones) 
  
In other words, by using external experts potential investors may address lacking knowledge and 
escape the restriction of their own dominant logic, but risk replacing it with an even more firmly 
established dominant logic within a specific field.  
 
Investment syndication 
Syndicated investment is a potentially beneficial way of identifying investment opportunities and 
also accessing the investment expertise of fellow venture capitalists (McNally, 1997). Investment 
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syndication is a collaborative investment relationship between two or more venture capitalists. 
Both corporate venture units and venture capitalists seem to have a preference for funding 
proposals that comes with referral from fellow venture capitalists (Fried and Hisrich, 1994).  
This strategy is a profound way of applying a more interactive and dynamic innovation model to 
the evaluation process. When a venture capitalist makes an investment in a venture, he also at the 
same time “certify” the quality of the entrepreneurial opportunity. This serves as an initial 
approval of the venture, which improves the odds for others to join in. In order for venture 
capitalist to gain access to investment opportunities from other venture capitalists there is a 
reversible commitment to provide these with other venture opportunities. One of the 
interviewees argues:  
“.. ‘success creates success’ and in addition creates synergies. This 
represents the Matteus effect: High performing investors attracts the best 
projects and the most compelling co-investors”. (Keld Holm, CEO, 
Business Research and Communication) 
Once a firm begins collaborating, it develops experience in cooperation and a reputation as a 
partner. Experience will over time help the corporate venturing firm to be more effective in 
exploiting collaborations. Reputation, on the other hand, proves a fertile ground for both formal 
partnerships and an expanding array of informal "relationships”. This is very important, as a 
broad range of collaborative efforts provides central connectedness in the network and help 
generate visibility and over time access to resources.  
Syndication is like staged investments a way to reveal information about the entrepreneurial 
firm. One of the problems with relying on co-investors is however the idiosyncratic nature in 
perception of the investment opportunity. The consequence for making an investment will 
change according to the nature of the investor and so will the expectations. However co-
investments have proven a valuable way to overcome parts of the asymmetric information 
embedded in the investment. 
 
Use of social networks 
Powell et al. (1996:117) make the point that in high-tech sectors, “… no single firm has all 
the internal capabilities necessary for success”. The locus of innovation in high-tech sectors 
is, therefore, to be found in networks of learning rather than in individual firms, 
since the knowledge pool is characterized as both complex and expanding, and the expertise is 
widely dispersed. For corporate investors, cooperation with the network, therefore, becomes vital 
since it provides the venturing firm with access to resources, skills and competences from a 
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broad range of firms, universities etc. and thus provides the venturing firm with complementary 
knowledge. Organizational theorists suggest that the disadvantages of asymmetric distribution of 
knowledge can be reduced by using knowledge accessed through social ties for supporting the 
investment decision (Shane and Cable, 2002; Granovetter, 1973, 1985). Especially investors who 
invest in high-technology businesses use social ties for creating access to private information 
about the entrepreneur and his business idea (Shane and Cable, 2002).  
It is argued that strong ties to network actors promote knowledge transfer, they however hold 
search disadvantages (Hansen, 1999). The citation also illustrates that tight network structures 
require many resources to be maintained: 
“It is often costly and takes up resources to collect information from your 
network. Moreover is it resourceful to maintain a network at a sufficient 
level [strong ties]. Furthermore it is concerned with risks of becoming a 
‘closed club’ that are self-perpetuating if you always confer with the 
same people. In other words you risk your approach is being narrow-
minded.  (Susanne Forsingdal, ATP Private Equity Partners) 
As indicated direct and strong network ties promotes exchange of knowledge and resources, 
however weak ties favors knowledge search (Burt, 1992). This is a task that involves managing a 
system of individual actors. At this point, a sparsely connected network with structural holes 
between its actors is better at generating competitive advantages for its actors (Burt, 1992). In 
this connection, one of the interviewees argues:  
“When it comes to assessing technological matters it seems logic to 
involve a narrower circle of people because of the very specific 
character. About market estimates, however, it is important to spread out 
your request in the network due to the notion that customers often 
represent a heterogeneous group and new projects attract a new group of 
customers”. (Jacob Bratting Pedersen, Investment Director, Olicom) 
Repeated partnerships seem to be more important than proximity of firms in the network for 
stimulating exchange of valuable knowledge (Soh, 2003). The explanation may be as Bouty 
(2000) points out that sharing valuable knowledge between firms depends on the level of trust 
among the exchange partners and this trust is developed trough past exchanges. Loosely 
connected networks carries the advantages of cheaper access to information because of the lower 
maintenance costs (Burt, 1992) but also because indirect ties reduce the cost of human attention 
in form of time and investment required to gather information (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  
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If firms are to react on windows of opportunities, they have to be participants of the network 
(Powell et al., 1996; Powell, 1998; Kreiner and Schultz, 1993). Network location is, therefore, 
central to the corporate venturing firms’ competitiveness. Firms more centrally located in 
investment networks should have more timely access to promising ventures, and companies with 
collaborative experience should be better at selecting and exploiting them.  
 
Conclusion and discussion  
Many of the current evaluation strategies seams to be occupied with how to cope with evaluation 
of proved opportunities that have dripped out of the research pipeline instead of being concerned 
with emerging opportunities and tapping into the interactive dynamics between science and 
innovation processes. The outcome of the above analysis is consequently two different 
approaches to evaluation. One approach build on linear progressive strategies and the other is 
build on a more dynamic network and learning perspective. The linear strategies conduct the 
value assessment when the entrepreneurial opportunity has been developed and articulated into a 
business plan or an “investor pitch”. The dynamic strategies pays more attention to how the 
investor, through out the development of the entrepreneurial opportunities, extends their 
knowledge foundation for evaluation.  
Each of the different evaluation approaches has significant impact on how the evaluation is 
carried out and what the consequences are. The below table illustrates the main management 
differences between the two. Particular attention is paid to what impact the two different tactics 
have on evaluation of science based opportunities.  
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The two fundamentally different approaches to evaluating entrepreneurial opportunities differs in 
their ability to address the selection conditions, evaluation consequences, diversity on 
expectations, idiosyncratic nature of entrepreneurial opportunities and asymmetric distribution of 
knowledge about the entrepreneurial opportunity. The analysis also shows that investors can use 
a range of different compensation strategies to overcome the shortcomings of their preferred 
evaluation approach. The table below lists the impact of the two evaluation approaches and how 
management can try to compensate for unintended consequences. 
Selection problem Linear evaluation approach Dynamic evaluation approach 
The  appearance of 
the opportunity to be 
evaluated 
Opportunity recognition: Evaluation of proven 
venture opportunities, when they are presented as 
an advanced business plan or investor pitch. 
Opportunity discovery: Emerging venture 
opportunities. A market potential or technical 
discovery has been made, but the final use of 
opportunity can be difficult to asses.  
Relationship to the 
source of 
opportunity  
There is a strong separation between investor and 
entrepreneur. This distanced relationship creates a 
buyer and supplier relationship.  
There is a partnership where investors are part of the 
innovation process. Through out this process the 
investors make pre-evaluations of value potential. 
Cost implication The cost of evaluating the proposed opportunities 
is primarily associated with finding answers to 
investment criteria’s/(væk) check lists. Additional 
resources are used for comparing evaluation with 
other investors or finding “reliable” evaluators. 
Building an evaluation capacity, where most resources 
are used for building and maintaining both loose and 
strong ties to network associates. Other costs are used 
for being part of the development process, many of 
these are opportunity costs as the process is very time 
consuming.  
Agency problem Agency problems are solved post the investment 
decision, by implying sanctions and contractual 
agreements. 
Investors and entrepreneur share ownership early. This 
develops into a partnership, where the agency 
problems are less rigorous.  
The problems that occur are associated with who has 
contributed the most value, and therefore who should 
have the largest ownership share.  
Use of network  Risk sharing: The network is used to scout for a 
large quantity of venture opportunities to select 
from and to find the most compatible co-
investors. 
Learning: The network is used for learning about 
venture development and to help predict the future 
value of the opportunity. The strong and week tie 
bindings also facilitates testing/ challenging the new 
venture.    
Competitive 
resource / main 
advantage 
Prediction: Investors who work along linear 
models meets a large quantity of projects and 
build a capacity to predict outcomes of “general” 
entrepreneurial processes. 
Participation: Investors who follow a dynamic 
approach have better knowledge of the underlying 
science based opportunity and can better predict and 
influence the outcome. They also gradually reduce the 
level of asymmetric information and agency costs.  
Shortcoming / main 
problem  
Linear evaluation is based on a presumption that 
investors at any point in time know how to 
measure the outcome of the entrepreneurial 
process. The approach however suffers from lack 
of knowledge for assessing opportunities. There is 
also significant chance to oversee the “unpolished 
diamond”. 
Investors are pre-committed to the venture and it can 
be difficult to “kill” bad projects. Too much 
communication can also lower significant rents, since 
venture rents come from less then perfect competition. 
Additionally dynamic involvement is very resource 
demanding and investors will therefore follow fewer 
projects.  
Tabel 1. The consequences of linear and dynamic evaluation approaches. 
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 Linear evaluation approach Dynamic evaluation approach 
Evaluation 
consequences 
There is a chance of letting too many investments 
go by, as the investors do not hold the relevant 
knowledge to recognize potential value. 
 
Linear compensation: 
• Develop a broad international network to 
ensure a high velocity of venture 
opportunities to choose from. 
• Focus on a niche market. 
• Develop strong relationships with competent 
co-investors  
Investors using dynamic models tend to engage in too 
many projects and hence spend too much time on each 
project. 
 
Dynamic compensation: 
• Develop well defined criteria of the types of 
projects that should be engaged in.  
• Have a clear idea of what you can contribute with 
to each venture. 
• Create knowledge loops forward and backward in 
the value chain. This includes having an exit 
strategy for ventures that does not live up to the 
milestones. 
Diverse expectation There will be little knowledge of what 
expectations the science based opportunity can 
fulfill.  
 
Linear compensation: 
• Be clear of what you are searching for, and 
create a common understanding in  the 
investment team. 
• Keep updating your evaluation criteria to 
meet current needs. Communicate these 
internal and external. 
Through a long-term process of collaborative 
arrangement the science based opportunity can be 
developed to fulfill the expected needs: strategic or 
financial returns.  
 
Dynamic compensation: 
• Be sure to provide entrepreneurial autonomy in the 
process (organizational, financial, ownership).  
• Be prepared to terminate projects that do not live 
up to expectations. 
Idiosyncratic The investors have no common developed history 
of the ventures development. Hence, investors will 
have a very different interpretation of the outcome 
of the venture opportunity.  
 
Linear compensation: 
• Create an organized forum where you 
efficiently can measure the opportunities up 
against one another. 
• Create a reporting system so that you can 
easily learn from your previous investments.  
Through communication with transdiciplinary 
stakeholders investors develop a common 
understanding of the possible development path of the 
opportunities. This can lower the risk, but also the 
potential Schumpeterian rents.  
 
Dynamic compensation: 
• Be selective in which investors you include in the 
evaluation process. 
• Ensure that you are the one who have the 
ownership of the project and the one who 
determine the exit strategy. 
Information 
asymmetry  
There is a high degree of information asymmetry 
between entrepreneur and investor, due to the 
buyer / seller relationship.  
 
Linear compensation: 
• Rely on opinions from experts and well-
known co-investors. 
• Focus on a specific industry and investment 
stage. 
• Enforce tight and well-defined milestones, 
and observe and evaluate the development.  
Dynamic strategies diminish the information gab 
between investor and entrepreneur. The collaborative 
arrangement can however also lower the 
Schumpeterian rent and make the outcomes too 
predictable for competing investors. 
 
Dynamic compensation: 
• Be sure that you do not share your knowledge with 
others unintended.  
• Beware that your unique information is a valuable 
currency for exchange between other network 
actors. 
• Be sure to provide autonomy to the entrepreneur in 
the development process (organizational, financial, 
ownership).  
Tabel 2. The effects of evaluation approaches on evaluation conditions 
The present debate on criteria for evaluation and the evaluation process as such, is both 
interesting and relevant. Projects on the one hand needs to be genuine innovative and hence 
associated with a high level of risk in order to hold promises of yielding Schumpeterian rents. On 
the other hand, a too high level of risk may obstruct the selection by preventing any reliable 
prediction and hence the meaningful use of any of the criteria put forward. Adding to the 
difficulties of evaluation, venture managers only in rare cases hold all the needed competence for 
assessing the quality of the underlying technology and the related product features. Each of these 
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central elements leads to the belief that what is missing is the underlying knowledge, which can 
create a foundation for decision-making (and therefore evaluation). The missing stepping stone 
in preparing for the evaluation process is access to relevant knowledge that will improve the 
decision-making process. The type of actions needed to develop such knowledge is best obtained 
by following the guidelines of the dynamic evaluation approaches.   
A growing body of innovation literature and practice of venture management stress that the value 
assessment of new science based opportunities should happen as a process which is proceeding 
from the beginning from the project. The below quote from a venture manager illustrate this fact.  
“Some of Danisco’s most profitable investments are made proactively by 
searching and choosing projects. By addressing the issue of which areas 
they see as special potential, entrepreneurs were searched for. An 
example was in the US where Danisco were in contact with two 
entrepreneurs and asked them to develop a project Danisco had come 
across. The process of selecting a project was hereby turned upside 
down. This ended up with a 300 million $ company now headed by the 
two entrepreneurs and yielding Danisco an over normal profit. (Lars 
Dybkjaer, Venture Partner, Danisco) 
In a corporate venture context some argue that the complexity imbedded in the science based 
ventures can be reviled by participating in the early process of the idea development (Husted and 
Vintergaard, 2004). Different from the linear strategies which builds on criteria lists, dynamic 
corporate venture viewpoints argues that venture investors should engage in the very early 
phases of the venture process (Vintergaard, 2005; Munk and Vintergaard, 2004). Such strategy 
would facilitate the direction of the venture opportunity, but also lower the asymmetric 
information. One of the interviewees further illuminated the respect and credibility the investor 
gain from the entrepreneur when you engage early:  
“You can better manage potential cultural barriers when you enter early. 
These barriers are often costly to solve later on… It does not have to be 
expensive to test a market potential. Often the entrepreneurs demand a 
considerable amount of money in order to test the market potential. The 
point is that when they can present the idea in a flashy powerpoint for the 
potential investors they can do the same with potential customers. (Jacob 
Bratting Pedersen, Investment Director, Olicom) 
 
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 182  
Science based ventures often develop in unforeseeable directions and it can be very difficult to 
predict the outcome of the process (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). It has been known that early 
stage engagement in the venturing process can ensure that the corporate venture investors can 
influence the development in a deceived direction (Vintergaard, 2005). One of the interviewees 
argues: 
“…Some products have multiple uses. How can you make an extreme 
return yield with products that have an obvious potential for diversity?...” 
(Susanne Forsingdal, Partner, ATP Private Equity Partners) 
 
By participating early in the process of testing knowledge for the entrepreneurial process, the 
outcome of the innovation will also be more socially robust (Gibbons et al., 1994). This will 
additionally lower the need for transferring risk to the entrepreneur, as a more clear and common 
goal will be achieved. As a positive effect, early stages involvement also diminishes the 
asymmetric information embedded in the project, as the corporate venture investor will become 
more involved in the development. This will in principle also result in better exploitation of the 
staged investments, as the stages can be better defined and evaluated. Through this process the 
venture specific information reveals in the development process – lowering the level of 
asymmetric information and hence also opening for a more qualified use of the linear criteria 
lists. This changes the venture process from selection to reshaping. In conclusion, adopting a 
dynamic approach to evaluation will better overcome the evaluation conditions embedded in 
venture investments, but also reinforce the most commonly used evaluation strategies.  
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4. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
While the dynamics of the early phases of the venture process has been the overarching theme of 
this thesis. Trying to condense and convey a single message out of the collective studies can be a 
challenge. This is especially true in light of the grounded methodology used for developing the 
content of this thesis: an approach that focuses on progressive and emergent knowledge 
production and implies that the very object of my research is constantly evolving. Also, since my 
own knowledge of the academic field of the early phases of corporate venturing and its 
theoretical and empirical arguments has been under continuous development, the reader will 
quite properly also experience a change in the style of the arguments from my early work to the 
later studies. This development has made the later work more analytical and more detailed. This 
chapter will draw some comprehensive conclusions from the work presented here – a supplement 
to the individual conclusions in the studies. While this section continues to draw on the work of 
other authors, it primarily strives to survey and summarize the work already presented in this 
thesis.  
 
This thesis makes two main contributions to the current literature on corporate venturing: First it 
argues that the literature lacks sufficient attention to the early phases of the venturing process. 
Secondly, it stresses overemphasises on a linear way of thinking that often can be misleading. 
Other corners of the scientific community (which is often included in the innovation process) 
and the community of corporate venture firms have a different approach to the development and 
evaluation of innovations. Since corporate ventures are highly dependent on science-based 
innovations, an alternative corporate venture process is called for. Being part of this new 
approach requires a complementary interpretation of the way corporate venture firms operate and 
a particular attention to the early phases of the process. This thesis accordingly proposes several 
new dimensions for a non-linear and proactive approach to developing new venture ideas, 
discovering opportunities and preparing for evaluation. This creates a collective contribution that 
encompasses arguments about both the phases in the venture process and theirs interconnection. 
One may argue that what is unique about the early phases is not only that this is the first part of 
the venture process, but also that here resources are at one and the same time brought together 
and evaluated. Leaving this phase unattended will neglect the complexity of managing a 
corporate venture, but also leave out valuable information to the later stages. 
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The thesis has presented arguments that contribute to a more interactive model where each of the 
individual activities in the process does not necessarily follow in a fixed chronological order 
(Cloutier and Boehlje, 2002). As argued by Kline and Rosenberg (1986):  
“In the linear model, there are no feedbacks from sales figures or from 
individual users. But all of these forms of feedback are essential to 
evaluation of performance, to formulation of the next steps forward, and 
to assessment of competitive position” (p. 286)  
In this process Christensen and Lundvall (2004), argues that different academic perspectives can 
be brought in. Such an approach contributes to the way fellow authors and corporate venture 
firms see the business model. While the corporate venture model keeps many of the dimensions 
that have been derived from previous findings, this thesis ads new perspectives; in particular, it 
shows how knowledge is created in networks to facilitate the dynamism involved in the process. 
This has led to the construction of a new dynamic model, which draws on the main conclusions 
from the studies included in this thesis.    
  
4.1 A new dynamic model    
The focus of this thesis has been on a new and more dynamic corporate venture model, which 
focuses on the early stages of the venture process. It is dynamic in the sense that it approaches 
corporate venturing from a non-linear, knowledge creating and network perspective. My work 
has particularly contributed to existing literature by focusing on the need for rethinking the way 
in which new innovative ventures are developed, discovered and evaluated in the context of 
corporate venturing. While each of the different activities of the traditional process and pipeline 
model for corporate venturing are to some extent still relevant, it is argued that the tasks should 
be analysed in a more interconnected way (Wright and Robbie, 1998). Particularly the thesis has 
highlighted the relevant interconnectedness in the venture process which is driven by 
mechanisms through which knowledge is transferred, but also by which new knowledge, and 
learning, is created and tested.  
Different from much previous literature on corporate venturing I have approached the task from 
a knowledge management and network perspective so the model below highlights and conclude 
on some of the overall dimensions of this new approach. Using these theoretical perspectives 
fills some of the current gabs in the literature as focus is more on learning and interactivity and 
less on planning of events. The below early stage knowledge creation model for corporate 
venturing retains the familiar corporate venture activities (e.g. Burgelman et al., 1996), but they 
are connected and analysed differently. In this model the previously known dimensions of 
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corporate venturing are supplemented with the early stage focus and the interactivity and 
dynamics of the process. Hence the progression is supplemented with interactive dimensions.  
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Figure 3. The early stage knowledge creation model for corporate venturing 
 
The model illustrates how the corporate venture’s venture base, its ability to make discoveries 
and prepare an investment evaluation is highly dependent on the kind of knowledge from which 
activities and results are created. The model makes the distinction between activities and results, 
a distinction previously made by Burgelman et al. (1996: 3). In contrast to e.g. Burgelman, 
however, the activities in this model are driven by the knowledge creation and learning processes 
which leads to the results in the model. The outcome and quality of the results will naturally 
depend on the internal and external knowledge creating activities. However, the results will also 
have a significant impact on future knowledge creating activities. Based on the above model 
there are three distinct elements of the knowledge creating activities that in particular needs 
further explanation: 
• Knowledge creation and learning between activities 
• Network: Internal and external learning 
• Contextualized knowledge 
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4.1.1 Knowledge creation and learning between activities 
In the above model one process does not necessarily lead chronologically to the next (Burgelman 
et al. 1996; Reynolds and Miller, 1992). Therefore, while the model creates an awareness of 
which distinct critical activities are called for when managing the early stages of the venturing 
process, it also illustrates that they are not always logically connected as on a “conveyer belt” 
from basic science to new prosperous ventures from which results can be harvested. The new 
model includes a dynamic and interactive approach where knowledge of each phase in the early 
stage requires knowledge of past and future tasks. As argued by Kline and Rosenberg (1986): 
“We have already seen that innovation is neither smooth nor linear, nor 
often well-behaved. Rather, it is complex, variegated, and hard to 
measure…” (p. 285-286)  
In contrast to the model of innovation offered by Burgelman et al. (1996), the early stage 
knowledge creation model for corporate venturing pays particular attention to the knowledge 
creation and learning that takes place between the various activities. There are a number of 
reasons why knowledge creation in corporate venturing is a key element. Firstly, this approach 
pays more attention to how knowledge is created and hence what drives the ventures forward, 
than it does to mapping the development. Secondly, focus on knowledge creation reveals 
valuable information about potential value of the venture. Analysing each of the activities in the 
venture process is still relevant, but greater awareness of the underlying knowledge creation and 
learning, which takes place between activities and results when reaching backward and forward 
in the innovation process, is still needed. As an example, Study V (Vintergaard and Husted, 
Submitted) argues that corporate ventures cannot prepare for making an investment evaluation, 
unless they have some knowledge of the underlying science based opportunities (from the 
venture base). During such a process the investor strives to gain as much information as possible 
of what has lead to the science based opportunity in order to make a qualified investment 
evaluation. During this process the investor gains better insight into the technology, the market, 
the customers etc., but also minimizes information and knowledge asymmetry to the 
entrepreneur. While it may not seem logical that investors need to focus their attention on the 
prerequisites for new venture formation, the fact is that investors do need this knowledge in 
order to prepare for a valid evaluation. If investors do not hold such knowledge themselves, they 
need at least to have a network of people who do, and from whom they can learn. Study V 
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further illustrates the fact that a corporate venture investor’s capacity to evaluate science based 
opportunities can only be developed if knowledge of the venture base is included in the process.  
Likewise, Study III (Husted and Vintergaard, 2004) stresses that the venture base can only 
develop robust and innovative knowledge for new venture opportunities if the knowledge is 
tested against market powers. New products and services need to be produced as entrepreneurs 
have a broader knowledge of market conditions and knowledge about what investors are looking 
for, i.e., an awareness of the later activities in the process. In a similar vein, Husted and 
Vintergaard (2004) argue that especially investors pursuing corporate venture strategies can 
influence the characteristics and quality of new venture ideas. During this process corporate 
ventures need to look forward in the process in order to anticipate future demand. As will be 
explicated later, proactive venture evaluation requires a combination of internal and external 
knowledge, and demands negotiation (contextualization) between them. Such knowledge is 
developed through interaction with a diversified set of actors. In Study I (Munk and Vintergaard, 
2004) develop a 2*2 matrix from which they argue for how venture investors could be more 
known in society and also how their role and capabilities could be more actively deployed in 
managing innovation.  
Additionally, Vintergaard (2005) (Study IV) makes the argument that discovery of 
entrepreneurial opportunities demand that the corporate venture firm go back to the initial phases 
of the process, to understand what developmental signs to look for. More specifically, the study 
argues that the development process of new venture opportunities is not always straightforward 
and progressive but can take many different routes and end up with many different results. A 
subject for later studies could be to see whether these routes can be categorized. While recent 
research has argued that innovations travels and develops according to unforeseeable patterns 
(e.g. Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Burgelman et al., 1996) it could be of great advantage if 
investors could predict these, or at least know of some of the potential outcomes.  
The early stage knowledge creation model for corporate venturing illustrates that sometimes the 
steps in the process are left out or acquire their relevance only later in the process. Put 
differently, we can say that, while the model illustrates a possible progression of the venture, it 
does not argue that there will always be one. Most opportunities will never develop very far 
(Reynolds and Miller, 1992), still less will be evaluated by venture investors and only a very few 
will end up as a venture firm exited through a trade sale or an IPO. A further complicating matter 
is the value that is created in one part of the activities does not necessarily develop in the way 
that it was initially expected. Kline and Rosenberg (1986) stress in this connection that: 
“There is a further critical aspect of the innovation process that it is not 
illuminated by the black-box approach. That is, innovations will often 
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generate benefits fare from where from the industries in which the 
originated. It turns out to be extraordinary difficult to ‘map’ the costs and 
benefits of many innovations within any single framework of industrial 
classification” (p. 280) 
As an example, the value that was once perceived in the venture base may very well find a 
different use. Study IV (Vintergaard, 2005) illustrates this point well: The development process 
of an opportunity is very difficult to anticipate. Ideas go through many stages before their actual 
value is appreciated by the investor and capitalised upon. Following this argument Kline and 
Rosenberg (1986) makes a further point that:  
“In an ideal world of omniscient technical people, one would get the 
design of the innovation workable and optimized the first time. In the real 
world of inadequate information, high uncertainty, and fallible people, 
nothing like this happens. Shortcomings and failures are part of the 
learning process that creates innovation of every kind. Innovation 
accordingly demands feedback, and effective innovation demands rapid, 
accurate feedback with appropriate follow-on actions. Radical, or 
revolutionary, innovation prospers best when provided with multiple 
sources of informational input” (p. 286)  
The kinds of input that influence the development process derives from the knowledge created 
both within the corporate venture, in its network and more importantly between the two (Zahra 
and Nielsen, 2002). 
Seen from a management standpoint, the dynamic realities of the venture process naturally 
complicate predictions of future outcomes for corporate investors. As illustrated in many of the 
studies of this thesis, venture opportunities can easily change when influenced by internal forces 
or exogenous shocks. In order to turn this reality into a competitive advantage, venture managers 
will have a difficult time applying a “wait and see” approach. A passive investor strategy will 
have to accept the natural progression of the venture. Such an approach brings several 
difficulties, as venture investments have to yield both financial and strategic returns. A more 
active approach to the investment process, however, can turn the dynamic nature of the venture 
development to their advantage. In contrast to the previous innovation models, this one helps 
venture managers to see the investment process in a holistic manner and as a process that can be 
changed. Through active involvement (like it was mentioned in Study I), venture investors can 
influence the direction of the venture and more easily target strategic intents. To gain these 
advantages the corporate venture will develop organisational routines which can follow and 
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monitor the development of the venture. This requires a constant evaluation of previous 
developments and a well-defined intention of a future direction. From a knowledge creation and 
network perspective, corporate venture investors can facilitate this unforeseeable process through 
active involvement in the innovation process, milestone/monitors system which can detect the 
direction of the venture, and strong and weak network ties to key stakeholder that can influence 
the innovation process. 
This thesis has based its arguments on a qualitative methodology. This approach has functioned 
well for describing the early phase dynamics, but not the impact of its activities. A task left for 
future studies could be to measure the significant of the results of this thesis. A quantitative 
analysis like this could help to provide answers to questions such as: How much and when 
should investors influence the direction of new venture opportunities? What kind of network ties 
should investors make use of in the different phases of the venture process? To what degree can 
venture investors predict the direction and outcome of future venture opportunities? Such 
quantitative studies could be designed using longitudinal data from venture investors and their 
investment opportunities. The analysis could include the correlation between venture opportunity 
development and the activities undertaken by the investor.                
The present thesis is limited to focus on the early phases of the process. The later phases are also 
illustrated in the model, though they are not included in the analysis. It is clear, however, that 
this part of the process could benefit from including a dynamic dimension where forward and 
backward loops are included – a task left to future studies. From my interview with venture 
mangers I have become aware that, already before the investment is made, investors are very 
focused on the exit options of a given investment. If there are no significant possibilities for 
predicting a profitable exit through a trade sale, an IPO, or something of that order, then the 
investments will not be made. Similar results show that:  
“…many business owners fail miserably at devising exit strategies, 
which include selling the company, going public or passing the business 
to a family member. That's not because the strategies are too 
complicated. They're just overlooked… Exit strategies are critical and 
should guide what you do on a day-to-day basis…” (Dillon, 1997: 1)  
There are other examples of how the late stages could also benefit from a new analytical 
approach. Particular attention should be paid to how investors should balance their influence of 
the venture in a desired direction.   
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4.1.2 Networks: Internal and external learning 
As illustrated in the early stage model for corporate venturing, the knowledge and learning that 
takes place to stimulate the venture activities are a result of combined knowledge both from 
within the corporate venture and its network (Zahra and Nielsen, 2002). As argued by 
Christensen (1992): 
“…the direction of search [for knowledge] is determined by the existing 
knowledge base in the firm and by exogenous stimuli e.g. from 
competition or other environmental influences” (p. 84) 
As the later section will illustrate, it is in this intersection of knowledge contextualisation that 
most of the learning takes place.    
In networks, research results and leading edge knowledge are exchanged. Both types can also 
function as steppingstones for new knowledge creation (Mønsted, 2003). The ability to network 
has been well argued for in small innovative firms, a capacity that not all large firms possess 
(Mønsted, 2003, 2004). Small firms in the start-up process are forced to network because of a 
lack of resources, whereas many established firms can rely on their own resources. As illustrated 
in Study II (Jørgensen and Vintergaard, 2006), however, many large firms use networks as a 
window to opportunities. As indicated earlier in this thesis, knowledge production and 
innovative processes depend on network formations regardless of the size of the firm. Powell et 
al. (1996) makes the point that in high-tech sectors: 
“…no single firm has all the internal capabilities necessary for success” 
(p. 117)  
The locus of innovation in knowledge intensive sectors is, therefore, to be found in networks of 
learning rather than in individual firms. 
Husted and Vintergaard (2004) (Study III) argues that building a solid and valuable foundation 
for new venture opportunities (i.e. the venture base) comes from collaboration in networks, 
which are both a ticket to the network and a vehicle for rapid and early communication of news 
about opportunities and obstacles (Frederiksen, Hemlin and Husted, 2005). Kreiner and 
Schultz (1993) see networking as an intensification of information and knowledge sharing with 
the purpose of discovering and generating new ideas. Cooperation with the network, therefore, 
becomes vital since it provides the corporate venture firm with access to resources, skills and 
competences from a broad range of firms, universities etc. and thus provides firms with 
complementary knowledge. Collaborative research and development function as an eye-opener 
for accessing ideas and knowledge from a variety of sources.  
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Within networks, knowledge can be presented and tested in a community of interaction 
constituted by actors from many different disciplines. This makes the results of research more 
socially robust (Nowotny et al., 2001). However, these new structures and processes can make it 
difficult for people and firms to identify and specify their individual contribution. This raises 
new problems for corporate ventures as property rights to the venture, for example, become less 
easy to determine. While this thesis argues for the potential benefits of creating knowledge in 
networks, it leaves these potential challenges for future studies. 
When addressing the early phases of the venture process, management will, as indicated above, 
benefit from working with both relational and structural embeddedness. These network 
conditions provide the foundation for venture investors to adapt, coordinate, and safeguard 
exchanges effectively (Jørgensen and Vintergaard, 2006). Relational embeddedness characterises 
relationships to other network partners, and the corporate venture will have to learn what can be 
gained from both strong and weak tie binding. Likewise, venture investors also have to manage 
structural embeddedness (the positional perspectives). Structural embeddedness emphasizes the 
informational value of the structural position a corporate venture company can occupy in the 
network (Gulati, 1998). If corporate venture managers place themselves between two or more 
unconnected actors it will offer a very powerful position to set agendas for future developments 
(cf. Burt´s (1992) argument on structural holes). This position, for example, can be found 
between the entrepreneur and a co-investor.  
 
4.1.3 Contextualized knowledge 
It is argued in several of the studies in this thesis, as well as in the literature review, that 
knowledge creation in the early phases of the venture process has to take place within a broader 
audience - one that is heterogeneous and transdiciplinary (Gibbons et al., 1994). This 
collaborative arrangement is often referred to as Mode 2 research (Nowotny et al., 2001), Triple 
Helix (Ernø-Kjølhede, 2001; Ernø-Kjølhede, Husted, Mønsted and Wenneberg, 2003; 
Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1996, 1998) etc. As illustrated in the “early stage knowledge 
creation model for corporate venturing”, negotiation and contextualization of knowledge takes 
place in each of the activities and between the corporate venture and its external network. 
Interaction with the external network and the built-in process of contextualization can help the 
corporate venture to avoid getting caught up in its own dominant logic. This dominant logic 
filters out ideas and behaviours that do not match the corporate venture’s understanding of its 
business and makes it hard for new ideas to survive. Burgelman et al. (1996) declares that the 
only way to make unfitted ideas survive is by having some level of “strategic dissonance”. 
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However the transformation process that runs from one strategic intention to another can be very 
difficult.   
Firm-specific resources can be thought of as the strengths and weaknesses of 
particular companies, and can be of both a tangible and an intangible nature (Wernerfelt, 
1995). When companies form a network, it is exactly these strengths and weaknesses they seek 
to combine, to foster resource synergy and to test their knowledge. Combining supplementary 
and hitherto only tenuously related knowledge bases is considered to be particularly valuable in 
contextualising knowledge and ideas for creativity and innovation (Powell et al., 1998). 
Collaboration with firms assessing complementary resources could provide an opportunity for 
the corporate venture to compensate for weaknesses in their existing resources, and accordingly 
allow the corporate venturing firm to combine the resources of network partners with their 
own resource sets, thereby creating an enhanced resource base for contextualisation.  
An important element of working with contextualized and negotiated knowledge production is 
early involvement in the development process. This argument was stressed in most of the studies 
of this thesis. From the corporate venture literature and Vintergaard and Husted (Submitted) we 
know that investment criteria are part of the evaluation strategy. However, an investment 
analysis based on the criteria alone will always reflect the information asymmetry of the 
investment. Instead, the inclusion of a broader set of actors with different backgrounds and 
perceptions to make the evaluation will make it more cohesive. This will additionally reduce the 
need to transfer risk to the entrepreneur as a clearer and more common goal will be achieved. 
This will also result in better exploitation of the staged investments, as the stages can better be 
defined and evaluated.  
Through the contextualisation process, venture-specific information will be revealed and hereby 
lower the level of asymmetric information. This changes the venture process from selection to 
reshaping. In Study IV (Vintergaard, 2005) it is claimed that only participation in the core 
collaborative arrangements will lead the corporate venture to be competitive. An important, but 
rarely noted discussion in this thesis concerns the specific capabilities that are needed for 
assigning meaning to the different knowledge resources from the network. An area for future 
studies could be how contextualisation can be systematically organized and how knowledge can 
subsequently can be condensed into strategic action.  
From a management standpoint, working with the early phases (and most likely also the later 
phases) demands a broader understanding of how knowledge is created and tested. In the early 
stages, contextualization is illustrated by vertical processes between the corporate venture 
organization and its external network. Nowotny et al. (2001) argues that a space (an agora) has 
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to be created where issues concerning venture ideas and their potential outcome can be debated. 
Investors can greatly benefit from addressing relational and structural embeddedness when 
developing this space for contextualisation. For this to happen it is important that the corporate 
venture firms develop a reputation in the market as it will also enable them to receive more 
knowledge for innovation, more venture proposals, make them better prepared for evaluation, 
and provide them with a central point in the network for contextualizing knowledge. Thus it is 
important that the corporate venture becomes the preferred partner in the network of 
entrepreneurs, but also in the broader network of related venture investors, universities, 
innovation centres etc. Under these structures investors have to develop a conscious 
understanding of how to test knowledge of the venture’s future development opportunities and 
their own capacity to manage these. 
 
By bringing together the arguments of this thesis in this chapter I hope it has contributed to a 
more profound focus on the early phases of the venture process and also added important 
dynamic dimension to the process. This contributions have uncovered important insight to how 
new venture opportunities are created, discovered and evaluated. Equally important, arguments 
have been made that the development process to undertake these actives is driven by learning 
process backward and forward in the value chain and in between a variety of actors. Such insight 
makes the venture process less easy to describe. It does however create a valuable foundation for 
developing management tools and future theories.  
As the above conclusion show, this thesis has developed new components of a corporate venture 
model. However, much work is still needed in the field and there are still many areas that require 
further attention. Sir Isaac Newton has often been quoted for saying:  
“If I have been able to see further, it was only because I stood on the 
shoulders of giants”4.  
Likewise the contribution of this thesis has only gained its momentum because of previous 
researcher’s insightful work. However the thesis contributes new and insightful provisional 
theories to the field and open up for new and future discussions. Hopefully the arguments 
presented will also serves as a source of inspiration for future authors. 
                                                 
4 A quotation from Sir Issac Newton´s letter to Robert Hooke (February 5, 1676). 
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6. EXHIBITS 
6.1 Exhibit: Complementary studies 
Accompanying the 5 core studies of this thesis I have written several working papers, 
managerial/ policy studies, book contributions etc. during the thesis period but which are not 
included as a core part of this thesis. The separate, but interconnected studies are: 
 
Working papers: 
• Jensen, N. W. and Vintergaard, C. (2002): "Vækstfremmende faktorer for den danske 
venturekapitalbranche". MPP working paper 
• Pedersen, J. and Vintergaard, C. (2001): ”Det danske venture kapital marked - en oversigt 
anno 2000”. MPP working paper 
 
Accepted work in progress: 
• Isaksson, Vintergaard, Ezkowitz and Klofsten “Supporting entrepreneurship and innovation: 
The venture capital process” Book published by the SNS - Centre for Business and Policy 
Studies. 
• Vintergaard, C. (2005). “En ny bølge af ledelsesmæssige udfordringer i corporate venturing” 
Ledelse og Erhvervsøkonomi”. 
 
Managerial/ policy publications: 
• Nielsen, A. P & Vintergaard, C. (2006). “Venture kapital – mere end blot kapital” 
Submission to the GEM report 
• Vintergaard, C. (2006) ”Kortlægning af Danske Universiteters Uddannelsestilbud Indenfor 
Entrepreneurship – Version 2”. Published by The Danish Venture Capital Association. 
• Vintergaard, C. (2004) ”Kortlægning af Danske Universiteters Uddannelsestilbud Indenfor 
Entrepreneurship”. Published by The Danish Venture Capital Association.   
• Vintergaard, C. (2004) ”Iværksætter-Danmark”. Civiløkonomen 12, december, 2004. 
• Vintergaard, C. (2001) ”Corporate Venturing - en strategi for virksomheder under konstant 
forandring” Published by Copenhagen Business School and Schrøder • Lucas & Partnere – 
Virksomhedsmæglere og kapitalformidling.  
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6.2 Co-author statements 
Study I  
Munk, B. K and Vintergaard, C. (2004). Accentuating the role of venture capitalists in systems 
of innovation. (VEST) Journal for Science and Technology Studies. 1-2(17): 65. 
 
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 214  
Study II.  
Jørgensen, H. and Vintergaard, C. (2006). Connecting Company Strategy and Network Identity. 
In: Managing Dynamic Networks Organisational Perspectives of Technology Enabled Inter-Firm 
Collaboration. Poulymenakou A. and Klein S. (eds.) Heidelberg: 
Springer.
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Study III. 
Husted, K and Vintergaard, C. (2004). Stimulating innovation through corporate venture bases. 
Journal of World Business. 39(3): 296-306.  
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Study V.  
Vintergaard, C. and Husted, K. (Submitted). Corporate Venture Companies Linear and Dynamic 
Evaluation Strategies for Science Based Venture Opportunities. In: Handbook of Corporate 
Entrepreneurship by Shaker Zahra. Elger. 
 
The Early Phases of Corporate Venturing 
 
Christian Vintergaard      Page 217  
6.3 Danish abstract 
Dette værk er indgivet til Ph.D. bedømmelse under Forskerskolen i Viden og Ledelse ved Institut 
for Ledelse, Politik og Filosofi ved Copenhagen Business School som en del af opfyldelse af 
kravene for at opnå graden Ph.D. Målet med denne afhandling er, at fremsætte en kombination af 
nye teoretisk perspektiver og ledelsesmetoder, som tilsammen vil give et bedre indblik i de 
tidlige stadier af corporate venturing. Dette vil inkludere nye perspektiver på corporate 
venturing, eftersom afhandlingen videreudvikler akademiske og praktiske værktøjer for 
beslutningsprocesser. 
Afhandling bidrager med to overordnede tilføjelser til den nuværende litteratur om corporate 
venture. For det første, sætter den fokus på de vigtige, men oversete, tidlige faser ved venture 
processen. Dette indebærer de forhold, nødvendige for udvikling af nye innovative venture 
muligheder (venture basen), opdagelse af investeringsmuligheder og endelig forberedelse til 
evaluering af investeringsmuligheder. Venture basen er de karakteristika og forhold der for et 
firma og dets miljø kan udgøre ressourcer til opstart af nye ventures. Grundet ventures 
innovative natur bliver det, at opdage entreprenelle muligheder en hovedudfordring der 
involverer en diversificeret gruppe af aktører. Den tidlige fase inkluderer også specifikke 
vidensskabende handlinger der skal udføres for at kunne evaluere de mange 
investeringsmuligheder.  
For det andet bibringer afhandlingen nye perspektiver til hvorledes aktiviteterne i de tidlige faser 
er forbundet i værdikæden. I modsætning til tidligere litteratur, hvor venture processer 
præsenteres som lineære og forudsigelige, demonstrerer dette værk, at en mere dynamisk tilgang 
er tiltrængt, en tilgang der er særlig fokuseret på hvordan vidensprocesser og læringsfremmende 
aktiviteter driver venture processen, lige fra udviklingen af nye ideer til deres betydning 
evalueres.  
Disse bidrag trækker på teoretiske perspektiver fra den nuværende corporate venture litteratur 
(såsom Block and MacMillan, 1993; Burgelman, 1984, 1996; Chesbrough, 2000; Zahra, 1991) 
og komplementerende litteratur der tilvejebringer et netværk og videns perspektiv (såsom 
Gibbons et al. 1994; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Powell et al., 1996). Disse perspektiver er 
særligt gennemslagskraftige i deres argumentation om innovations processer og evolutionær 
udvikling. De bringer også ny indsigt om den type læringsproces som corporate ventures er en 
del af når de udvikler og evaluerer nye venture muligheder. 
I modsætning til en traditionel monografisk Ph.D. afhandling, så præsenterer denne afhandling 
sine resultater i fem (5) uafhængige men forbundne undersøgelser, udgivet i internationale peer-
reviewed tidsskrifter og bog kapitler. Udover disse studier så indeholder afhandlingen også en 
teoretisk introduktion og metode, en litteratur gennemgang og en konklusion. 
TITLER I PH.D.SERIEN:
2002
1. Jens Kristian Elkjær-Larsen
Process Value Management
En empirisk og teoretisk undersøgelse af
nogle elementer og deres anvendelse set i
et situationsbetinget ledelsesperspektiv
2. Niels Thyge Thygesen
Målstyret ledelse
3. Dan L. Otzen
Det styringsorienterede
regnskabsvæsens teoretiske forankring
og samspil med produktionsfilosofien
Just-in-Time
4. Jens Gammelgaard
Gaining Competences in the Multinational
Corporation through International
Acquisitions: An Investigation of Foreign
Danish Acquisitions 1994-1998
5. Henrik L. Bang
Strategic organisation of construction
contracting firms: Ownership, form,
growth and boundaries
6. Peter Engelschmidt
The War Machines of Madness
A Transversal Inquiry into the Sectored
Psychiatry in Denmark
7. Steen Vallentin
Pensionsinvesteringer, etik og offentlighed
– en systemteoretisk analyse af offentlig
meningsdannelse
8. Eirik J. Irgens
Å skape forutsigbarhet i en omskiftelig
verden: En studie av kontinuitet, endring
og ideologi i en hyperturbulent virksom-
het
9. Heine Thorsgaard Larsen
Teoriens konsekvens
10. Panu Kalmi
On the (in)stability of employee owner-
ship: Estonian evidence and lessons for
transition economies
11. Karen Lisa Goldschmidt Salamon
Beåndet ledelse – en antropologisk ana-
lyse af managementkonsulenters ny-
åndelige diskurs og netværker
12. Bent Gringer
DJØFernes kompetencer og
kompetenceudvikling
Bind 1 & 2
13. Casper Rose
Essays on Corporate Governance and
Finance – a Law and Economics Approach
14. Fred Stronen
Strategy Formation from a Loosely
Coupled System Perspective
THE CASE OF FJORDLAND
15. Helle Zinner Henriksen
Performance, Pressures, and Politics:
Motivators for Adoption of
Interorganizational Information Systems
16. Martin Richter
Stochastic Differential Equations with
Applications in Economics and Finance
17. Allan Hansen
Produktudvikling og ledelseskriteriernes
performativitet – en aktør-netværk-ana
lyse af udviklingen af “den
konkurrencedygtige konstruktion”
18. Henrik Mathiesen
Managerial Ownership and
Financial Performance
19. Henrik Stener Pedersen
Quality Management in Outsourcing
Relationships – Framing a Supplier’s
Perspective
20. Lluís Armangué
La disputa como creación conjunta. Una
aproximación comunicativa al
procesamiento extrajudicial de disputas en
materia de consumo
21. Norman T. Sheehan
Reputation as a Driver in Knowledge-
Intensive Service Firms: An exploratory
study of the relationship between reputa-
tion and value creation in petroleum
exploration units
22. Esben Karmark
Organizational Identity in a Dualistic Sub-
culture – A Case Study of Organizational
Identity Formation in Lego Meia Interna-
tional
23. Christer Ekelund
How to Govern Relationships and
Established Commitments: A Study of
Standardized Products in Mature
Industrial Market
24. Connie Køhler Gudum
Managing variability in a supply chain:
An inventory control perspective
25. Árni Halldórsson
Third Party Logistics
-a means to configure logistics resources
and competencies-
26. Ken Henriksen
The Construction of Ethnic and Spatial
Identities. Everyday Forms of State
Mutation on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast
27. Rikke N. Ørngreen
Multimedia Teaching Cases
28. Øystein Rennemo
Partnering mellem foretak - en studie av
organiseringen av partnering og en ana-
lyse av rasjonalitetens rolle i denne
processen
2003
1. Jesper Aastrup
Networks Producing Intermodal Transport
2. Bo B. Nielsen
Managing Knowledge in International
Strategic Alliances: Theory and Practice
3. Juliana Hsuan Mikkola
Modularization in New Product Develop-
ment: Implications for Product Architec-
tures, Supply Chain Management, and In-
dustry Structures
4. Lone Vind Pedersen
KULTUREMER OG OVERSÆTTELSE
Et kontrastivt oversættelsesstudie af
kulturemer ekspliciteret som institutioner
i et italiensk-dansk perspektiv
5. Carmit Romano-Hvid
To See the Signs and Hear the CALL
A Speech Perception Training Study in a
Computer Assisted Language Learning
Environment
6. Birgitte Hein
Oversættelse af Verbo-Nominale
Prædikater i EU-tekster
– med udgangspunkt i støtteverbers
leksikaliseringsmønstre i dansk og fransk
7. Robert Neumann
Aspects of Institutional Investors’
Ownership, Portfolio Decisions
and Corporate Performance
8. Jan Pedersen
Narrativers anvendelser indenfor
turismeindustrien
Eller
En helterejse i Østjylland
Bind 1 + 2
9. Sidsel Vinge
Organisering og Reorganisering af
Medicinsk Arbejde på Sygehuse
10. Signe Svenningsen
ELECTRONIC PATIENT RECORDS AND
MEDICAL PRACTICE
Reorganization of Roles, Responsibilities,
and Risks
11. Michael René Kristiansson
Organisationsudvikling og
informationspolitik i vidensamfundet
– Øresundsuniversitetet som case
12. Daniel Görsch
Multi-Channel Integration in the Retail of
Physical Products
Towards a Holistic Model of Integration
Elements and Consumer Perceptions
13. Sami Boutaiba
Becoming a company
Narrative temporalities in new start-ups
14. John Scheuer
Patient forløb i praksis
– en analyse af en idés oversættelse i
mødet med praksis
15. Joyce Hartog McHenry
Management of Knowledge in Practice
– Learning to visualise competence
16. Bo Danø
Exchange Rate Exposure in Denmark
17. Robson Rocha
Work Systems Transformation: Factory
Re-organisation in Multinational
Companies
18. Finn Hansson
Forskningsevaluering, kvalitet og
organisation
– nye roller for forskningsevalueringen i
organisationer
19. Lise Backer
Virksomheder i samtale med samfundet
– Udviklingen i Shell’s identitet fra Rio til
Johannesburg
20. Norman T. Sheehan
Reputation as a Driver in Knowledge-
Intensive Service Firms: An exploratory
study of the relationship between
reputation and value creation in
petroleum exploration units
Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem
Samfundslitteratur
21. Betina Wolfgang Rennison
Offentlig ledelse i tekst, tal og tale
– en konstitutionskamp i tid og rum
22. Julie Sommerlund
Demarcation Lines and Boundary Objects:
Scientific Balancing Acts in Molecular
Microbiology
23. Bersant Hobdari
Does Owner(s) Identity Matter?
An Empirical Investigation of the Impact
of Corporate Governance Structures on
Capital Allocation, Investment and
Financial Constraints
24. Lars Nellemann Thisted
Mangfoldighedens dilemmaer
– Hvad livshistorier fortæller om identitet,
arbejde og integration
25. Søren H. Jensen
Arbejdsmiljø som organiserende koncept
– en sund strategi for busbranchen?
26. Jon O. Pedersen
Corporate Venture Capital
Establishing and Managing Multi-
Contextual Innovations
27. Harald Ness
Den sociale konstruksjon av aktører og
organisationsoppskrifter ved Aker Verdal
1971-2002 – En institusjonell analyse av
import og eksport av organisations-
oppskrifter ved en offshorebedrift
Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem
Samfundslitteratur
28. Maja Horst
Controversy and collectivity
– Articulations of Social and Natural Order
in Mass Mediated Representations of
Biotechnology
2004
1. Martin Grieger
Internet-based Electronic Marketplaces
and Supply Chain Management
2. Thomas Basbøll
LIKENESS
A Philosophical Investigation
3. Morten Knudsen
Beslutningens vaklen
En systemteoretisk analyse of modernise-
ringen af et amtskommunalt sundheds-
væsen 1980-2000
4. Lars Bo Jeppesen
Organizing Consumer Innovation
A product development strategy that is
based on online communities and allows
some firms to benefit from a distributed
process of innovation by consumers
5. Barbara Dragsted
SEGMENTATION IN TRANSLATION AND
TRANSLATION MEMORY SYSTEMS
An empirical investigation of cognitive
segmentation and effects of integrating
a TM system into the translation process
6. Jeanet Hardis
Sociale partnerskaber
Et socialkonstruktivistisk casestudie af
partnerskabsaktørers virkelighedsopfattelse
mellem identitet og legitimitet
7. Henriette Hallberg Thygesen
System Dynamics in Action
8. Carsten Mejer Plath
Strategisk økonomistyring
9. Annemette Kjærgaard
Knowledge Management as Internal
Corporate Venturing
– a Field Study of the Rise and Fall of a
Bottom-Up Process
10. Knut Arne Hovdal
De profesjonelle i endring
Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem
Samfundslitteratur
11. Søren Jeppesen
Environmental Practices and Greening
Strategies in Small Manufacturing
Enterprises in South Africa
– A Critical Realist Approach
12. Lars Frode Frederiksen
Industriel forskningsledelse
– på sporet af mønstre og samarbejde i
danske forskningsintensive virksomheder
13. Martin Jes Iversen
The Governance of GN Great Nordic
– in an age of strategic and structural
transitions 1939-1988
14. Lars Pynt Andersen
The Rhetorical Strategies of Danish TV
Advertising
A study of the first fifteen years with
special emphasis on genre and irony
15. Jakob Rasmussen
Business Perspectives on E-learning
16. Sof Thrane
The Social and Economic Dynamics
of Networks
– a Weberian Analysis of Three Formalised
Horizontal Networks
17. Lene Nielsen
Engaging Personas and Narrative
Scenarios – a study on how a user-
centered approach influenced the
perception of the design process in the
e-business group at AstraZeneca
18. S.J Valstad
Organisationsidentitet
Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem
Samfundslitteratur
19. Thomas Lyse Hansen
Six Essays on Pricing and Weather risk in
Energy Markets
20. Sabine Madsen
Emerging Methods – An Interpretive
Study of ISD Methods in Practice
21. Evis Sinani
The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment
on Efficiency, Productivity Growth and
Trade: An Empirical Investigation
22. Bent Meier Sørensen
Making Events Work
Or, How to Multiply Your Crisis
23. Pernille Schnoor
Brand Ethos
Om troværdige brand- og virksomheds-
identiteter i et retorisk og diskursteoretisk
perspektiv
24. Sidsel Fabech
Von welchem Österreich ist hier die Rede?
Diskursive forhandlinger og magtkampe
mellem rivaliserende nationale identitets-
konstruktioner i østrigske pressediskurser
25. Klavs Odgaard Christensen
Sprogpolitik og identitetsdannelse i
flersprogede forbundsstater
Et komparativt studie af Schweiz og
Canada
26. Dana B. Minbaeva
Human Resource Practices and
Knowledge Transfer in Multinational
Corporations
27. Holger Højlund
Markedets politiske fornuft
Et studie af velfærdens organisering i
perioden 1990-2003
28. Christine Mølgaard Frandsen
A.s erfaring
Om mellemværendets praktik i en trans-
formation af mennesket og subjektiviteten
29. Sine Nørholm Just
The Constitution of Meaning
– A Meaningful Constitution? Legitimacy,
identity, and public opinion in the debate
on the future of Europe
2005
1. Claus J. Varnes
Managing product innovation through
rules – The role of formal and structured
methods in product development
2. Helle Hedegaard Hein
Mellem konflikt og konsensus
– Dialogudvikling på hospitalsklinikker
3. Axel Rosenø
Customer Value Driven Product Innova-
tion – A Study of Market Learning in New
Product Development
4. Søren Buhl Pedersen
Making space
An outline of place branding
5. Camilla Funck Ellehave
Differences that Matter
An analysis of practices of gender and
organizing in contemporary workplaces
6. Rigmor Madeleine Lond
Styring af kommunale forvaltninger
7. Mette Aagaard Andreassen
Supply Chain versus Supply Chain
Benchmarking as a Means to Managing
Supply Chains
8. Caroline Aggestam-Pontoppidan
From an idea to a standard
The UN and the global governance of
accountants’ competence
9. Norsk ph.d. – afvist
10. Vivienne Heng Ker-ni
An Experimental Field Study on the
Effectiveness of Grocer Media Advertising
Measuring Ad Recall and Recognition,
Purchase Intentions and Short-Term Sales
11. Allan Mortensen
Essays on the Pricing of Corporate Bonds
and Credit Derivatives
12. Remo Stefano Chiari
Figure che fanno conoscere
Itinerario sull’idea del valore cognitivo e
espressivo della metafora e di altri tropi da
Aristotele e da Vico fino al cognitivismo
contemporaneo
13. Anders McIlquham-Schmidt
Strategic Planning and Corporate
Performance
An integrative research review and a
meta-analysis of the strategic planning
and corporate performance literature
from 1956 to 2003
14. Jens Geersbro
The TDF – PMI Case
Making Sense of the Dynamics of
Business Relationships and Networks
15 Mette Andersen
Corporate Social Responsibility in Global
Supply Chains
Understanding the uniqueness of firm
behaviour
16. Eva Boxenbaum
Institutional Genesis: Micro – Dynamic
Foundations of Institutional Change
17. Peter Lund-Thomsen
Capacity Development, Environmental
Justice NGOs, and Governance: The Case
of South Africa
18. Signe Jarlov
Konstruktioner af offentlig ledelse
19. Lars Stæhr Jensen
Vocabulary Knowledge and Listening
Comprehension in English as a Foreign
Language
An empirical study employing data
elicited from Danish EFL learners
20. Christian Nielsen
Essays on Business Reporting
Production and consumption of strategic
information in the market for information
21. Marianne Thejls Fischer
Egos and Ethics of Management
Consultants
22. Annie Bekke Kjær
Performance management i Proces-
innovation
– belyst i et social-konstruktivistisk
perspektiv
23. Suzanne Dee Pedersen
GENTAGELSENS METAMORFOSE
Om organisering af den kreative gøren i
den kunstneriske arbejdspraksis
24. Benedikte Dorte Rosenbrink
Revenue Management
Økonomiske, konkurrencemæssige &
organisatoriske konsekvenser
25. Thomas Riise Johansen
Written Accounts and Verbal Accounts
The Danish Case of Accounting and
Accountability to Employees
26. Ann Fogelgren-Pedersen
The Mobile Internet: Pioneering Users’
Adoption Decisions
27. Birgitte Rasmussen
Ledelse i fællesskab – de tillidsvalgtes
fornyende rolle
28. Gitte Thit Nielsen
Remerger
– skabende ledelseskræfter i fusion og
opkøb
29. Carmine Gioia
A MICROECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
30. Ole Hinz
Den effektive forandringsleder: pilot,
pædagog eller politiker?
Et studie i arbejdslederes meningstilskriv-
ninger i forbindelse med vellykket gen-
nemførelse af ledelsesinitierede for-
andringsprojekter
31. Kjell-Åge Gotvassli
Et praksisbasert perspektiv på dynamiske
læringsnettverk i toppidretten
Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem
Samfundslitteratur
32. Henriette Langstrup Nielsen
Linking Healthcare
An inquiry into the changing perfor-
mances of web-based technology for
asthma monitoring
33. Karin Tweddell Levinsen
Virtuel Uddannelsespraksis
Master i IKT og Læring – et casestudie i
hvordan proaktiv proceshåndtering kan
forbedre praksis i virtuelle læringsmiljøer
34. Anika Liversage
Finding a Path
Labour Market Life Stories of
Immigrant Professionals
35. Kasper Elmquist Jørgensen
Studier i samspillet mellem stat og
erhvervsliv i Danmark under
1. verdenskrig
36. Finn Janning
A DIFFERENT STORY
Seduction, Conquest and Discovery
37. Patricia Ann Plackett
Strategic Management of the Radical
Innovation Process
Leveraging Social Capital for Market
Uncertainty Management
2006
1. Christian Vintergaard
Early Phases of Corporate Venturing
TITLER I ATV PH.D.-SERIEN
1992
1. Niels Kornum
Servicesamkørsel - organisation, økonomi
og planlægningsmetoder
1995
2. Verner Worm
Nordiske virksomheder i Kina
Kulturspecifikke interaktionsrelationer ved
nordiske virksomhedsetableringer i Kina
1999
3. Mogens Bjerre
Key Account Management of Complex
Strategic Relationships
An Empirical Study of the Fast Moving
Consumer Goods Industry
2000
4. Lotte Darsø
Innovation in the Making
Interaction Research with heterogeneous
Groups of Knowledge Workers creating
new Knowledge and new Leads
2001
5. Peter Hobolt Jensen
Managing Strategic Design Identities
The case of the Lego Developer Network
2002
6. Peter Lohmann
The Deleuzian Other of Organizational
Change – Moving Perspectives of the
Human
7. Anne Marie Jess Hansen
To lead from a distance: The dynamic
interplay between strategy and strategiz-
ing – A case study of the strategic
management process
2003
8. Lotte Henriksen
Videndeling
– om organisatoriske og ledelsesmæssige
udfordringer ved videndeling i praksis
9. Niels Christian Nickelsen
Arrangements of Knowing: Coordinating
Procedures Tools and Bodies in Industrial
Production – a case study of the collective
making of new products
2005
10. Carsten Ørts Hansen
Konstruktion af ledelsesteknologier og
effektivitet
